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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation outlines the role that futures markets for tradable permits can 
play in improving the performance of incentive based policies for environmental 
externalities.  An extensive literature on tradable permits exists.  However, to my 
knowledge, the role of futures contracts as an instrument for responding to permit price 
uncertainty has not been considered, nor has their pricing performance in this role been 
examined.  This research provides a theoretical description of how futures can be used to 
manage the price uncertainty associated with permit purchases.  It then evaluates if the 
futures contract performance for the former U.S. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and the existing 
EU Carbon Dioxide (CO2) futures markets are consistent with the theoretical 
constructs.  Overall, for the short time horizons examined, futures are the best 
information source regarding later permit prices for both markets examined.  Consistent 
with the theoretical model presented, this implies futures markets can be looked to as a 
forecast of the incremental costs of emission control.  The theory illustrates that firms can 
then use futures to eliminate the negative effects of permit price uncertainty and restore 
policy compliance cost minimization.  These results demonstrate that an ideal futures 
market for emission permits can enhance policy performance.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Tradable permit systems offer policymakers an incentive based means to correct 
for externalities.  By establishing rules for exchange and compliance, these systems allow 
permits to be traded in a market setting.  Through assignment of property rights to 
permits, ownership of the right to emit a controlled pollutant is created. The permit total 
determines the maximum allowable amount of the pollutant.  Within the rules, provisions 
for banking can be used to allow permits to be stored for later use.  Ideally, decentralized 
independent agents participate in permit trading so that responsibility for controlling 
emissions is allocated among emitters in such a way as to equalize the incremental cost of 
control (Dales 1968).  Beginning with Montgomery (1972) and under certainty, permit 
systems have been shown to reach the same cost-minimizing outcome as an effluent tax 
when the quantity of permits is set so that the price for each permit equals the effluent 
tax.   
 Once different types of uncertainty are introduced into the analysis, the outcome 
is not as clear.  For instance, one line of research considers how policymaker uncertainty 
at the time a policy is defined can lead to different outcomes under a quantity standard 
versus a tax (Weitzman 1974).  Depending upon whether the uncertainty is about 
marginal costs or marginal benefits, the findings describe how a tax or permit system 
may represent a second best solution.  The marginal cost uncertainty and the relative 
slope of the cost function have been shown to be the major determinants in outcomes 
between a quantity standard versus a tax.  Another research perspective by Schennach 
(2000) considers the effect of uncertainty on banking levels.  This study finds that 
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uncertainty leads to a higher level of permits being banked than in the certainty case.  
 The objective of this dissertation is to outline the role that a market in futures 
contracts for tradable permits can play to address some sources of uncertainty facing 
regulated firms.  A futures contract is a legal agreement to either take delivery (buy) or 
provide delivery of (sell) a specified quantity of an underlying commodity of a particular 
grade (quality) at a defined future maturity date and at an agreed-upon price.  The 
analysis develops a theoretical model that describes how permit price uncertainty affects 
firms’ behavior and policy compliance costs in the absence of a futures market.  This 
setting motivates the analysis to then consider whether futures contracts in permits can 
eliminate the effects of price uncertainty and the associated production adjustments due 
to a firm’s risk aversion.  The theoretical results used to address these questions rest on 
an important maintained assumption, that the futures price provides the best available 
information on the market-wide incremental costs of controlling the pollutant.  This 
assumption motivates the last component to the analysis which involves evaluating the 
ability of futures contracts for the former U.S. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and the existing EU 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) futures markets to reflect this information. 
 The results illustrate that permit price uncertainty is one dimension of uncertainty 
that can affect firms’ policy compliance costs and in turn a permit system’s overall 
performance.  In the presence of a futures market for permits, this uncertainty can be 
eliminated if the current futures price is employed in determining the efficient level of 
emissions.  In this situation, production is no longer affected by a firm’s degree of risk 
aversion or changes in permit price expectations.  Thus, futures allow firms to maintain 
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supply of the marketed good at the cost minimizing level, thereby separating the output 
production decision from the emissions control decision.    
 Futures contract performance for the former U.S. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and the 
existing EU Carbon Dioxide (CO2) futures markets are then empirically evaluated.  The 
analysis considers if the futures prices contain the permit compliance cost information 
necessary for the theoretical assumptions to hold.  In comparison to spot market prices, 
futures are shown to reflect changes in pricing information as it occurs for both markets.  
In forecasting later spot permit prices, futures are then shown to encompass all of the 
information contained in an alternative forecast based on a theory of storage pricing 
model.  Both the theoretical model presented and empirical information examined 
suggest that later permit compliance purchase decisions can be guided by futures prices.  
Overall, this research describes how futures contracts for permits can provide important 
social benefits in allocating resources, achieving pollution reductions, and mitigating 
permit price uncertainty.  Thus, futures markets can enhance a permit system’s 
performance.   
 The following chapters describe how this analysis was addressed.  Chapter 2 
reviews the permit literature.  It discusses how permit systems perform and characterizes 
the types of uncertainty that have been considered in analyzing those systems. Within this 
literature, two important gaps exist.  The first is an analysis of how firms respond to 
permit price uncertainty.  The second is how futures contracts improve policy 
performance.  To address the first issue, an expected utility framework is used to 
characterize a firm that produces both a marketable good (e.g., electricity) and the 
associated emissions that are regulated through the use of permits.  At the time of the 
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production decision, uncertainty exists regarding the marketable good’s final price as 
well as the permit price.  The results are then derived for a firm without access to a 
futures market. The risk premium is used to describe the effects that later period price 
uncertainty associated with the marketable good’s final price and permit price have on a 
firm’s decisions.  These findings describe a measurable way to characterize a source of 
uncertainty that futures markets can address. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 describe two permit systems and their respective spot and 
futures markets.  Chapter 3 details the U.S. SO2 permit trading policy covered by Title IV 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Under this policy, permits regulated SO2 
emissions from the electricity sector. The rules allowed permit banking and maintained 
permit issuance, compliance, and trading through electronic registries over the period 
1995 – 2011.  Permits were traded in an active spot market during these years.  In 
December 2004, the SFI futures contract for SO2 permits was launched; this was the first 
environmental permit futures listed.  By 2007, an active futures market had formed and 
trading continued until 2011.  From 2007 to 2011, the spot permit price ranged from $1-
694, and SFI1 futures prices traded from $1-720 per permit.  This chapter suggests that 
prices were very volatile due to potential and actual policy changes which eventually led 
to the end of SO2 permit policy use.   
The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2 is discussed 
in Chapter 4.  This permit system was created to reduce CO2 emissions as a means of 
limiting global temperature rise.  It has continuous phases set to run through 2030 and 
covers regulated firms in thirty countries.  To facilitate trading across countries, one 
homogenous CO2 permit is used.  At the start of Phase II in 2008, permits were allowed 
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to be banked for use in subsequent years.  As with the SO2 futures, electronic registries 
are used for permit issuance, trading, and compliance.  Chapter 4 examines CO2 Phases II 
and III over the years 2008 – July 2014.  During these years, EUA futures contracts for 
CO2 permits were listed for trading along with several CO2 spot markets.  Over 7 billion 
permits were traded through futures contracts in 2013.  The total number of permits 
issued in 2013 was 2 billion.  EUA and spot prices ranged from €2-28 per permit over 
this period.   
 Chapter 5 describes the characteristics of markets for futures contracts.  At any 
given time, futures contracts are listed for different delivery periods, ranging from one to 
several months in the future, thereby offering a constellation of prices. The theory of 
storage is used to describe the role for permit futures in a firm’s decision making.  
Permits are required for use in the coproduction of a marketed good.  Banking provisions 
allow them to be stored.  The details of how futures for storable commodities trade, 
facilitate price discovery, promote large competitive markets, and smooth inventory 
allocation through time are then outlined.  The chapter concludes by illustrating how the 
theory of storage can be used to describe permit spot and futures prices formation.   
 Chapter 6 illustrates the effects of a futures market on firm behavior.  It begins by 
discussing the literature on futures hedging and its interaction with risk.  This is followed 
by a hedging example.  Next the presence of a futures market for permits is considered 
within the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. The marginal conditions are 
derived for the optimal production levels of the marketed good.  In this analysis, the risk 
premium is used to describe firm risk and futures hedging.  The findings describe how 
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futures markets can be used in production decisions to eliminate permit price uncertainty 
effects.  
 The theoretical results assume that the futures market is ideal.  An ideal futures 
market is one in which the price reflects the best available information, at a point in time, 
on the incremental cost of controlling the pollutant.  Chapter 7 empirically examines the 
SO2 and CO2 futures markets for the presence of traits necessary to satisfy this 
information criterion.  I use data on futures contracts from the U.S. SO2 and EU CO2 
permits to evaluate pricing performance.  The analysis uses three procedures.  The first 
examines the speed with which futures prices reflect changes in permit pricing 
information in comparison to the spot market. The second procedure focuses on the 
ability of a given futures contract price to rationally forecast the eventual underlying 
permit price at the time of futures delivery. This analysis also determines futures’ ability 
to encompass the information contained in an alternative forecast based on the theory of 
storage.  The final procedure describes the futures price, spot price, and storage 
relationship in each market through the theory of storage.  If futures prices are found to 
meet these information criteria, this suggests that a futures price offers a unique window 
into the marginal cost of compliance associated with using permits.  Finally, Chapter 8 
summarizes the key findings from this dissertation and identifies areas for future 
research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PERMIT POLICIES AND FIRM RESPONSE TO PRICE UNCERTAINTY 
2.1 Introduction 
 The objective of this chapter is to evaluate how a permit system performs in the 
presence of price uncertainty.  There is an extensive literature on tradable permits.  
Conventional analysis of environmental policy instruments suggests that effluent taxes 
and permit systems can lead to the same cost-minimizing outcome when the quantity of 
permits is set so that the price for each permit equals the effluent tax.  Under this 
condition, the two instruments yield the same level of externality control measured in 
terms of the amount of pollutant controlled.   
 To my knowledge, the effects of permit price uncertainty and risk aversion have 
not been evaluated from a firm’s perspective.  This issue is important because this type of 
uncertainty can affect the welfare costs of implementing a permit system.  By examining 
firm behavior subject to permit price uncertainty and risk aversion, a new perspective for 
the performance of these systems will be provided.   
 This chapter provides a theoretical description of how permit price uncertainty 
affects firms.  An expected utility framework is used to characterize a firm that produces 
both a marketable good (e.g., electricity) and a pollutant that is regulated through the use 
of permits.  At the time of the production decision, uncertainty exists regarding the 
marketed good’s final price and the permit’s final price.  Risk averse firms will make 
output adjustments in response to this uncertainty.  This theoretical analysis shows that 
permit price uncertainty negatively affects output of the good, raises total costs, and 
lowers terminal wealth.   
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 This chapter begins by describing how firm behavior subject to uncertainty is 
addressed in the literature.  Then permit policies are described.  The literature review 
concludes with an overview of how the theoretical results regarding tradable permits have 
been evaluated.  Next, a model is developed to describe a firm’s behavior under permit 
price uncertainty.   
2.2 Literature/Background 
Firm Behavior  
The theory of the firm under certainty assumes that a rational firm will act to 
maximize profits (Silberberg and Suen 1990).  In a competitive market, this process is 
usually characterized by specifying a production function and then describing the product 
and factor markets.  The firm’s optimal output level is defined where marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost.  The profit-maximizing choice implies cost minimization of the 
production factors used to produce the output quantity. 
The literature has also considered situations in which a firm’s decisions are made 
subject to uncertainty over some or all of the exogenous variables that affect decisions in 
the certainty case (e.g. Sandmo 1971, Chavas 2004).  Conventional production 
adjustments in the expected utility model are used to describe firms’ behavior in these 
situations.  The expected utility hypothesis assumes that a decision maker has risk 
preferences represented by a utility function U(a) and makes decisions to maximize 
expected utility EU(a), where E is the expectation operator based on the subjective 
probability distribution of a (Chavas 2004).   
 The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, r, is an index commonly 
used to characterize risk preferences (Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964).  It is defined as the 
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negative of the second derivative of the utility function divided by the first derivative of 
utility, )
'
''
(
U
U
r  (Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964).  Firms can be risk averse r > 0, risk neutral 
r = 0, or risk seeking r < 0 (Chavas 2004).  Risk aversion affects a firm’s behavior.  For 
instance a firm with a high degree of risk aversion will require a higher expected return 
than a firm with a lower level of risk aversion, other things being equal.   
 The certainty equivalent is another method used to characterize the effects of 
uncertainty on firm behavior (Chavas 2004).   It is widely used for asset pricing because 
it offers a direct way to capture expected returns, the distribution of expected returns, and 
risk preferences across a portfolio of assets (Cochrane 2005).  The certainty equivalent 
measures the certain amount a firm would need to receive in order to be indifferent 
between receiving a risky return a versus a known or certain amount R, expressed as  
[E(a)-R]  (Chavas 2004).  The term R is the risk premium and represents the payment a 
firm would be willing to make to avoid risk associated with variability in the rate of 
return, replacing a by E(a).  The risk premium can be stated as a measure of the private 
cost of the risk a firm bears (Chavas 2004).  In the neighborhood of the expected return, 
R is proportional to the variance of the risky return.  In this setting, the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is again used to describe the firm’s risk preferences.  
The firm’s risk preferences and utility function specification have been linked, providing 
the following relationships (Chavas 2004): 
 Risk averse firms have R > 0 corresponding to r > 0 and U’’ < 0 
 Risk neutral firms have R = 0 corresponding to r = 0 and U’’ = 0 
 Risk seeking firms have R < 0 corresponding to r < 0 and U’’ > 0 
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 The theory of the firm under uncertainty was advanced by Sandmo 1971, Leland 
1972, and Batra and Ullah 1974.  Various aspects of this literature deal with output price 
uncertainty, input price uncertainty, technological uncertainty, production uncertainty, 
policy uncertainty, and time uncertainty (e.g. Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, Batra and 
Ullah 1974, Chavas 1987, Chavas and Holt 1990, Chavas 2004).  Sandmo (1971) 
formalized an expected utility model for examining production decisions subject to what 
he characterized as product market uncertainty.  Product market uncertainty arises when a 
firm makes production decisions in one period without complete knowledge of what the 
output price will be when production is realized in a later period (Sandmo 1971).  Such a 
situation may arise from a lag between when a firm decides how much to produce and 
when that production is realized.  Chavas (2004) has shown that output price uncertainty 
negatively affects a firm compared to the certainty case.  If a firm is risk averse, price 
uncertainty leads to reduced production and lower terminal wealth (Sandmo 1971, Batra 
and Ullah 1974, and Chavas 2004).    
Permit Policy 
 A tradable permit system (cap and trade) can be used to control an externality1.  
Introduced by Crocker (1966), Dales (1968), and Montgomery (1972), permit systems 
require defining a fixed quantity of permits at a level that leads to the desired reduction in 
overall externality damages (Dales 1968).  Montgomery (1972) was the first to formalize 
how a permit policy would work under conditions of certainty.  In his formation, the total 
number of permits is set at a quantity Z.  Social benefits received are a function of the 
                                                 
1 Tradable permits and cap and trade are interchangeable terms of reference; the term permit will be used 
here. 
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number of permits, represented by B(Z).  Similarly the regulated sector’s cost of control 
is a function of the permit quantity, represented as C(Z).  The optimal permit quantity Z* 
is found that maximizes the difference between benefits received and cost incurred, 
expressed as )]()([ ZCZB  .  The solution must satisfy )](')('[ ** ZCZB   reflecting the 
point where marginal benefit equal marginal cost.  Under ideal conditions, the permit 
price equals the marginal abatement cost, represented as '* Cq  .  If Z* was set such that 
)(')(' ** ZCZB  , then )('* *ZBq  by definition of Z*.  A market equilibrium permit 
price q* then emerges where )(' ** ZCq  .   If the regulator sets the permit quantity at Z*, 
the optimal solution is achieved (Montgomery 1972)2.     
 When creating tradable permits, regulators must also define a set of rules that 
create a market in those permits (Dales 1968).  The rules and assignment of property 
rights to permits serve to determine the type of market structure formed.  Permits can be 
distributed as free endowments to firms, through auctions, or by a combination of the 
two.  Under certainty the least cost solution has been found to be independent of the 
allocation mechanism (Montgomery 1972).  After being distributed, permits can be freely 
traded by regulated firms and speculators alike.  The system allows decentralized 
independent agents to participate in trading through a permit market so that responsibility 
for controlling emissions of a pollutant is allocated in a way that reflects the incremental 
cost of control (Dales 1968).  Firms will take actions and behave in such a way that their 
                                                 
2 The regulator could also introduce a tax equal to q*per permit, thereby arriving at Z* under certainty.   
Therefore under certainty, identical welfare solutions can be reached by either a tax or a permit 
(Montgomery 1972).  The equivalence arises because the tax rate chosen, or permit quantity level selected, 
is determined at the point where marginal benefits of abatement are equal to the marginal costs of control 
(Montgomery 1972, Baumol and Oates 1988, Phaneuf and Requate 2014).  Under certainty with regard to 
either the tax or the permit setting, firms are able to achieve the least cost solution.    
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marginal abatement costs of control equal the market-determined permit price (Dales 
1968, Montgomery 1972)3.  For instance, if a firm‘s abatement cost per unit of emissions 
is less than the permit price, it will sell permits and abate emissions up to the point where 
its marginal abatement cost equals the permit price.  Conversely, if abatement cost 
exceeds the permit price, it will continue to produce emissions and buy permits until its 
marginal abatement cost equals the market permit price.  Trading allows the least cost 
solution to be found for the set permit quantity by equating of abatement costs between 
different regulated sources (Montgomery 1972).    
 The design of permit rules can include a provision for banking.  This implies 
permits are assets that can be stored (Schennach 2000, Phaneuf and Requate 2014).  
Banking allows a permit vintage to be used in compliance either in the vintage issuance 
year or in any subsequent year4. The term vintage is commonly used in the literature and 
industry to signify the year a permit was issued.   For example, if a firm was issued one 
hundred permits in a vintage year but only needed eighty permits in compliance that year, 
that firm would either sell the twenty extra permits in the market or retain them as 
inventory for future years.   
Banking effects on permit prices have been examined by Cronshaw and Kruse 
(1996), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997), and Schennach (2000).  Schennach’s 
(2000) work built upon the permit pricing and banking literature in several ways.  Her 
model considered that permit prices were 1) certain over time or 2) uncertain over time.  
                                                 
3 Conditions for this price formation are that a large competitive market exists, firms are price takers, and 
each firm’s abatement cost information is learned/revealed. 
4 Within the policies, some auctions and other sales of distant vintage years occurred.  However for this 
context, only permits valid for compliance in the immediate year are considered for equating firm behavior. 
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This specification provided a detailed analysis of how permit price assumptions and 
banking interact to form a price path through time.  It also considers the effects of a 
constraint such that permits could not be borrowed from later years.  In modeling 
uncertainty, risk neutrality was assumed.  The results illustrate that uncertainty in price 
expectations changes both the price path and the level of banked permits.  A key finding 
was that under price uncertainty, more permits will be banked compared to the certainty 
case.  Further under price uncertainty, firms may bank permits even if the price rises at a 
rate less than the risk free rate of interest.   However, the paper did not explicitly consider 
how benefits to storage could be measured; for other storable commodities (e.g., Pindyck 
2001, Tomek 1997), storage benefits are used to analyze prices and could possibly 
explain the effect on banking found here.   
Finally, another line of literature begins with Weitzman’s (1974) seminal work and 
evaluates the information policymakers use in setting a tax or quantity standard policy. 
His paper considers how policymaker uncertainty (characterized as inadequate 
information about costs or benefits at inception) can influence policy outcomes.  
Weitzman, along with Stavins (1996), Requate (1998), Hoel and Karp (2001, 2002), 
Pizer (2002), Newell and Pizer (2003), and Karp and Zhang (2005), studied how these 
types of uncertainty would affect the choice of a price (tax) per unit versus a quantity 
standard.  These papers evaluate the instruments in terms of the ex post welfare losses 
with each approach over the different sources of uncertainty. Their findings illustrate how 
policymakers’ uncertainty may lead to a suboptimal outcome.  Depending upon the 
degree of uncertainty and whether the uncertainty is about costs or benefits, a particular 
tax or permit system may represent a second best solution.   
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For my purposes, the permit literature has established that under certainty a permit 
system can be used for externality control so that a given level of control is realized at 
least cost.  However differing sources of uncertainty, such as permit price path 
uncertainty, as characterized by Schennach (2000) or policymaker uncertainty described 
by Weitzman (1974) can lead to differences in this outcome.  Therefore, motivation 
exists for understanding how other types of uncertainty may affect policy performance. 
Considering the rich line of literature examining output price uncertainty (e.g., Sandmo 
1971, Barta and Ullah 1974, and Chavas 2004), one alternative perspective to explore is 
understanding whether  product market price uncertainty and uncertainty in permit prices 
affects firm behavior and policy costs.   
2.3 Context for Firm Behavior Subject to Permit Price Uncertainty 
Firm Setup  
 This section has three objectives.  First, it outlines an expected utility model that 
describes firm behavior in the presence of permit price uncertainty.  Second, it 
demonstrates the negative impacts of permit price uncertainty on profits, production, total 
costs, and terminal wealth.  Third, it expresses permit price uncertainty through a risk 
premium by linking the expected utility results with the certainty equivalent approach to 
describe firm behavior. 
 For the purpose of regulating production of emissions, Z, as a source of external 
effects, assume that a permit policy has been established and that a market for trading 
permits has formed5. In the discussion, Z is used to describe the total allowable amount of 
                                                 
5 For discussion I assume that the regulated bad represents a form of emissions (SO2 or CO2) which allows 
for direct connections to the policies considered in later chapters. 
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emissions and z as an individual firm’s emissions. The policy requires each firm to 
submit a permit, with a price of q, in compliance for each unit of emissions (e.g., SO2) 
produced.  Policy rules maintain permit issuance, accounts, and compliance through 
electronic registries, and they also allow for banking of permits.  Because one permit is 
required for compliance in production of one unit of emissions, the number of permits 
submitted must be equal to the units of the specific type of emission allowed.  The 
regulated firm being modeled is a multiproduct firm producing a marketable good y and 
emissions z.  The firm is assumed to be a price taker and cannot affect the permit price or 
the price of good y.   
 The model represents a two-period production process.  The periods could be 
months, quarters, or years.  In the first period t, production decisions for both the good y 
and the emissions z are made. In the second period denoted as T, after a production lag, 
the final output of y is produced and sold.  Additionally in the second period, z units of 
the pollutant are emitted which requires z permits for compliance.  Within this setup it is 
assumed that once decisions are made in the first period, the quantities of the good to be 
produced and emissions emitted in the second period are known.      
 Assume that at the time production decisions are made, uncertainty exists for both 
the marketed good’s price (e.g., electricity) and for the permit price in the second period.  
It follows that the firm’s supply of good y along with its demand for z permits are both 
based on uncertain prices.   
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In the decision period t, the inputs required for the chosen production levels are 
purchased; input prices are considered known6.  The firm chooses n inputs ),...,( 1 nxxx   
in the production of good y, and emissions z.  The prices paid for the inputs are 
represented by ),...,( 1 nvvv  .   Cost minimization for a given output means that  
n
i ii
xv
1
 
can be replaced by ),( yvc .  Assuming constant returns to scale, )(vcy  reflects total 
production cost7.   
 The production technology is represented by two production functions, )(xfy 
and )(ygz  , with the f’>0, f’’<0, g’>0, and g’’<0.  Production of good y generates 
positive revenue for the firm with a final output price per unit of p.  Emissions z create 
costs because the existing regulation requires that each unit of z be matched to a permit 
with a unit price of q.  From the firm’s perspective, the permit price q multiplied by z is 
its total compliance cost.   
 Suppose that each firm receives a free endowment of permits from the regulator, 
labeled .  The initial policy sets the endowment quantities as annual distributions.  It 
follows that they are considered a known quantity.  The endowed permits can be used for 
compliance, sold, or banked as inventory.  After endowments are considered, the number 
of permits required for regulatory compliance is z , where a positive (negative) value 
reflects the number of permits a firm must purchase (sell from inventory).   
                                                 
6 It is assumed that enough time has elapsed for the firm to fully understand its own production costs and 
abatement costs.  It is then assumed that the firm production processes have been learned and are known, 
resulting in nonrandom output.   
7 Time discounting simply adds a discount factor to input prices; for this text, it will be suppressed for 
clarity.   
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 In the decision period t, the output period T unit price p for the good and permit 
price q are random variables.  The firm’s uncertain revenue is py .  The uncertain permit 
compliance cost is ))(( ygq .  The good’s output price p is represented by ep   , 
with a mean )( pE  where e is a random variable with an expected value of zero and 
variance of unity, and σ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the distribution of p.  
The permit price in period t is q, which is assumed to be a random variable characterized 
by  q , with a mean )(qE  where   is a random variable with an expected 
value of zero and variance of one, and λ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the 
distribution of q.  Table 2.1 provides a summary of the variables. 
Table 2.1. List of Variables Defined 
Variable Description 
w wealth 
y good output, with a production function of y=f(x), where f’>0 and f’’<0 
p the good’s price in period T, which (from the perspective of the production 
decision in period t) is assumed to be a random variable with a mean
)( pE  in which ep   , where e is a variable random with mean 
zero and σ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the distribution of p 
q the expected period T permit price, which is assumed to be a random 
variable with a mean )(qE , and is characterized by  q where 
  is a random variable with mean zero, and λ is a mean-preserving spread 
parameter for the distribution of q 
z emissions output (number of permits required), with a production function 
of z=g(y), where g’>0 and g’’<0.   
  free permit endowment 
v vector of input prices 
x input quantity, with a cost function of   
n
i ii
yvcxv
1
),(  
E expectation operator for the subjective probability distribution of the 
random variables 
)(U  utility function, which satisfies 0/'  wUU and 0/'' 22  wUU  
  
Maximizing Expected Utility 
The firm’s uncertain revenue and compliance costs are  
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))((  ygqpy . 
Its initial wealth is represented by w.  Its terminal wealth is  
),()( yvCzqpyw   , 
which is uncertain8.  The decision maker is assumed to maximize expected utility of 
wealth and to have risk averse preferences represented by the utility function )(U  
(2.1) )()),()((   wEUyvCzqpywEU , 
where E is the expectations operator based on the subjective probability distributions of 
the random variables p and q. 
 The firm’s production decision is described by  
(2.2) )}()(:)(({
1,,
ygzxfyxvzqpywEUMax
n
i iizyx
   . 
After further simplification, the production decision may be written as  
(2.3) ))},())((({ yvcygqpywEUMaxy   , 
 see (A.1). This allows the firm’s decisions to be characterized entirely in terms of the 
good y output9. The firm’s profit is ),())(( yvcygqpyw   .   
 The first order necessary condition for optimal output y is 
(2.4) 0)]''('[: 


CqgpUE
y
EU
. 
The second order condition for a maximum is 
(2.5) 0)]''''(')''(''[:
2
2
2



 CqgUCqgpUE
y
EU
D . 
                                                 
8 Time discounting is not considered in initial wealth for clarity; if it was, wealth would be )1( rw  . 
9 Noting eq. (2.3) implies uncertainty does not affect the cost function; future research could examine cost 
uncertainty implications.  
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Equation (2.5) describes a saddle point reflecting a local maximum; it follows that the 
saddle point found would be in the positive production range.  Additionally, because of 
permits’ negative effect on revenue, y = 0 is an alternative production possibility. That 
would be the case if, because of permit regulations, a firm is no longer profitable and 
shuts down. 
 The interaction of the uncertain good price expectation and expected utility, 
solved in (A.2), is ]'[),'(]'[ UEpUCovpUE  where  represents the good’s 
expected unit price.  The interaction of expected utility and the expectation of the 
uncertain permit price is ']'[),'(']'[' gUEqUCovgqUEg   with  the expected 
permit price, see (A.2).   By rewriting (2.4) in terms of price expectations, the optimal 
choice of y satisfies the following condition 
(2.6) 
)'(
),'(),'('
'':
UE
pUCovqUCovg
gC
y
EU 



 , 
where the firm’s marginal cost of production is yCC  /' and marginal cost of 
emissions compliance is ygg  /'   with respect to y.  Thus, production of good y is 
based on the good’s expected price  , marginal production cost of y, expected marginal 
compliance cost, and the third term.   The incremental cost of compliance is represented 
by the expected permit price  times the number of permits associated with production of 
an additional unit of good y.  It follows that in this static framework, 'g  is the firm’s 
marginal compliance cost from producing one more unit of y.   
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The third term consists of two parts.  The first is 
)'(
),'('
UE
qUCovg
 which reflects the 
permit’s expected price relationship with utility10.  The second is 
)'(
),'(
UE
pUCov
 which 
reflects the good’s expected price relationship with utility.  This result illustrates that the 
firm’s production decisions for both outputs are based on and affected by uncertain 
prices.  However at this stage, the effects of the uncertain prices are not intuitively clear.  
The certainty equivalent will help in explaining the effects of these uncertain prices on 
production of good y, namely through the risk premium term R.   In this setting, the risk 
premium is a way to measure how product price uncertainty affects firm decisions.   
  The Firm’s Certainty Equivalent  
 The certainty equivalent can be derived as an alternative characterization of the 
firm’s response to uncertainty (Chavas 2004).  It measures the private cost of risk borne 
by the firm using a risk premium R.  R represents the amount a firm is willing to pay to 
avoid risk.  Within this context, the firm is indifferent between receiving the risky return 
)),())((( yvCygqpyw    versus the sure amount
])),())((([ RyvCygqpywE   .   
 By combining two Taylor series expansions and by defining r as the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion: )
'
''
(
U
U
r  (Arrow 1965 and Pratt 1964), the risk 
premium can be shown as 
                                                 
10 The covariance terms can also be expressed as expectations where ]'[),'( eUEpUCov  , and 
]'[')','( UEgqgUCov   see (A.2).    
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 (2.7) )][var(
2

r
R , 
solved in (A.3), where profit variance is   
(2.8) 
),cov(2),cov()(2
)var()(2)var()()var())(()var()var( 222
qpyqpyyg
qygqqygpy




  
The appendix (A.3) also shows that the results hold globally.  Since the variance of 
profits is greater than zero ( 0)var(  ) for any nondegenerate random variable, it can be 
stated that the sign of the risk premium R is always the same as the sign of r (Chavas 
2004).  The risk premium R can be viewed as the shadow cost of bearing risk arising 
from both permit price uncertainty and good y price uncertainty.   
 From eq. (2.7) and (2.8) the certainty equivalent expressed through (2.3) is  
(2.9)        },))(({ RyvCygyMaxy   .    
The first order necessary condition is  
(2.10)   ''':/ RgCyU    
where yRR  /' is the marginal risk premium, yCC  /' is the marginal cost of 
production, and ygg  /'   is the marginal compliance cost in generating one more 
unit of good y.   
 The marginal risk premium is given by the expression  
(2.11)   
)],cov(),cov('),cov()(
)var(')var(')()var()[('
qpqpygqpyg
qgqgygpyrR




 
 
which contains terms representing the firm’s aversion to risk (r), the permit price 
variance, the good’s price variance, and the covariance between the two - all with respect 
to the output quantities and given the endowment of permits.  The endowment terms in 
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eq. (2.11) have signs opposite those of the emitted emissions which require permits 
(emissions = required permits). This is because the endowment acts as an initial inventory 
that essentially reduces the amount of later permits needed for compliance.  Further 
discussion of the risk premium is continued after linkages with expected utility are 
highlighted.  
Expected Utility and the Certainty Equivalent Connected 
By comparing the certainty equivalent eq. (2.10) with expected utility eq. (2.6), it 
may be shown that  
(2.12) 
)'(
),'(),'('
'
UE
pUCovqUCovg
R

 .  
Equation (2.12) illustrates that in producing one more unit of output y the covariance 
terms of utility may alternatively be expressed through the marginal risk premium11.  
 Both expected utility and the certainty equivalent show that production decisions 
are based on the good’s expected price   and emission levels are based on the expected 
permit price  .  The marginal risk premium illustrates that both of these uncertain prices 
interact to increase the profit variance.  In turn, the profit variance interacts with a firm’s 
risk preferences to form the marginal risk premium.  Therefore, the marginal risk 
premium demonstrates how price risk alters the marginal costs of production and 
influences decisions. 
  The risk premium demonstrates that permit price uncertainty increases the private 
risk borne by firms.  This risk creates policy costs to firms that lower production levels, 
profits, and terminal wealth.  As a result, for a risk averse firm, permit policies impose 
                                                 
11 This connection is well-established in the risk literature (Chavas 2004). 
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both incremental costs of compliance, represented by permits required for emissions, and 
an increase in the risk premium caused by permit price uncertainty.  This suggests in the 
presence of permit price uncertainty, policy cost minimization is not be achieved.       
2.4 Conclusion 
  This chapter describes how permit price uncertainty influences policy costs and 
decisions for a firm that must manage permit compliance.  An expected utility framework 
is used to characterize a firm that produces both a marketable good (e.g., electricity) and 
the associated emissions that are regulated through the use of permits.  At the time of the 
production decision, uncertainty exists regarding the marketable good’s final price as 
well as the permit price.  The model requires a permit to be turned in for compliance for 
each unit of emissions emitted.  In deriving the marginal conditions, the risk premium 
intuition was used to describe the price uncertainty impacts through established expected 
utility and certainty equivalent connections.     
 In producing one more unit of good y, the incremental compliance cost is 'g .  
This represents the number of permits required for compliance 'g  times the expected 
permit price  .  Because these emission decisions are based on the expected permit price 
 , permit price uncertainty alters the marginal risk premium.  The marginal risk 
premium illustrates that permit price risk impacts decisions and increases risk borne by 
firms, leading to higher production costs.  This effect causes lower production of the 
good, lower profits, and lower terminal wealth.  As a result, permit policy costs include 
both permit compliance costs and permit price risk costs.  In this setting, policy cost 
minimization is not achieved.             
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 A drawback to the current model is that firms’ only method of mitigating risk is to 
lower supply.  In practice, firms have three options to mitigate permit price risk: lower 
production, install technology that produces fewer emissions, or hedge the risk through 
an alternative pricing mechanism.  Therefore, motivation exists for examining other 
options available to firms seeking to mitigate permit compliance cost uncertainty (risk).  
The next two chapters describe the permit policies and their corresponding permit and 
futures markets; this establishes the context for assumptions and evaluation. Then 
Chapter Five describes why futures markets are an ideal fit for eliminating permit price 
uncertainty (risk) at a low cost.   
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CHAPTER 3 
UNITED STATES SO2 PERMIT MARKET 
3.1 SO2 Introduction  
 The US sulfur dioxide (SO2) permit trading policy was initiated through Title IV 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA).  The policy was established to control 
harmful effects of pollution associated with SO2 emissions from power plants by setting 
an allowable number of permits.  The policy represented a new market based approach to 
SO2 regulation. The SO2 permit system is the largest permit system created in the U.S. to 
date.  It is also the first environmental permit to have a listed futures contract. The 
objective of this chapter is to describe the factors that influenced SO2 permit and futures 
market formation and performance.    
 The chapter is arranged chronologically to describe SO2 regulations and the 
associated permit market.  The first section discusses SO2 emissions and prior 
regulations.  Then the CAAA permit policy and rules are detailed.  Next the sources for 
the data used to analyze permits are outlined.  A section on permit issuance, compliance, 
and transactions gives context for discussions of supply, demand, and inventory levels.  
The spot market is then discussed.  Futures are introduced, along with a detailed 
comparison of spot and futures volumes and prices.  The chapter concludes by discussing 
factors that potentially influence market performance.     
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3.2 SO2 Background and Prior Policy  
SO2 Background 
 In the U.S., SO2 is primarily emitted as a coproduct of the burning of fossil fuels 
in power generation (73%) and other industrial facilities (20%) (EPA 2014).  The 
remaining 7% is coproduced in the smelting of minerals that contain sulfur or through the 
burning of fuels that contain sulfur in trains, ships, and other non-road vehicles.  SO2 
emissions have been found to cause damages to human health and ecosystems.  Human 
health effects have been found to cause illness and premature mortality from heart 
disease, acute and chronic respiratory disease, and other lung disorders.  Additionally, 
SO2 is a precursor to acidic particulate matter (PM).  PM contributes to acid rain 
formation which also detrimentally affects human health and ecosystems (EPA 2013 a).   
 Due to wind patterns and chemical interactions with other pollutants, 
concentrations of SO2 deposits can also form nonlinear regional relationships termed “hot 
spots” through their spatial dispersion,.  Hot spots have the potential for SO2 
accumulation to degrade some areas and populations more severely than others.   
 Prior to 1970, SO2 emissions were freely discharged into the atmosphere in the 
course of usual business practices. Total emissions in 1970 amounted to 31.2m tons (EPA 
2014).  Because production of SO2 by business firms imposes detrimental effects to 
others, unregulated SO2 emissions create an externality.  The Clean Air Act was passed in 
1963 and amended in 1970.  To correct for the externality effects imposed by the criteria 
air pollutants, including SO2, part of the 1970 amendment required the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to develop and enforce regulations to protect the general public 
from exposure to airborne contaminants known to be hazardous to human health.  
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Currently in the U.S., ambient air quality standards are set nationally for six criteria air 
pollutants through powers granted in the Clean Air Act and its amendments12.  The goal 
of ambient air quality standards is to protect human health within an adequate margin of 
safety (Burtraw and Szambelan 2009).   
 The amended 1970 regulations allowed the EPA to set performance standards for 
new and existing sources of SO2 from power plants.  In 1977, a later amendment to the 
Clean Air Act further changed the SO2 performance standards.  The 1977 new source 
performance standards established emission removal rates that required the installation of 
flue gas desulfurization systems, termed ”scrubbers”, even if the plants burned low sulfur 
coal (Burtraw and Szambelan, 2009).  The 1970 and 1977 SO2 performance standards 
represented a command and control approach for meeting ambient air quality standards.  
The policies did not achieve desired emission reductions and created incentives to keep 
inefficient sources in production.  The regulations placed different and more stringent 
standards on new plants vs. existing plants, leading plants built before the 1977 
amendment to have a dramatically extended life (Ellerman and Montero 2002).  The SO2 
command and control policies were generally considered failures in achieving the 
expected emission reductions (Burtraw and Szambelan 2009).   
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments Title IV SO2 Permit Program  
 In 1990, the U.S.’s first large scale permit policy was enacted for use in 
controlling SO2 emissions.  The permit policy under Title IV of the 1990 CAAA created 
an SO2 permit market (cap and trade) system covering emissions from the electricity 
                                                 
12 The six criteria air pollutants are particle pollution (often referred to as particulate matter), ground-level 
ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead. 
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sector.  The law established two phases of trading: SO2 Phase I from 1995-2000 and SO2 
Phase II covering 2000-present13. The environmental objective was to achieve ambient 
air quality standards by lowering SO2 pollution levels within a market based system.  The 
CAAA SO2 permit system was a clear shift away from the prior twenty years of 
command and control regulations.  The policy represented an incentive based approach to 
SO2 regulation with a clear focus on economic efficiency (Evans and Woodward 2013).   
 A focus on the electricity sector was warranted because this sector was the largest 
emitter of SO2.  In 2012, the U.S. produced 4,047,765m kilowatt-hours of electricity 
which accounted for 73% of all SO2 emissions (EIA 2014).   Within the broad economy, 
a focus on the electricity sector represents an upstream placement of the cap on SO2.  The 
sector was accustomed to complying with other regulations.  Also firms had sophisticated 
risk management/trading departments dealing with production factors well equipped to 
handle trading in a newly formed permit market14.  Thus, the sector chosen had the 
potential to understand regulatory requirements, trading activities, and form a permit 
market for pricing permits to emit SO2.  
 EPA was the agency in charge of issuing permits, monitoring emissions, and 
enforcing compliance.  The initial policy treated all emissions equally by designating one 
permit to be equivalent to one ton of emissions.  It follows that all firm emissions were 
                                                 
13 Even though the CAAA policy was passed to still be in law, all meaningful trading activity ceased by the 
end of 2011 (detailed later); for this research, CAAA policy will only be considered through 2011.   
14 For example, Pacific Gas and Electric and Detroit Edison are publicly traded utilities with a market 
capitalization of $19.75b and $12.25b respectively as of 2013.  The companies own and operate coal, 
natural gas, wind, solar and nuclear power plants along with natural gas pipelines, underground natural gas 
storage and rail cars for coal transportation.  Combined the two companies serve over 7m customers 
(Yahoo Finance 2013).  As part of business operation both companies have large risk management/ trading 
departments that service commodity procurement, risk management, trading, and hedging.  Due to the 
regulated nature of electricity markets in the U.S., these companies are representative of the industry as a 
whole.  
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treated equally regardless of plant geographic location. Permits were issued on January 1 
of a given year.  This was termed the permit vintage year.  A permit vintage could be 
used against current emissions or banked as inventory to be used for later year 
compliance (i.e., permits were storable and the program created assets).  For example, if a 
firm was issued 100 permits in a vintage year but only needed 80 for compliance, then 
that firm could either sell the 20 extra permits or retain them as inventory for use in 
future years.  The actual binding market cap in any given year is equal to the number of 
permits issued that year plus any market inventory.  The actual cap depends on the 
amount of electricity generated and how it was produced.  Compliance was required 
annually for all emissions during the calendar year ending December 31.  The actual 
compliance deadline for the year ending N-1, was March 1 of year N.  If a firm was not in 
compliance, a penalty of $2000 per ton of excess emissions was assessed.    
 The majority of permits, 97.2%, were freely distributed yearly as endowments to 
the regulated firms.  The endowment was based on compromises in the design of the 
legislation using 1980 emission levels (Chan, Stavins, Stowe and Sweeney 2012).  
Additionally, to allow new market participants, 2.8% of the annual permit allocation was 
separately auctioned yearly by EPA.  
 The pattern of permit distribution did not favor any specific firms (Chan et. al. 
2012).  Under conditions of certainty, the free allocation of permits still achieves a cost 
effective solution (Montgomery 1972).     
 The rules for the permit system also required the installation of a continuous 
monitoring system on all regulated plants which electronically transferred emission data 
to EPA.  The monitoring gave EPA information on emissions emitted which it made 
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available.  In December 2001, EPA began an electronic allowance management system in 
which permits could be transferred online and private transactions would be recorded.  
The system utilized electronic registries that could be directly linked with regulated 
firms, firm brokerage accounts, and exchanges. The system provided a medium for 
trading data to be transferred to the government in a manner compatible with EPA 
compliance.  By 2008, 99% of all private permit transactions were being registered with 
the system. (Note that futures delivery falls into this category.)  The system served an 
important market role by electronically providing a transaction transfer system, a record 
establishment for compliance behavior, and easily accessible information, all at a low 
cost to market participants and the EPA15.   
 By design, the CAAA provided clear institutions and rules for forming permit 
property rights.  The policy recognized only one geographic boundary and one 
homogenous permit.  Further, the law provided for only a single regulatory agency, the 
EPA, to issue permits, enforce compliance, monitor emissions, and disseminate 
information.  This system envisioned the federal government playing a minimal role at a 
low cost.  In fact, through electronic permit issuance, trading, and compliance, 
transparent and standardized monitoring, EPA information dissemination, and clear rules, 
there was broad consensus that the permit market operated fairly with a virtually perfect 
compliance record (Burtraw and Szambelan 2009, Schmalensee and Stavins 2012).  
Thus, the initial CAAA rules and property rights provided for one homogenous permit, 
                                                 
15 However, for research purposes the system does not report transaction price data or a breakout of 
transactions by source. 
 31 
 
 
one governing law, one regulator, and one regulated sector as the boundaries for permit 
market formation.     
3.3 Data 
 Three primary types of data are discussed in the following sections and later used 
in empirical testing.   
1) Actual SO2 permit issuance, compliance, inventory levels, and reported 
transactions.  The data was collected from the EPA website, allowance management 
system, and EPA reports (e.g., EPA 2010, EPA 2013).     
2) SO2 spot market prices and volume.  The Cantor SO2 over the counter (OTC) 
market, listed through BGC Environmental Brokerage Services (formerly CantorCO2e 
Brokerage), was the primary SO2 spot market
16.  Daily spot prices from July 2003 - 
October 2011 and daily transaction volume from 2003-2009 were gathered for the Cantor 
SO2 OTC directly from BGC (2012).   
3)  SO2 futures.  The Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) futures contract served as the 
primary SO2 futures contract. SFI daily prices, volume, contract symbols, and open 
interest for all monthly contracts were gathered from December 2004 – December 2011 
as sourced from Bloomberg (2013, 2014).     
 The spot market is a term used to describe the physical permit market; the spot 
price is the term used to describe permit prices.  The OTC market is a spot market listed 
by a specific brokerage firm (here it was listed by BGC Environmental Brokerage 
Services).  The term OTC price is the term used to describe spot permit prices of this 
market.  The term spot and OTC are interchangeable terms of reference to permit prices.  
                                                 
16 Index and OTC are interchangeable terms used in the literature; here, OTC will be used. 
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Generally for this research, spot is used commonly in reference to general or theoretical 
discussions.  OTC is used when referencing the specific markets; however at times either 
is appropriate.       
3.4 EPA Permit Issuance, Compliance, and Transactions 
 A total of 160.55m permits issued from 1995-201217.  Permits began to actively 
trade in 1994 with Phase I covered the 263 largest and dirtiest electricity generators with 
a capacity over 100mwe, which produced 9.4m tons of SO2 in 1980.  Phase I permits 
issued in 1995 were capped at 8.7m and reduced to 7m by 1999.  Table 3.1 displays the 
yearly numbers of SO2 permits allocated, turned in, banked and traded over Phases I and 
II.   During Phase I, 38.1m permits were issued and 26.4m were used in compliance.  The 
result was a banked supply of 11.7m permits at the start of Phase II.   The excess Phase I 
permit supply could be carried over as inventory into Phase II on a one for one basis.   
Table 3.1 SO2 Phase II Permits Issued, Firm Emissions, and Banked 2000 - 2010 
Year Permits issued Year bank Total bank Firm emissions 
2000 10 -1.2 10.5 11.2 
2001 9.6 -1 9.5 10.6 
2002 9.5 -0.7 8.8 10.2 
2003 9.5 -1.1 7.7 10.6 
2004 9.5 -0.8 6.9 10.3 
2005 9.5 -0.7 6.2 10.2 
2006 9.5 0.1 6.3 9.4 
2007 9.5 0.6 6.9 8.9 
2008 9.5 1.9 8.8 7.6 
2009 9.5 3.8 12.6 5.7 
2010 8.95 3.85 16.45 5.1 
Totals 142.65 16.45 139.55 211.9 
Note: All numbers are in millions; baseline emissions in 1980 were 17.3m tons 
Source: Own calculations from EPA reports 
 
                                                 
17 The EPA website, allowance management system and reports were accessed for permit data (EPA 2010, 
EPA 2013).    
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 The corresponding annual electricity production generated over all policy years 
by source and in total is displayed in Table 3.2.  Total electricity production in 1980, the 
CAAA baseline year, was 2,289,600m kilowatt-hours (EIA 2014).  In 1995, 2000, 2005, 
and 2010, total electricity production was 3,353,487m, 3,802,105m, 4,055,423m, and 
4,125,060m kilowatt-hours respectively. Electricity production peaked in 2008 and 
dipped slightly in the years following due to the U.S.’s financial crisis and corresponding 
economic slowdown.  However by 2013, total electricity production had approximately 
reached prior levels.  Overall the table shows that total electricity generation gradually 
increased over the policy years spanning 1995 – 2013.   
Table 3.2 U.S. Electricity Generation: (All Sectors)   
Year  Coal  
Nat. 
Gas Nuclear  Hydro 
 
Solar Wind Other  Total  
1950 154.5 44.6 0.0 100.9 - - 34.1 334.1 
1960 403.1 158.0 0.5 149.4 - - 48.2 759.2 
1970 704.4 372.9 21.8 251.0 - - 185.1 1,535.1 
1980 1,161.6 346.2 251.1 279.2 - - 251.5 2,289.6 
1990 1,594.0 372.8 576.9 292.9 0.4 2.8 198.1 3,037.8 
1995 1,709.4 496.1 673.4 310.8 0.5 3.2 158.7 3,353.5 
1996 1,795.2 455.1 674.7 347.2 0.5 3.2 167.8 3,444.2 
1997 1,845.0 479.4 628.6 356.5 0.5 3.3 179.3 3,492.2 
1998 1,873.5 531.3 673.7 323.3 0.5 3.0 215.9 3,620.3 
1999 1,881.1 556.4 728.3 319.5 0.5 4.5 206.6 3,694.8 
2000 1,966.3 601.0 753.9 275.6 0.5 5.6 200.0 3,802.1 
2001 1,904.0 639.1 768.8 217.0 0.5 6.7 197.4 3,736.6 
2002 1,933.1 691.0 780.1 264.3 0.6 10.4 174.2 3,858.5 
2003 1,973.7 649.9 763.7 275.8 0.5 11.2 202.8 3,883.2 
2004 1,978.3 710.1 788.5 268.4 0.6 14.1 204.7 3,970.6 
2005 2,012.9 761.0 782.0 270.3 0.6 17.8 204.7 4,055.4 
2006 1,990.5 816.4 787.2 289.2 0.5 26.6 147.8 4,064.7 
2007 2,016.5 896.6 806.4 247.5 0.6 34.4 149.4 4,156.7 
2008 1,985.8 883.0 806.2 254.8 0.9 55.4 127.8 4,119.4 
2009 1,755.9 921.0 798.9 273.4 0.9 73.9 119.1 3,950.3 
2010 1,847.3 987.7 807.0 260.2 1.2 94.7 119.7 4,125.1 
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Table 3.2 (Cont’d) U.S. Electricity Generation: (All Sectors) 
Year  Coal  
Nat. 
Gas Nuclear  Hydro 
 
Solar Wind Other  Total  
2011 1,733.4 1,013.7 790.2 319.4 1.8 120.2 113.7 4,100.1 
2012 1,514.0 1,225.9 769.3 276.2 4.3 140.8 108.3 4,047.8 
2013 1,586.0 1,113.7 789.0 269.1 9.3 167.7 115.5 4,058.2 
Notes: Electricity in billion kilowatt-hours. Other sources include petroleum, other gases, 
wood, waste, geothermal. 
Source: Own calculations from IEA reports 
 
 Phase II began in 2000 with coverage of 3,572 electricity generating units. This 
included all of the original Phase I firms, and additionally covered all fossil fuel steam 
boilers with a rated generation capacity of over 25 mwe.  Because of the rules covering 
boilers, one plant could have multiple regulated boilers.  By Phase II the program covered 
virtually all electric plants in the U.S.  Phase II baseline SO2 emissions in 1980 were 
26.7m tons.  At the beginning of Phase II, emissions were capped at 10m tons with the 
cap reduced to 8.95m tons by 2010 (Table 3.1).  The permit reduction was written as part 
of the initial law (i.e., the cap change was a known rule). 
 During the first six years of Phase II, 2000 – 2005, 57.6m permits were issued and 
63.1m were used in compliance, resulting in an inventory drawdown of 5.5m permits.  
Then from 2006 – 2010, 46.95m permits were issued and only 36.7m permits used for 
compliance, resulting in the banked supply growing to 16.45m permits by the end of 
2010 (Table 3.1).   By 2010, total emissions were only 5.1m tons per year, representing a 
decline of 70% from 1980.  Over the same time period, total electricity produced rose 
from 2,289,600m to 4,125,060m kilowatt-hours, representing an 80% increase. 
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SO2 Stocks- to-Use Ratio 
 The stocks-to use-ratio can be used to explain the permit supply, demand, and 
inventory conditions18.  This ratio measures how long the current permit supply will last, 
based on current demand.  The ratio only considers permits valid for compliance within a 
vintage year (i.e., no borrowing of permits is allowed).  For SO2 permits, the ratio can be 
measured with a high degree of accuracy because of EPA issuance, monitoring, and 
compliance real time information.  The permit stocks-to-use ratio is defined as 
(3.1) 
emissionstotalyear
emissionsmonthinventorymonthbeginningyearinpermitsissued
t
ttt )()()( 
 
The permit compliance total for emitted emissions compliances is based on year t data.  
Yearly emissions totals are used instead of monthly or forecasted values.  The large 
permit supply over the evaluation period implies that small differences in adjustments 
used to compute the ratio, accounting for seasonality or other factors, would not alter the 
implications of the basic comparison.   
 December and January stocks-to-use ratios, permits issued, and compliances 
turned in from 2000 – 2011 are reported in Table 3.3.  December values are discussed 
because these end of year values provide the lowest supply level and represent a worst 
case scenario.  January is reported because that is the month in which the annually issued 
permit supply enters the market.  The December 2000 stocks-to-use ratio was 1.02 years, 
implying that in December 2000 there were enough permits held as inventory to meet 
current demand levels for slightly more than one full year.  The initially high ratio is a 
direct result of the large permit supply carried over from Phase I.  From 2000, the ratio 
                                                 
18 The ratio is used and forecasted extensively in other commodity markets such as crude oil and corn.   
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gradually declined each year until 2005 when it reached 0.6 years, implying permits held 
as inventory were sufficient to meet current demand for about seven months.  The decline 
in this ratio is a result of compliance needs being greater than the yearly issued supply. 
Table 3.3 SO2 Permit Stocks-to-Use Ratios 2005 - 2011  
Date 
Stocks: use 
(month) 
Stocks: use 
(year) 
Total 
supply 
Issued 
permits 
Permits 
used 
1/1/2000 23.250 1.938 21.700 10 - 
12/1/2000 12.250 1.021 11.433 - 11.2 
1/1/2001 22.755 1.896 20.100 9.6 - 
12/1/2001 11.755 0.980 10.383 - 10.6 
1/1/2002 22.353 1.863 19.000 9.5 - 
12/1/2002 11.353 0.946 9.650 - 10.2 
1/1/2003 20.717 1.726 18.300 9.5 - 
12/1/2003 9.717 0.810 8.583 - 10.6 
1/1/2004 20.039 1.670 17.200 9.5 - 
12/1/2004 9.039 0.753 7.758 - 10.3 
1/3/2005 18.294 1.525 15.550 9.5 - 
12/1/2005 7.294 0.608 6.200 - 10.2 
1/3/2006 19.043 1.587 14.917 9.5 - 
12/1/2006 8.043 0.670 6.300 - 9.4 
1/2/2007 20.303 1.692 15.058 9.5 - 
12/3/2007 9.303 0.775 6.900 - 8.9 
1/2/2008 24.895 2.075 15.767 9.5 - 
12/1/2008 13.895 1.158 8.800 - 7.6 
1/2/2009 37.526 3.127 17.825 9.5 - 
12/1/2009 26.526 2.211 12.600 - 5.7 
1/4/2010 49.706 4.142 21.125 8.95 - 
12/1/2010 38.706 3.225 16.450 - 5.1 
1/3/2011 66.733 5.561 25.025 8.95 - 
12/1/2011 55.733 4.644 20.900 - 4.5 
Notes: Permits are in millions; Stocks: use ratio computes the amount of time the current 
supply of permits will last based on the current emission rates       
Source: Own calculations from EPA reports      
  The December stocks-to-use ratios from 2005 thru 2011 were 0.60, 0.67, 0.78, 
1.16, 2.21, 3.22, and 4.64 respectively.  During these years, the December ratio, the 
lowest yearly point, was always greater than a six month supply.  Further, the ratio 
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climbed drastically over time with over one year’s excess supply from 2008 on.  This 
large increase in stocks was caused by a 50% decrease in firm emissions; emissions fell 
from 10.2m in 2005 to 5.1m in 2010.  Because of the rapid decline in emissions and 
growing stocks, the 2010 ratio represented over three years of available permits at the 
then-current emissions rate.  However, total electricity generated actually rose slightly 
from 4,055,423m in 2005 to 4,125,060m kilowatt-hours in 2010 (EIA 2014).  Because 
yearly issuance remained approximately constant as did electricity production, firms 
clearly reduced the level of emissions per kilowatt-hour of electricity output19.  The result 
was that the market had an abundant supply of permits.  
 By comparison, over the last twenty years, the year ending stocks-to-use ratio for 
corn just before new crop harvest, its lowest yearly point, has only been above 0.30 (just 
over a three month supply) once.  Further, the ending corn stocks-to-use ratio fell below 
0.10 (1.2 months’ supply) five times.   
 Some overall judgements arise from Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, along with the SO2 
market discussion that can describe the permit market supply.  Over the years from 1995 
– 2010, total electricity production increased 80%.  A bank of 11.7m permits from Phase 
I was available at the start of Phase II.  During Phase II, the annual number of permits 
issued declined gradually from 10m down to 8.95m.  In the early Phase II years (2000 - 
2005), total emissions outpaced issued permits, forcing a drawing down of the permit 
bank.  Thereafter, firm emissions rapidly declined from 10.2m tons in 2005 to 5.1m by 
                                                 
19 The U.S. financial crisis and economic slowdown contributed to a slight dip in electricity production in 
2009 and then increased back to approximately constant levels with 2008 production from 2010 – 2013.  
However as the tables illustrate, the lowering in emissions emitted per KWH from 1995 to 2010 generally 
can be attributed to the permit supply increasing. 
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2010.  These factors resulted in an adequate permit supply over 2000 – 2005, due to the 
carryover of the large Phase I inventory.  Then from 2005 – 2011, the rapid decline in 
firm emissions drove excess supply.  Based on the original CAAA rules and the annual 
supply, clear supply trends were formed. Intuitively permit prices should exhibit different 
pricing patterns between the two periods -- 2000 – 2005 and 2005 – 2010.   
EPA SO2 Transactions  
 The EPA recorded permit transfers in two broad categories20.  The first is between 
economically related firms in the form of permit transfers between utility plants that have 
the same ownership.  For example, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) owns several utility 
plants in various states (see Table 3.4).  Each plant is issued its own permit endowment 
from the EPA.  However, PG&E would be the owner of record for all the permits its 
plants were issued.  If a PG&E plant in Florida was issued 100 permits and used 80 for 
compliance, a surplus (long position) of 20 permits would exist.  Simultaneously, if a 
PG&E plant in California was issued 200 permits, but needed 220 permits for yearly 
compliance, a resulting deficit (short position) of 20 permits would exist.  To meet 
compliance at both plants, PG&E would transfer 20 permits from the Florida plant to the 
California plant.  Compliance at both plants would then be met through an economically 
related transfer, as defined by the EPA. Table 3.4 illustrates this example.  When 
offsetting positions exist between economically related firms, as in the example, outside 
transactions for offsetting position are not typically necessary.  Thus, economically 
related transactions imply that no futures market activity would be used for 
                                                 
20 For consistency and comparisons, EPA’s definitions are followed for use of their data, noting that the 
terminology and definitions differ from other commodity trading terminology and reporting.   
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trading/hedging purposes.  This is similar to many commodity markets; for example, 
Exxon (Cargill) commonly trades crude oil (corn) between plants for facilitating 
individual plant supply and demand needs.   
 The second EPA category is economically unrelated transfers between firms with 
no ownership relationship.  Economically unrelated trades necessitate exchange through 
private negotiation, brokerage houses, OTC markets, or futures markets.  For example, if 
a PG&E plant in Florida has to purchase 100 permits from a Detroit Edison-owned plant 
in Michigan, the transaction would be termed an economically unrelated transfer of 
permits by EPA (Table 3.4).  
Table 3.4 EPA Permit Transfer Categories Example: Pacific Gas and Electric 
Utility Plants 
  Issued Emissions Permits  Net Transaction Compliance 
    Required    
Related example:     
 Florida 100 80 80 20 -20 80 
 California 200 220 220 -20 20 220 
        
Unrelated example:       
 Florida 100 80 80 20 -20 80 
 Michigan 200 220 220 -20 20 220 
 
 Total SO2 transactions for both EPA categories through 2009 were 392.2m 
permits.  Of the total 121.8m (31.1%) permits were traded in economically unrelated 
transactions.  The remaining 270.4m (69.9%) traded permits were between economically 
related entities.  Table 3.5 provides a listing of the EPA transactions from 1995 – 2009.  
In the first two years of trading, 1995-1996, only about 10% of the 28.7m permits traded 
were between economically unrelated firms.  By 1998, economically unrelated trades had 
increased to 9.5m permits accounting for 41% of the year’s total trades.  At the beginning 
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of Phase II (2000), 12.7m permits (35.9%) were traded between economically unrelated 
firms.  Over the available Phase II data, the average yearly volume of economically 
unrelated trades was 9.1m permits, accounting for 48% of all trades.   
 The 9.1m yearly average trading volume between economically unrelated firms 
was about equal to average permit compliance of 9.47m over this time21.  As highlighted 
by Ellerman (2002), this approximate correspondence is consistent with firms taking 
advantage of the cost savings that can be realized by re-allocating the responsibility for 
reducing emissions to the least cost abating units through trading. 
Table 3.5 SO2 Permits Traded 1994-2010     
Year 
Permits 
issued 
Permits 
used  
 
Economically 
related trades 
Economically 
unrelated 
trades 
Percent 
economically 
unrelated 
Total 
trades 
1994 - - 8.3 0.9 9.78% 9.2 
1995 8.7 5.3 14.8 1.9 11.38% 16.7 
1996 8.3 5.4 3.8 4.4 53.66% 8.2 
1997 7.1 5.5 7.3 7.9 51.97% 15.2 
1998 7 5.3 4 9.5 70.37% 13.5 
1999 7 4.9 12.5 6.2 33.16% 18.7 
2000 10 11.2 12.3 12.7 50.80% 25 
2001 9.6 10.6 9.9 12.6 56.00% 22.5 
2002 9.5 10.2 9.8 11.6 54.21% 21.4 
2003 9.5 10.6 8.4 8.1 49.09% 16.5 
2004 9.5 10.3 7.8 7.5 49.02% 15.3 
2005 9.5 10.2 9.9 10 50.25% 19.9 
2006 9.5 9.4 12.9 9.5 42.41% 22.4 
2007 9.5 8.9 7.8 9.1 53.85% 16.9 
2008 9.5 7.6 8 5.9 42.45% 13.9 
2009 9.5 5.7 11.1 4 26.49% 15.1 
2010 8.95 5.1 na na na na 
Totals 142.65 126.2 148.6 121.8 45.04% 270.4 
Note: All numbers are in millions. Source: Compilation of EPA 2010 and 
EPA 2013 documents 
                                                 
21 Of the EPA trade total, there is no way to determine how many trades correspond with futures delivery.    
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3.5 SO2 Permit Spot and Futures Markets  
SO2 Spot Market 
 Permit pricing mechanisms used from 1995 – 2004 were over the counter markets 
(OTCs), government auctions, forward contracts, and private negotiations.  Private 
negotiations could be for spot (immediate) or forward delivery depending on the parties’ 
agreed-upon terms.  Government auctions were conducted yearly and accounted for 2.8% 
of the vintage issuance.  Market participants consisted of regulated firms, financial 
intermediaries, brokerage houses, and speculators.   
 The Cantor SO2 OTC was the primary spot pricing point for the market
22.  The 
Cantor SO2 OTC was a financial product of BGC Environmental Brokerage Services 
(formerly CantorCO2e), a brokerage house that specializes in environmental trading 
services23.  Spot trading was also conducted on other OTC markets operated by the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), Emissions Exchange (EX) and Fieldston (EATX) 
with limited degrees of success.   
 Figure 3.1 and Table 3.6 provide a graph and table description of the Cantor SO2 
spot prices and volume from 2003 - 2011.  The Cantor OTC had a yearly average volume 
of 0.7m permits from 2003 – 2009, with a peak in 2004 of 1.5m permits. Permit prices 
during Phase II, from 2000 - 2011, ranged from $1 to $1626/ton.  All discussed prices for 
permits are listed in $/ton and hereafter the “per ton” will be implied.  Prices began 
increasing in 2003 from approximately $200 and reached a peak of $1626 in 2005.  This 
                                                 
22 This is supported by the Cantor OTC being the EPA’s price reported for its publications (e.g. EPA 2010). 
23 In August 2011, the business of CantorCO2e, L.P., was acquired by BGC Partners, L.P. and became 
BGC Environmental Brokerage Services, L.P.  For these purposes, the purchase did not alter the Cantor 
SO2 OTC. 
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was followed by a sharp decline to an average price of $528 in 2008.  Prices continued to 
decline, ultimately collapsing to $1 by October 2011.  The price range and volatility 
exhibited must be viewed in consideration of outside events (i.e., factors not envisioned 
in the initial rules) that ultimately led to the market collapse.  The policy event section 
outlines in greater detail the potential role for rule changes and other events to influence 
the price series movement and market collapse.  For the present purpose, all 
economically meaningful CAAA SO2 permit trading ceased by October 2011.   
 
Figure 3.1 SO2 Spot and SFI Futures Prices (2004 - 2011) 
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Table 3.6 Cantor SO2 OTC Prices and Volume 2003-2011 
Year Mean price Min price Max price Volume 
2003 $192 $174 $221 699,443 
2004 $437 $215 $722 1,565,463 
2005 $901 $640 $1,626 1,019,965 
2006 $743 $465 $1,583 390,104 
2007 $528 $395 $694 994,413 
2008 $281 $93 $552 319,482 
2009 $89 $56 $192 295,864 
2010 $33 $5 $233 na 
2011 $6 $2 $9 na 
Totals $377 $2 $1,626 5,284,734 
Notes: Prices and volume data were from separate data. 
Source: Own calculations from BGC 2012 data  
SO2 Futures Market 
 In December 2004, the Chicago Climate Exchange launched the Sulfur Financial 
Instrument (SFI) futures contract, whose underlying commodity was a SO2 permit
24.  SFI 
futures marked an important financial innovation because SO2 permits could now be 
priced over different time horizons through standardized exchange-traded futures.  Policy 
created permits for SO2 emission rights were now traded side by side with other 
commodity futures. To my knowledge, the SFI futures contract represented the first 
environmental policy permit ever listed as an exchange traded futures. 
  Additionally in August 2005, the New York Mercantile Exchange introduced the 
sulfur dioxide futures contract (RS) through CME’s electronic platform.  However, the 
RS contract never achieved adequate liquidity and the RS futures failed by 2008.   
                                                 
24 For futures market definitions, market details, and price formation see Chapter Five. 
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 A factor influencing general futures expansion during the 2000’s was electronic 
trading25.  Electronic trading offers a substantial opportunity for exchanges to lower 
exchange costs.  Further, electronic futures offer exchanges a low cost means of 
introducing new contracts in markets where futures did not previously exist.  Electronic 
futures also offer participants unlimited trading access, price transparency, and lower 
transaction costs which can generate trading volume for futures that would not otherwise 
succeed. Thus in the launch of SFI futures, electronic trading enhanced the contracts 
potential to be successful.  
 In 2003, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) partnered with the Chicago Climate 
Exchange to host its electronic marketplaces. As one of the world’s largest exchanges, 
ICE offered secure and fully developed electronic trading platforms.  The electronic 
trading changes and partnership influenced the December 2004 SFI launch.  It also was 
the lead-in to ICE’s purchase of the Chicago Climate Exchange in April 201026.  ICE 
bought the Chicago Climate Exchange through a purchase of its parent company Climate 
Exchange PLC for $622m.  With ICE’s purchase, the exchange was officially closed and 
all products transferred to ICE on February 28, 2011.  For current research purposes, 
ICE’s purchase did not alter the SFI contracts of interest.  ICE will be the referenced 
exchange company hereafter.   
                                                 
25 A brief discussion of electronic trading is needed for context of the timing of the contract launch.  The 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the world’s largest futures exchange, launched its first electronic 
contract in 1992 with 70% of its volume coming from electronic trading by 2003.  Conversely, the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), the world’s oldest futures exchange, did not introduce electronic trading to its 
agriculture products until 2006.   
26 Interestingly, Climate Exchange PLC also owned the European Climate Exchange (ECX) which listed 
the European Union Allowance (EUA) futures studied for the CO2 markets now also owned by ICE. 
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   The SFI futures contract specifications were for delivery of 25 U.S. EPA SO2 
allowances under Title IV of the CAAA at maturity.  Appendix B provides an SFI futures 
contract specification sheet for 2010 futures from ICE.  Upon maturity, the buyer (owner) 
of one SFI contract would take possession of 25 SO2 permits.  Similarly at delivery, the 
seller must provide 25 SO2 permits.  Therefore at the maturity date, SFI futures became 
an electronic supply transfer of SO2 permits.  Because EPA used electronic registries for 
SO2 permit issuance, accounts, and compliance there were no additional transaction costs 
associated with futures delivery of permits27. 
 Beginning in December 2004, SFI contracts were listed quarterly for March, June, 
September, and December maturities until March 2006.  Then from March 2006 onward, 
an SFI contract was listed for each month three years out.  Each calendar year is 
considered a vintage year with contracts created to match the spot permit cycle (i.e., SO2 
permits annual vintage issuance).  December SFI contracts were listed for up to five years 
out.  It is common to list only one contract for distant time horizons because trading 
volume typically decreases.  The December contract was selected because as the 
compliance calendar year end, its yearly contract was the most actively traded 28.  
Appendix B provides a list of all the SFI contracts traded from December 2004 - March 
2012.  Within the futures listing the symbols are expressed by SFI(letter)(#) where SFI 
stands for the contract root (Sulfur Financial Instrument), the letter is maturity month,  
and the # is maturity year29. Contract maturity is the futures last trading day The SFI was 
                                                 
27 Chapter Six details how futures turn into physical permits and discusses potential price differences.  
28 For example, corn and soybeans follow a similar pattern with the harvest month contract as the futures 
selected for distant year listing. 
29 For SFI and the majority of futures contracts the following letters correspond to these months F – 
January, G – February, H – March, J – April, K – May, M – June, N – July, Q – August, U – September, V 
– October, X – November, and Z – December.    
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officially delisted in March 2012 as a result of the underlying CAAA permit market 
collapse. 
 The maturity date was also the last trading day of a particular contract. This date 
was set three business days prior to the last business day of the expiration month (CCX, 
2012)30.  An example of a contract listing is the SFI December 2009 contract (SFIZ09) 
which represents the December 2009 vintage year SFI futures contract.  Its last trading 
day was Monday, December 28, 2009.   The contract transaction entry or exit fee as of 
2006 was $2.00 per contract for non-members and $1.60 for members31.  The transaction 
fee for nonmembers of one SFI contract in 2006 represented 0.0114% of the contract’s 
total permit value.  This is consistent with the assertion that futures provide a low cost 
means for exchange.     
 The one month ahead (front month) contract is identified by the contract month 
about to expire.  One month ahead futures present the closest comparison to the spot 
price.  For example, on July 1, 2009, the one month futures contract represented the July 
2009 SFI contract (SFIN9) which matured on July 28, 2009.  Then on July 29, 2009, the 
one month contract rolled over and became the August 2009 SFI contract (SFIQ9) which 
matured on August 26, 2009.  The one month series is denoted hereafter as SFI1.   
 For consistent time horizon analysis, daily rolling contract series were constructed 
to represent the one month ahead (SFI1), two months ahead (SFI2), three months ahead 
(SFI2),…, twelve months (SFI12) ahead futures.  The rolling series structure creates 
                                                 
30 The SFI contracts’ first notice day for performance is also three business days prior to the last business 
day of the expiration month (Chicago Climate Exchange 2012).    
31 In futures trading terminology, entry or exit of a position is termed a side.  A full contract fee is the 
complete round turn for entry and exit of a position.   
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observations over time that represent identical time horizons for forecasts32.  The futures 
SFI1-12 month series represents what the market expects spot prices to be at the different 
time periods.  As discussed in Chapter Six these provide the basis for estimating what 
expected marginal compliance costs will be at the time of the contract maturity.  An 
example of how the SFI monthly horizons works is presented in Table 3.7.  The table 
illustrates the SFI1 -5 month horizons.  On July 1, 2007, the SFI futures had contracts 
listed with the following maturity and prices: July 2007-SFI1 $542; August 2007 SFI2 
$544; September 2007 SFI3 $546; October 2007 SFI4 $548; November 2007 SFI5 $550.  
This means that on July 1, 2006, the SFI2 was forecasting a spot price of $544 at maturity 
on July 26, 2007.   Similarly on July 1, 2007, the SFI5 was forecasting a November 27, 
2007, spot price of $550.  To complete this snapshot discussion, the differences between 
the July 1, 2007, futures prices and the actual corresponding maturity date prices were 
SFI1 $12, SFI2 $25, SFI3 $16, SFI4 $6, and SFI5 (-$2) reflecting how the forecasted 
prices can differ from realized prices(Table 3.7).   
Table 3.7 Snapshot of SFI 1-5 Futures Prices and Realized Values 
Futures SFI1 7-Jul SFI2 7-Aug SFI3 7-Sep SFI4 7-Oct SFI5 7-Nov 
7/1/07 $542 SFIN7 $544 SFIQ7 $546 SFIU7 548 SFIV7 $550 SFIX7 
7/26/07 $530 M         
8/28/07   $519 M       
9/25/07     $530 M     
10/26/07       542 M   
11/27/07         $552 M 
Difference $12  $25  $16  $6  ($2)  
Note: M means maturity. Upon contract maturity, the futures owner receives a transfer of SO2 permits.  
SFI(letter)(#) represents the contracts symbol.  
Source: Bloomberg (2013, 2014) 
          
                                                 
32 This is common practice in futures literature and testing (e.g., Tomek and Gray 1970, Sanders, Garcia, 
and Manfredo 2009, Schnake, Karali, and Dorfman 2012) 
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SO2 Spot and Futures Price and Volume 
 The SFI front month contract (SFI1) had a trading range of $1-$1615 from 
December 2004 - 2011 (Figure 3.1).  Figure 3.1 displays the weekly SFI1 and Cantor spot 
prices from 2005 – 2011.  The figure illustrates how both prices traded in a very wide 
price range across years.  During this time both prices maintained very similar, but not 
identical, price movements.  The next three figures display prices from 2008 – 2011; 
Figure 3.2 displays the OTC price and SFI1 futures, Figure 3.3 the OTC price and SFI6 
price, and Figure 3.4 the OTC and SFI12 price.  In 2008 prices all the prices were trading 
above $500.  Then from 2008 on prices began to decline reaching $2 by 2011.  These 
three figures illustrate how spot and futures maintained similar, but not identical, price 
movements over this very volatile time period.  Further the figures illustrate that as the 
futures maturity horizon increases the difference between spot and futures prices 
becomes wider.  This potentially reflects the market pricing adjustments for storage and 
risk across time.   
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Notes: Prices are in $/permit. 
Figure 3.2 SO2 Cantor OTC and SFI1 Month Ahead Futures Prices from 2008 – 
2011 
 
Notes: Prices are in $/permit. 
Figure 3.3 SO2 Cantor OTC and SFI6 Month Ahead Futures Prices from 2008 – 
2011 
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Notes: Prices are in $/permit. 
Figure 3.4 SO2 Cantor Spot and SFI12 Month Ahead Futures Prices from 2008 – 
2011 
 
 For supply, demand, inventory, and price relationships, Figures 3.1 thru 3.4 can 
be considered in relation to the stocks-to-use ratio.  There is no obvious relationship 
between the prices and the stocks-to-use ratio from 2003 to 2008.  However, from 2008 
to 2011, the stocks-to-use ratio increased dramatically while prices fell, which is the 
expected relationship. This relationship needs to be further investigated.   
 Table 3.8 provides the SFI 1-12 month horizon mean price, minimum price, and 
maximum price, and volume, yearly from 2005 to 2011.  To illustrate all the monthly 
horizons the SFI4 - 6, SFI7 – 9, and SFI10 – 12 were grouped together within the table; 
within the data each series was recorded individually.  The SFI 1-12 month yearly 
average volume was 3m permits from 2006 – 2011, peaking in 2009 with 6.8m permits 
traded.  The futures prices traded in broad range from a high of $1,620 to a low $1; again 
this volatility is because of policy rule changes and the ultimate market collapse.  
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Table 3.8 SFI Futures Prices and Volume 2005 - 2011   
Year SFI 1 SFI 2 SFI 3 SFI 4-6 SFI 7-9 SFI 10-12 
2005       
  Mean price $906 $785 $750 $883 $884 $1,294 
  Max price $1,615 $924 $890 $1,620 $1,625 $1,635 
  Min Price $627 $629 $629 $629 $629 $894 
  Volume 2,875 1,225 na na na na 
2006       
  Mean price $704 $600 $623 $687 $688 $729 
  Max price $1,585 $821 $824 $1,588 $1,591 $1,597 
  Min Price $456 $459 $474 $464 $470 $476 
  Volume 298,275 22,484,375 21,968,750 87,625 na na 
2007       
  Mean price $526 $528 $527 $531 $540 $578 
  Max price $720 $722 $725 $731 $749 $758 
  Min Price $390 $392 $393 $395 $398 $496 
  Volume 2,405,600 597,025 33,225 104,250 13550 59875 
2008       
  Mean price $275  $276  $278  $273  $270  $274  
  Max price $534  $536  $538  $477  $546  $550  
  Min Price $91  $91  $92  $92  $94  $95  
  Volume 2,665,325 948,225 433,475 786,100 484075 405975 
2009       
  Mean price $81  $83  $82  $76  $68  $60  
  Max price $215  $216  $218  $225  $226  $230  
  Min Price $57  $57  $57  $30  $30  $30  
  Volume 1,543,200 705,300 939,525 2,547,625 715000 437125 
2010       
  Mean price $18  $19  $17  $16  $16  $17  
  Max price $87  $73  $45  $45  $45  $45  
  Min Price $3  $3  $3  $2  $2  $2  
  Volume 443,525 171,525 106,425 152,725 379000 548675 
2011       
  Mean price $2  $2  $2  $2  $2  $2  
  Max price $6  $6  $6  $6  $6  $6  
  Min Price $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  
  Volume 11,750 0 0 6,000 0 1150 
Note: All prices are in $/permit; a contract is for 25 permits in total volume calculation. 
Source: Own calculations from Bloomberg 2013 data      
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 In 2004, the year of the SFI futures launch, 9.5m permits were issued by EPA, 
10.3m were turned in for compliance, and the banked supply was 6.9m permits.  During 
2004, the Cantor spot price varied between $215 and $722 with a volume of 1.5m 
permits.  SFI futures began trading sparsely in December 2004 with a total volume of 
only 5,075 permits through December 2005.  Then in 2006, SFI trading accelerated 
substantially with a total volume of 458,275 permits.  The SFI volume increase in 2006 
illustrates that more permits were traded on the futures than on the Cantor OTC, which 
had a volume of 390,104 permits for the year.  For the year, SFI 1 prices traded in a range 
of $456 - $1591, similar to that of the Cantor OTC range of $465-$1583.   
 In 2007, the SFI 1-12 month futures had a volume of 3,213,525 permits compared 
to the Cantor volume of 994,413 permits.  SFI futures had over three times the volume of 
the Cantor OTC.  The increasing volume of futures trading continued in 2008.  SFI 
volume increased to 5,723,175 permits.  This was over ten times that of the Cantor 
volume, 319,482 permits.  In 2009, the SFI1-12 futures had twenty-three times the 
volume as the Cantor OTC; SFI1-12 volume was 6,887,775 compared to Cantor volume 
of 295,864.  By directly comparing the Cantor OTC volume of 3,019,828 permits from 
2005 – 2009 against the corresponding SFI1-12 month futures volume of 16,286,850, the 
difference of 13,267,022 permits results illustrates the substantial impact of SFI futures 
on permit trading. 
 In 2009, 2,716 private transactions of past, current and futures vintages 
representing 15.1m permits were recorded.  Of the 2009 trading volume, 4m (26%) 
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permits were traded between economically unrelated parties33. The EPA (2010) estimates 
the total notional value of SO2 permits at $1.1b for 2009 (this is computed by using the 
average Cantor OTC price of $61 for December 2009 based on a volume of 15.1m 
permits).  The 4m of economically unrelated transactions translates to a market value of 
$244m.  Applying the same standards to the 2009 SFI 1-12 month futures, a notional 
value of $420m was realized on a volume of 6.8m.   The futures value was greater than 
all economically unrelated transaction recorded by EPA for that year.  Further in 2009, 
more SFI permits traded hands (6.8m) than were used as compliances in compliance 
(5.7m). 
3.6 SO2 Market Events and Factors 
SO2 CAAA Regulation Challenges - Events 
 The variation in SO2 emissions and permit prices results from many factors – 
economic conditions, new and proposed rules, and court challenges of existing rules 
(Evans and Woodward 2013).  The proposed and promulgated rule changes would have 
essentially altered permit property rights and institutions as designed in the CAAA.  
Potentially these events would in turn alter the permit market structure. From the 
perspective of the permit market, the changes created information uncertainty and an 
increase in price volatility (see Figure 3.1).   For purposes of evaluating SO2 permit spot 
and futures markets, these events are considered new sources of uncertainty and risks to 
the market.  The events to be discussed come from Burtraw and Szambelan (2009), 
                                                 
33 Technically, any SFI futures contracts that were delivered against would be included within the EPA 
number; however, there is no way to separate them out.  By ignoring this fact, the point is conveyed more 
clearly.  If one considers futures within that category, then other trades would actually be decreased and the 
point made strengthened. 
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Schmalensee and Stavins (2012), Chan et. al. (2012), and Evans and Woodward (2013).  
Some highlights of the changes provide context for interpreting the price movements.   
 On December 17, 2003, the EPA proposed the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).  
This rule sought to alter how EPA regulated particulate matter (PM) to account for 
regional effects.  CAIR would create new regulations that altered the permit property 
rights.  In attempting to deal with regional pollution, CAIR proposed creating a set of 
ratios for plant emissions based on the state where a plant was located.  Beginning in 
2010, CAIR proposed that certain states must turn in permits at a ratio of 50% of current 
compliance use standards; then in 2015, the ratio would fall to 35% of current 
compliance use standards.  These ratios implied that one permit was not equal to a ton of 
SO2 for the selected states.  Also, CAIR proposed allowing states to opt out and create 
their own compliance mechanism. Thus by limiting the ratios to values less than one, 
CAIR would require a larger number of permits to be used in overall compliance.  CAIR 
represented a challenge to the SO2 permit market rules and the homogenous permit 
structures established under the initial CAAA permit policy.  On December 17, 2003, the 
CAIR proposal announcement date, the Cantor price was $215 and within one year 
permits were trading at $700. Thus, permit prices increased by 325% as the market 
attempted to evaluate the costs of compliance under the reduced ratio standards.   Permit 
prices continued to increase as the market continued to incorporate the effects of the new 
rule. Cantor spot prices reached highs of $1626 and $1583 in 2005 and 2006 respectively  
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Similarly as SFI futures began active trading, their prices reached a high of $1615 in 
2005 and $1585 in 200634.   
 The next set of influences arose through court challenges. North Carolina 
challenged the EPA rule on June 27, 2006, arguing that the state’s ability to meet the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) was inhibited by cross-state SO2 
emissions.  On the filing date, Cantor and SFI1 prices both closed at $615.  Oral 
arguments were held in March 2008 with North Carolina arguing that CAIR would not 
protect North Carolina from cross-state emission damages.  By the time oral arguments 
had finished, spot prices had dropped to $380 (SFI1 $349) a decline of $225 or 39% 
(SFI1 $266 or 44%) from the initial filing in June 2006. 
 On July 11, 2008, the court ruled for North Carolina and vacated CAIR in its 
entirety finding that states should be prohibited from damaging other states through cross 
pollution (North Carolina v. Environmental Protection Agency 2008).  The ruling implied 
that buying permits to assure compliance with emissions limits was an insufficient 
remedy for CAIR compliance if the emitted SO2 would materially harm another state’s air 
quality.  Further, the court found that EPA had no statutory authority to alter CAAA 
permit policy language as written and passed into law by Congress (North Carolina v. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2008).  The permit market reacted with a decline in 
spot permit prices from $287 to $123 on that day (July 11, 2008) representing a 57% 
decline.  Similarly, SFI1 futures prices went from $298 to $123, a 56% decline.  Overall 
                                                 
34 At times, the SFI futures prices will be presented in parentheses following Cantor Spot prices throughout 
the discussion.  Also, the Cantor price will be referred to as just the spot price. 
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permit prices were very volatile for July 2008, ranging from $325 to $93 (SFI1 $324-
$91).     
 Subsequently, EPA requested a rehearing on September 28, 2008, and the court 
took arguments considering the prospect for temporarily reinstating CAIR on October 21, 
2008.  On October 21, 2008, spot prices closed at $142 (SFI1 $141).  During this period, 
Congress also debated new legislation that would have enacted CAIR as a statute and 
used the CAAA permits as the ratio mechanism (Frass and Richardson 2012, Evans and 
Woodward 2013). 
 A court ruling on December 23, 2008, left CAIR and the CAIR Federal 
Implementation Plans -- including the CAIR trading programs -- in place until EPA 
issued a new rule to replace CAIR.  The permit market reacted with prices rising from 
$164 to $192 (SFI1 $147-$211), a single day increase of 17% (SFI 44%).   
Then on July 6, 2010, the EPA proposed the Transport Rule to control SO2.   The rule 
represented a response to the court’s remand of CAIR.  In the three days following the 
proposal, prices dropped from $26 to $19 (SFI1 $8-$4), a 27% (SFI1 50%) decline.  The 
Transport Rule became known as the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and was 
implemented in July 2011 at which time OTC prices were $5.50 (SFI1 $1.5) with 
thinning volume.  The rule was promulgated in August 2011 and was structured as an 
elaborate regional trading program.  The elaborate structure was a result of trying to 
account for regional impacts in equating ratios for different states and plant sources.   
 For my purposes, CSAPR is a completely new regime for dealing with SO2 
emissions and was separate from CAAA permit trading policy.  It established a different 
environmental objective, by considering both regional and cross state pollution.  CSAPR 
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represents an overlapping regulation that effectively displaces the CAAA permit property 
rights. All CAAA SO2 permit trading ceased, and the market collapsed shortly after 
CSAPR was promulgated in August 2011.  As a result, October 2011 is considered as the 
end for any meaningful CAAA SO2 permit trading.  The Cantor SO2 OTC is no longer a 
listed market and SFI futures were delisted in March of 2012.  
 Interestingly, due to CSPAR’s complex equating of sources, the rule was 
immediately challenged in court.  On August 21, 2012, CSAPR was vacated by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Currently, SO2 regulations are still being 
debated with no established long term policy.  Further, all of the EPA SO2 proposals 
attempt to regulate SO2 emissions through regional permit markets.    
Electricity Sector Market Factors and Events 
 SO2 emissions result primarily from electricity production.  It follows that the 
electricity market directly influences the SO2 permit market.  In these production 
activities, each fuel source produces a different SO2 emission profile.  Of the 4,054 
billion kilowatt-hours of electricity produced in 2012, coal accounted for 37%, natural 
gas 30%, nuclear 19%, hydropower 7%, renewables 5% and petroleum 1%.  The majority 
of power plants in the U.S. are located east of the Mississippi River.  Coal is produced 
from three major seams: the Central Appalachian, Illinois Basin, and Powder River Basin 
(PRB).  Each type of coal carries its own price, produces different levels of electricity per 
ton, and results in different levels of SO2 emissions per ton.  PRB coal, mined in 
Wyoming and Montana, is the cheapest to produce and is the lowest in sulfur content.  By 
1999, PRB coal was used in 95% of Phase I regulated power plants west of the 
Mississippi and 40-45% of the plants east of the Mississippi (Busse and Keohane 2007).  
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Central Appalachian coal is more expensive to mine and has high sulfur content.  With 
costs and a time lag, coal plants can switch production from high to low sulfur coal or 
vice versa.  A firm’s decision to switch coal sources depends upon the price of coal, the 
amount of electricity production per ton, transportation costs, permit prices, and 
regulatory considerations.   
 Within 2011, over 70% of coal was delivered by rail.  Coal accounted for 43% of 
total rail tonnage and 25% of gross rail revenue in 2011.  Coal is a low cost source of 
electricity not only because of its cost per kilowatt hour of electricity output but also 
because of cost effective shipping35.   
 Technological innovation in fuel used per ton of electricity output and in 
emissions reduction is another factor that affects the operation of permit markets.  Flue 
gas desulfurization (scrubbers) is the major source for retrofitting existing coal plants to 
lower emissions.  Since the inception of CAAA, the number of installed scrubbers has 
doubled (Chan et. al. 2012).  Specifically through examination of patent data before and 
after CAAA permit system passage, Popp (2003) found evidence that the permit system 
led to an increase in the patents associated with an improvement in SO2 removal 
efficiency. 
 Of the 263 units regulated in Phase I, 52% pursued fuel switching or blending 
low-sulfur coal with higher-sulfur coal, accounting for a 59% reduction of SO2 emissions 
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2012).   
                                                 
35 Railroad deregulation occurred in the 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act and again 
in the 1980 Staggers Rail Act.   The railroad deregulation allowed railroads to set freight rates.  The 
deregulation led to lower freight rates for coal transportation essentially making long distance PRB coal 
more competitive.   
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 In the U.S., the electricity sector is the largest emitter of CO2 emissions.  In 
electricity production, both CO2 and SO2 are emitted.  Depending on regulatory structure 
and stringency, CO2 emissions control had the potential to override SO2 permit effects on 
firms’ compliance behavior. In the 2007 presidential campaign, all three major candidates 
supported a national CO2 cap and trade system, which would have led to an exogenous, 
long-run decline in SO2 emissions (Chan et. al. 2012).  Once the election was over, with 
the support of President Obama and key legislators, CO2 emissions control through 
permit policy was considered.  In 2009, the House of Representatives introduced and 
passed the Waxman-Markey Bill which would have established a permit trading system 
for CO2 emissions control. The bill was considered dead by 2010.  However, its potential 
impacts on SO2 policy affected permit markets and was closely followed by the power 
sector36.    
 Other macro factors affecting emissions include Hurricane Katrina on August 25, 
2005.  This storm caused a severe disruption to electricity production and transportation 
across the U.S.   In May 2005, rail track failures affecting delivery of low-sulfur coal 
from the PRB to Midwestern power plants occurred on both the Union Pacific and 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroads.  The failures caused low-sulfur coal prices in the 
Midwest to peak in December 2005 at a level three times greater than a year earlier.  The 
financial crises and great recession of 2007 - 2012 also led to a slowing in economic 
output subsequently resulting in lower electricity demand.   
 
                                                 
36 Through the Clean Air Act the Supreme Court has upheld EPA’s right to control CO2 emissions as a 
criteria air pollutant.  In 2014 EPA announced CO2 regulations covering the electricity sector which 
directly impact SO2 emissions (also a criteria air pollutant) from power plants. 
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3.7 SO2 Policy: Conclusion 
 The CAAA SO2 permit trading policy marked a new approach to regulating 
external effects caused by SO2 emissions.  After 25 years of command and control 
regulations, policymakers sought a market based approach with minimal government 
involvement.  Permit property rights were designed to be bankable with one permit equal 
to one ton of emissions.  Phase I permit trading began in 1995 with the issuing of 8.7m 
permits.  At the end of Phase I in 2000, trading activity had expanded allowing firms to 
realize gains from trading by equating abatement costs across sources.  Additionally, a 
large permit bank consisting of over one year’s supply was available for use at the 
beginning of Phase II. 
 Phase II began in 2000 with an expanded coverage encompassing virtually all 
electricity generating units.  In its first year, 10m permits were issued and 11.2m permits 
were used in compliance.  The bank reached a low point in 2005 with just over a seven 
month permit supply at the current emissions rate.  At that point, emissions began to 
decline below permit issuance levels, reaching a level equal to 5.1m permits in 2010.  
Thus by 2010, firms had reduced yearly emissions by over 50% while total electricity 
production rose.  The result was that the permit bank exceeded a three year supply at 
emission levels by 2010.  Through these years, regulated firms had an almost perfect 
record of policy compliance. To facilitate trading activity, OTC spot markets were 
formed.   
 SFI SO2 futures were introduced in December 2004 as an alternative pricing 
mechanism, marking the first environmental permit futures ever launched.  Through 
electronic trading, SFI futures offered an alternative means to hedge permits, allocate 
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compliance costs through time (inventory allocation), and promote price discovery. SFI 
volume grew rapidly, peaking in 2009 with over 6.8m permits traded in that year.  From 
2006 through the end of permit trading in 2011, SFI futures volume was greater than that 
of the primary OTC market.  SFI prices were also very volatile, ranging from $1 to $1615 
over the period from 2004 to 2011, as the market responded to an ever changing 
regulatory environment. 
 The CAAA SO2 permit policy was subject to considerable uncertainty over the 
period with rule changes and court cases beginning in 2003.  This uncertainty reflected 
challenges to CAAA permit property rights as initially passed into law and resulted in 
extreme price volatility and the ultimate market collapse in 2011.     
 CAAA SO2 permit policy was the first to have a futures contract.  The SFI futures 
contract formed a liquid market, facilitated price discovery, and offered intertemporal 
pricing, all at a low cost.  The SFI market achieved this through an independent 
exchange.   
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CHAPTER 4 
EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME FOR CO2 
4.1 Introduction 
 The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2 permit 
trading was created in 2003 by EU Directive 2003/87/EC.  The policy was established as 
a means to control aggregate CO2 emissions’ effect on global temperature rise. The 
policy represented the first, cross country, permit trading system and covered over thirty 
European countries.  To encompass all the diverse countries, a homogenous permit equal 
to one ton of CO2 emissions was created.  A futures market was formed to facilitate 
permit trading and compliance for the over two billion permits issued yearly.  The 
objective of this chapter is to describe the factors that influence CO2 permit and futures 
market formation and performance. 
 The chapter begins by describing the legislation establishing the system and rules 
for permit exchange.  After that background, the influence of specific rules on the market 
over time is discussed. This includes consideration of how the permits were issued, used 
in compliance, and affected inventory levels.  In the next section the spot and futures 
markets’ prices and trading volume are described.  The chapter concludes by discussing 
events that potentially affected the market performance over time. 
4.2 European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2 
 EU ETS Policy 
 The EU ETS’s CO2 permit trading goal is to reduce 2020 CO2 emissions by 20% 
from 1990 levels through the use of permit trading as a means to limit global temperature 
rise to no more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.  The EU ETS CO2 
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system has three phases: EU ETS Phase I 2005-2007, EU ETS Phase II 2008-2012, and 
EU ETS Phase III 2013-2020.  In October 2014, the EU reached an agreement extending 
CO2 permit trading from 2020 to 2030 when it is expected that the program will have 
reduced emissions by 40% from 1990 levels.   
 This research examines CO2 Phase II and III over the years 2008 – July 2014 
because permits were identical during both of these phases.  CO2 Phase I was not 
considered because it was a trial phase, and permits were not allowed to be used in the 
later phases.   
 Baseline level emissions in 1990 were 5,574 million (m) tons of CO2 for the 27 
member states in the EU ETS37.  A breakdown of total emissions by country from 1990-
2011 is provided in Table 4.1.  Germany, France, and the UK accounted for 46% (2,573m 
tons) of the total in 1990.  The three smallest countries of Luxemburg, Cyprus, and Malta 
had total emissions of 21m tons in 1990, comprising less than 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 All emissions are discussed as CO2 tons; this is consistent with EU reporting (e.g. EC 2014).  However, 
the EU emissions levels technically represent the CO2 equivalent of total EU greenhouse gases.  CO2 
represents over 80% of total greenhouse gases.  
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Table 4.1 Total EU 27 CO2 Equivalent Emissions (Regulated and Nonregulated)   
Country 1990 2000 2005 2008 2011 
Austria 78 80 93 87 83 
Belgium 143 146 143 137 120 
Denmark 69 68 64 64 56 
Finland 70 69 69 70 67 
France 556 559 558 531 486 
Germany 1,250 1,041 998 975 916 
Greece 105 126 135 130 115 
Ireland 55 68 69 68 58 
Italy 519 551 574 541 489 
Luxembourg 13 10 13 12 12 
Netherlands 212 213 209 203 194 
Portugal 61 84 88 78 70 
Spain 283 379 433 399 350 
Sweden 73 69 67 63 61 
United Kingdom 767 674 658 630 553 
EU-15 4,255 4,138 4,173 3,989 3,631 
Bulgaria 110 60 64 67 66 
Cyprus 6 9 9 10 9 
Czech Republic 196 146 145 142 133 
Estonia 41 17 18 20 21 
Hungary 99 78 79 74 66 
Latvia 26 10 11 12 11 
Lithuania 49 20 23 25 22 
Malta 2 3 3 3 3 
Poland 457 385 390 400 399 
Romania 244 134 142 140 123 
Slovakia 72 49 51 49 45 
Slovenia 18 19 20 21 20 
EU-27 5,574 5,067 5,126 4,951 4,548 
Notes: All numbers are in millions of tons; the total excludes land use, land use change 
and forestry (LULUCF)  
Source EEA 2013 
 CO2 emissions result from the combustion of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, and 
petroleum) for energy and transportation, along with certain industrial processes and 
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land-use changes38.  All CO2 emission point sources contribute equally in forming 
aggregate stocks of CO2.  Because geographically diverse firms, industries, and 
countries’ CO2 emissions affect aggregate levels equally, the law considers a ton of CO2 
emitted in Belgium or a ton of CO2 emitted in Poland as having the same effect on overall 
emission levels.   
 The EU ETS regulates specific industry sector CO2 emissions that represent 40% 
of total 1990 emissions39.  The regulated sectors were power and heat generation, 
commercial and private aviation, industrial plants for timber products, and energy 
intensive industries which include oil refineries, steel works and production of iron, 
aluminum, metals, cement, lime, glass, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids and bulk 
organic chemicals 40.  Within these sectors, any industrial installation is covered with a 
thermal input greater than 20 megawatts (MW) of electricity.  The energy sector is the 
largest regulated sector.  In 2009, the energy sector accounted for 65% of allocated 
permits and 75% of exercised permits and these proportions are representative of all 
years (Rickels, Görlich and Oberst 2010).   
 A permit is equivalent to one ton of CO2 emissions
41.  Each permit is issued in a 
given year, termed a vintage year.  Permits enter the market in two ways --  as free 
endowments to firms or through auctions.  Permits are issued, held, traded, and turned in 
                                                 
38 An example of a land-use change is the clearing of a forest.  
39 This means 60% of CO2 emissions are not regulated.     
40 The aviation sector didn't begin partial participation until 2012 and full participation until 2013.  Specific 
EU industry classification codes can be found using NACE which represents the Statistical Classification 
of Economic Activities in the European Community 
(https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/asset_release/statistical-classification-economic-activities-european-
community).  
41 Permits control CO2 not carbon; the distinction is made because 1 ton of carbon is equal to 3.67 tons of 
CO2. 
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for compliance through electronic registries.  The accounts are standardized based on EU 
and United Nations data exchange standards to track the vintages, inventory, and transfer 
of permits.  In a given year, the binding cap is the total of free endowments issued plus 
auctioned permits of that vintage year and any accumulated market inventory (bank). 
 Enforcement and Reporting 
 The rules for monitoring and implementation of the EU ETS are outlined in 
Council Decision No 280/2004/EC and 2003/87/EC.  Their objective is to ensure the 
timeliness, completeness, accuracy, consistency, comparability and transparency of 
reporting by the EU and its members states.  The European Environmental Agency 
(EEA) is responsible for policy operations.  Permits are issued on February 28 of each 
year.  For yearly compliance (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31), the EC must receive a verified emissions 
report from each installation for the prior year by March 31 of the current year.  Permits 
required for compliance in the prior year are due by April 30 of the current year. For 
noncompliance, a permit must be submitted in the subsequent year in addition to a fee of 
€40/ton for CO2 Phase I and €100/ton for CO2 Phase II and III.  The EEA reports the 
yearly greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories, CO2 emission levels, and permit activity to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol targets.   
Phase II Permit Distribution Rules 
 A national allocation plan (NAP) is each member state’s rule for permit 
endowment allocation among the regulated firms within each sector.  In Phase II up to 
10% of permits could be auctioned.  Once each state creates its NAP, the plan is 
submitted to the EC for approval.  During Phase II the aggregate sum of each member 
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state’s NAP formed the total permit cap.  The EC considers this a bottom up approach to 
establishing permits caps (EC 2012a).   
 The majority of NAPs were created based on historical and projected emissions 
but some member states also used benchmarking, which allows the number of permits 
issued annually to change based on an established benchmark.  All three types of NAP 
estimates are directly related to firm economic output.   
 Of the participating countries, the EU-15 (comprising Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) were bound to participation through a 
common target commitment to the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU15 commitment to the Kyoto 
Protocol required these countries to decrease CO2 emissions 8% from 1990 baseline 
levels.  The EU15 Kyoto commitment requires achieving the EU ETS 20% goal by 2020.  
The other participating countries (comprising Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) were only bound to the EU ETS directive and did not have a 
common Kyoto Protocol target.  This means that the two types of commitments carry 
different emission reduction goals on a percentage basis.  Even though the EU-15 
commitment is different, the two standards are nonetheless enforced under a common 
agreement: the EU ETS.     
 CO2 Phase II NAPs were viewed as complicated, not uniform, and in some cases 
required several rounds of revision before acceptance.  Political pressure for free permits 
to help maintain cross border competiveness was exerted on member states and industry 
ministers.  Effectively the 27 states were pressured individually from within to get a 
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favorable allocation for their industries to compete in the EU ETS.  This is illustrated by 
the fact that 23 initial NAPs had to be revised lower by the EC (i.e., a more stringent cap 
was needed than the country proposed).  These reductions demonstrate the problems 
created by having individual states create targets for themselves in aggregate policy 
formation.  The final 2008 cap was set at 1,957m permits; this cap was 368m permits 
lower than the initial proposals,  
Phase III Permit Distribution Rules 
 Phase III permits are identical to those in Phase II.  This was intentionally 
intended to maintain a continuous program.  Phase III runs from 2013through 2020 and 
covers more than 12,000 power plants and manufacturing installations.  The new EU ETS 
agreement extends the policy and banking provisions until 2030.  It encompasses the 28 
EU member states, Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, as well as emissions from airlines 
flying between European airports.  Permit issuance is based on revised rules adopted as 
part of the EU climate and energy package on April 23, 2009, the Commission Decision 
2010/384/EU in July 2010, and the Commission Decision 2010/634/EU in October 2010.   
 The revised rules eliminated NAPs and established a harmonized system for 
endowment allocations across all participating countries, termed national implementation 
measures (NIMS).  This change was a shift to a top down approach for setting permit 
levels.  NIMS use a benchmarking rule for distribution.  The benchmarks use the 
principle of “one product - one benchmark.”  Because the benchmark methodology is 
based on one product, it does not differentiate according to technology, plant size, 
location, or fuel used.  Generally, the benchmarks are set by taking the average GHG 
emissions from the top 10% product producing installations (EC 2014). The benchmark 
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is then used to set the endowment levels of all firms based on their production levels 
within that sector.  
 The rules also increased the use of auctions as a means of distributing permits.  In 
2013 over 40% of the allowances were auctioned.  The proportion is set to increase 
yearly with over half of the allowances expected to be auctioned by 2020 (EC 2014). The 
system requires that power companies purchase all permits through auctions (i.e., they no 
longer receive any free endowments).  However power companies in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania received exemptions 
from this rule and continue to receive a decreasing number of free endowments thru 
2019.   
International Emission Reduction Credits 
 CO2 Phase II and III allow installations to surrender international emission 
reduction credits generated through the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms in order to 
offset a part of their emissions (EC 2012a).  The reduction credits can be created in two 
forms.  The first, called the Clean Development Mechanism, refers to Article 12 which 
allows Annex B parties (industrialized countries) to invest in emission reduction projects 
in non-Annex B parties (mainly developing countries).  These credits are termed 
Certified Emission Reductions (CER). These credits were established to allow flexibility 
in compliance and to promote cross border projects.  For example, if an EU firm built 
wind turbine capacity in Nigeria, this project would qualify for CER credits. 
 The second form of credits is the Joint Implementation mechanism.  It was 
created in Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol and allows Annex B parties to invest in 
emission reduction projects in other Annex B countries.  These reduction credits are 
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termed Emission Reduction Units (ERU).   They allow industrialized country firms to 
qualify for credits for emission reduction investments within other industrialized 
countries.   
 One ERU or CER is set equivalent to one CO2 permit in Phase II and III 
compliance.  The EU tracks the use of ERUs and CERs in an electronic registry similar to 
CO2 permits. Upon project approval and documentation ERU and CER registries are 
granted to the account holder.  The account holder can then use CER and CER permits in 
CO2 compliance, bank them, or sell them.  Within the EC documentation and research 
literature CERs and ERUs are generally counted as a permit because of their equivalence 
in use; for instance, if a CER was used in CO2 compliance it would be counted as a 
permit turned in.  From a policy perspective, ERUs and CERs are created by companies’ 
investment projects independently.  Thus, their supply flow is separated from the annual 
EU ETS CO2 permit issuance.  
 The maximum number of international emission reduction credits allowed for 
Phase II 2008-2012 compliance use was 1,400m credits.  This represents a possible 
supply increase of 13.4% to that of the CO2 issued permits.  Phase III allows for an 
additional 300m international emission reduction credits to be used for a total of 1,700m 
credits over both Phase II and III (2008-2020).  These rules allow CERs and ERUs to 
potentially influence the supply of permits for CO2 emissions compliance.   
4.3  Data 
Three primary types of data are discussed in the following sections and later used in 
empirical testing.   
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1) Actual CO2 permit issuance, compliance, inventory levels, and international 
credits (CERs and ERUs).  The data was collected from the EC website, EEA website, 
and EU reports (e.g., EC 2010, EC 2014).     
2) CO2 spot market prices.  The Point Carbon CO2 over the counter (OTC) market 
price is a composite price compiled by Point Carbon and used by the European 
Commission.  Daily spot prices from July 2008 – December 31, 2012, and monthly spot 
prices from January 2013 - July 2014 were purchased directly from Point Carbon (2014).  
Volume data was not available through Point Carbon in connection with the composite 
price. 
3) CO2 futures prices.  The European Union Allowance futures contract served as 
the primary CO2 futures contract. EUA daily prices, volume, contract symbols, and open 
interest for all monthly contracts were gathered from July 2008 – July 2014 as sourced 
from Bloomberg (2013, 2014).     
Point Carbon’s OTC price is a composite of prices from CO2 OTC market housed 
on Bluenext, Climex, the European Energy Exchange, Green Exchange, ICE and Nord 
Pool from July 2008 – July 2013.  The price is taken as the average of the closing prices 
reported to Point Carbon by the respective exchanges.  In July 2013, Point Carbon 
changed its OTC spot price series to reflect only prices on ICE’s OTC because of 
extremely thin volume on the other OTCs (Point Carbon 2014).  This marked a change in 
the OTC composition reporting with possible effects from thinning volume on some of 
the exchanges that affected composition price levels prior to the change.   
 Next these sources are discussed in the context of permit issuance, supply, and 
use in compliance along with ERU and CER levels.  Spot OTCs and futures volume and 
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prices are then discussed.  The price series used in empirical estimation are described in 
Chapter Seven.   
4.4 CO2 Permit Markets   
Phase I Market 
 For purposes of this research, Phase I is considered a separate trial phase. It did 
serve several important roles though.  It was the first CO2 permit market.  It set up the 
monitoring, data collection, and reporting system.  OTC spot markets and futures markets 
for trading were formed.  At the end of Phase I, these trading mediums transitioned to 
markets for Phase II permit exchange.  Thus, spot OTC markets and futures markets were 
already identified for permit exchange at the start of Phase II.   
CO2 Phase II (2008-2012) & III (2013 – 2020) Issued Permits 
 CO2 Phase II (2008-2012) began in 2008 with the allocation of 1,957m permits 
covering more than 11,500 industrial instillations in 30 countries42.  As provided in the 
initial directive, NAPs were created by each country to establish Phase II caps.   
 During Phase II, the total of permits issued were 1,994m, 2,024m, 2,070m, 
2,084m, and 2,228m permits for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 respectively (EC 
2012a).  This total consists of both free endowments and those auctioned.  Of this total , 
auctioned permits were 44m, 66m, 86m, and 87m in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 
respectively (EC 2012a).  In 2008 Germany, Spain, France, the UK, Italy, and Poland 
were each allocated several hundred permits for a total of 1,299m permits or 66% of the 
                                                 
42 The aviation sector was brought into the EU ETS in 2012.  Aircrafts accounted for 84m permits in 2012.   
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total.  Table 4.2 provides each nation’s Phase II and III (2008-2013) allocation and 
verified permits (permits used in compliance).  
 The 2013 permit issuance marked the beginning of Phase III which used the new 
harmonized permit allocation rules.  The total permit allocation was set at 2,084m 
permits, of which 926m were auctioned (EC 2014).  Permit auctions are run by 
exchanges/brokerage houses for the member states.  For instance, the UK auctions are 
run by the ICE exchange and Germany’s by European Energy Exchange.    
 During Phase II and III, permits used in compliance declined.  This reduction 
likely reflects success in meeting the goal of reducing total GHGs43.  Twenty-three of the 
29 countries decreased the number of exercised permits from 2008 to 2012.  Of these, 
nineteen countries decreased emissions by over one million tons.  Italy had the largest 
decrease in exercised permits of over 38m.  During these years Sweden had the largest 
increase in permit use of over 2.4m.   
Table 4.2 CO2 EU ETS Permits Allocated and Verified in Compliance 2008 – 2012 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Country All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified 
Austria 30.2 32.0 31.9 27.3 32.7 30.9 32.6 30.6 35.4 29.6 
Belgium 55.4 55.5 56.8 46.2 56.0 50.1 56.6 46.2 61.6 45.1 
Bulgaria 38.3 38.3 40.6 32.0 35.3 33.5 41.5 40.0 43.1 35.4 
Croatia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cyprus 4.8 5.6 4.8 0.1 5.4 5.1 5.8 4.6 6.7 4.6 
Czech Rep 85.6 80.4 85.9 73.8 86.1 75.6 86.4 74.2 87.2 70.2 
Denmark 24.0 26.5 23.9 25.5 23.9 25.3 23.9 21.5 25.2 19.5 
Estonia 11.7 13.5 11.9 10.3 11.9 14.5 15.9 14.8 14.3 13.6 
Finland 36.5 36.2 37.1 34.3 37.9 41.3 38.0 35.1 40.3 30.7 
France 129.6 124.1 128.7 111.1 138.5 115.2 139.5 105.7 160.0 112.9 
Germany 388.8 472.7 392.3 428.2 400.5 454.9 400.8 450.3 467.3 468.2 
 
                                                 
43 The total of verified permits used in compliance reflects the total emissions emitted in a year; because 
CERs and ERUs can be used to create permits, they do not alter the verified number of emissions emitted 
in a year.  They do alter the total permit supply.   
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Table 4.2 (Cont’d) CO2 EU ETS Permits Allocated and Verified in Compliance 2008 
– 2012 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  
Country All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified All. Verified 
Hungary 25.0 27.2 23.9 22.4 25.7 23.0 25.0 22.5 26.2 22.4 
Ireland 20.0 20.4 20.0 17.2 21.0 17.4 21.6 15.8 28.8 26.2 
Iceland N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.4 0.4 
Italy 211.8 220.7 204.0 184.8 200.0 191.5 195.3 190.0 197.6 182.6 
Latvia 2.9 2.7 3.5 2.5 4.5 3.2 4.6 2.9 5.3 3.0 
Liechtenstein 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Lithuania 7.5 6.1 7.6 5.8 8.2 6.4 8.0 5.6 8.4 5.8 
Luxemburg 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.1 4.8 3.6 
Malta 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.3 
Netherlands 76.8 83.5 83.8 81.1 84.8 84.7 88.8 80.0 99.4 80.6 
Norway 7.5 19.3 8.0 19.2 8.0 19.3 8.4 19.2 9.5 20.5 
Poland 201.0 204.1 201.0 191.0 205.6 199.7 207.2 203.0 213.5 197.3 
Portugal 30.5 29.9 30.5 28.3 32.5 24.2 33.0 25.0 35.1 26.8 
Romania 71.6 64.1 73.7 48.6 75.0 47.3 74.8 51.2 75.6 48.4 
Slovak Rep 32.2 25.3 32.5 21.6 32.4 21.7 32.6 22.2 33.5 21.0 
Slovenia 8.2 8.9 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.0 8.3 7.7 
Spain 154.0 163.5 151.0 136.9 151.0 121.5 151.4 132.7 163.6 140.1 
Sweden 20.8 20.1 21.1 17.5 23.6 22.7 22.7 19.9 25.9 22.5 
UK 214.3 265.1 217.0 231.9 220.6 237.4 223.4 220.9 283.5 247.2 
TOTAL(1) 1,957.1 2,119.6 1,967.4 1,873.2 1,998.6 1,938.6 2,016.9 1,904.6 2,228.7 1,950.4 
Notes: All numbers are in millions of permits.  Slight discrepancies in the data may exist as separate reports 
were used to describe all the years.  Allocated permits only reflect CO2 permits.  A country’s allocated 
permits are then distributed as both free endowments and through auctions.  Verified is used to describe the 
total of permit and permit equivalents (ERUs and CERs) used in compliance for CO2 emissions emitted in 
that year.  Source: own calculations from EC 2009a, EC 2010a, EC 2012d,  
    
International Emission Reduction Credits 
  CERs and ERUs provide a supply flow not based on member state emission 
levels.  Through 2013, 1,246m international emission reduction credits were turned into 
permit equivalents; these could be used for CO2 compliance, held as inventory, or sold.  
Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of these credits from 2008-2013.  Over these years 
164m, 159m, 248m, 429m, 713m, and 264m credits have been used respectively.  Of 
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total international emission reduction credits, CERs accounted for 59% (731m) and ERUs 
41% (515m).  Of the CERs total, China, India, South Korea and Brazil accounted for 
over 90% through 2011 (EC 2012b).  The main suppliers of ERUs have been Ukraine, 
Russia, Eastern and parts of Central Europe (e.g., Bulgaria) (Nazifi 2013).   At the end of 
Phase II, international emission reduction credits accounted for over 10% of EU ETS 
permit compliance (EC 2012b).   
Table 4.3 Permit Inventory, CERs, and ERUs 2008 – 2013 
Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CERs  82 78 114 177 214 66 
ERUs  0 3 20 75 285 132 
Total Bank   -80 94 288 652 1,430 2,100 
     (CO2, CER, and ERU permits)     
Notes: Inventory is [(Year total -exercised)+prior year inventory].  Because this table was created 
from different data reports and includes CERs and ERUs registered in a year, it is not directly 
comparable to table 4.2. 
Source complication of numbers drawn from annual reports EC 2009a, EC 2010, EC 2011, EC 
2012b, EC 2013a, EC 2014 
 
 Permit Inventory and Compliance 
 The permit inventory is composed of permit market inventory and permit 
equivalents (CERs and ERUs) that have been turned into permits.  The inventory of 
permits from 2008 to 2013 was -80m, 94m, 288m, 652m 1,430m, 2,100m respectively.  
Because Phase II started a new market, the initial permit inventory was zero.  Over each 
consecutive year, the inventory levels grew.   
 A stocks-to-use ratio can be used to further understand permit supply, demand, 
and inventory conditions (see equation 3.1).  In December, the lowest yearly inventory 
point, the stocks-to use ratio was just under one month in 2009, over one and a half 
months in 2010, over four months in 2011, over eight months in 2012, and over a full 
year’s supply by 2013.  It is reasonable to assume that the excess permit supply will 
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continue to grow because Phase III runs through 2030, a large inventory currently exists, 
CERs & ERUs can be created adding to supply, and current yearly permit issuance is 
greater than yearly compliance.  
 EU ETS compliance was over 99% in 2013 (EC 2014).  By the compliance 
deadline, less than 1% of the participating installations had not surrendered allowances 
for their 2013 emissions. These installations are typically small firms and together 
account for less than 1% of emissions covered by the EU ETS (EC 2014).  These 
compliance numbers are representative of compliance for all years over the 2008 through 
2013 period (EC 2014).    
  Spot OTC and Futures Market Prices 
 The Phase II and III CO2 permit market consisted of a spot market, futures market 
and a link to the international emission reduction credit market through the equivalence 
compliance rule.  The spot pricing mechanisms were private negotiations, OTC markets, 
auctions and brokerage facilitated transactions.  OTC markets were housed on Bluenext, 
Climex, the European Energy Exchange, Green Exchange, ICE and Nord Pool.  These six 
markets generate Point Carbon’s spot CO2 OTC permit price.  OTC permit prices traded 
from €15.53 – 28.66 in 2008, €9.95 – 15.06 in 2009, €12.57 – 16.35 in 2010, €7.93 – 
16.96 in 2011, €5.95 – 8.65 in 2012, and €2.87 – 6.37 in 2013.  
 The ICE EUA futures contract is the primary futures market instrument.  An EUA 
Phase II and III futures contract was for a lot of 1000 emission permits.  EUA contracts 
are physically deliverable by the transfer of emission allowances from an acceptable 
trading account of the selling member to the specified trading account of ICE Clear 
Europe (ICE 2013).  EUA contracts could also be delivered from the trading account of 
 77 
 
ICE Clear Europe to an acceptable trading account of the buying member (ICE 2013).  
EUA contracts mature the last Monday of the contract month.  If the last Monday is a 
non-business day or there is a non-business day in the four days following the last 
Monday, the last day of trading will be the penultimate Monday of the delivery month.  
EUA futures transaction fees were €2.00 per side per contract for members’ proprietary 
business and €2.50 per side per contract for nonproprietary business.  This translates into 
an EUA transaction fee 0.017% of a permit’s value based on 2010 prices.  Appendix C 
provides a EUA futures contract specification sheet and also lists all of the futures 
contracts that traded from 2008 – 2013.   
Table 4.4 EUA Futures and OTC Price and Volume from 2008-2013 
Year EUA 1 EUA 2 EUA 3 OTC 
2008     
  Mean price € 22.67 € 23.00 € 23.34 € 21.32 
  Min Price € 13.72 € 14.36 € 14.36 € 14.50 
  Max price € 29.33 € 30.53 € 30.53 € 29.38 
  Volume 1,083,622,000 191,715,000 92,057,000 N/A 
2009     
  Mean price € 13.21 € 13.35 € 13.48 € 13.16 
  Min Price € 8.06 € 8.06 € 8.06 € 8.25 
  Max price € 15.63 € 15.87 € 15.87 € 15.15 
  Volume 510,603,000 616,621,000 787,323,000 N/A 
2010     
  Mean price € 14.38 € 14.48 € 14.37 € 14.32 
  Min Price € 12.22 € 12.41 € 12.41 € 12.24 
  Max price € 16.42 € 16.47 € 16.52 € 15.64 
  Volume 549,345,000 653,573,000 1,112,260,000 N/A 
2011     
  Mean price € 12.52 € 11.61 € 12.76 € 13.02 
  Min Price € 6.45 € 6.48 € 6.56 € 6.41 
  Max price € 16.79 € 16.73 € 16.96 € 16.81 
  Volume 805,328,000 282,330,000 299,517,000 N/A 
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Table 4.4 (Cont’d) EUA Futures and OTC Price and Volume from 2008-2013 
Year EUA 1 EUA 2 EUA 3 OTC 
2012     
  Mean price € 7.39 € 7.40 € 7.39 € 7.35 
  Min Price € 5.72 € 5.74 € 5.76 € 5.89 
  Max price € 9.28 € 9.30 € 9.12 € 8.97 
  Volume 1,146,982,000 390,862,000 383,414,000 N/A 
2013     
  Mean price € 4.50 € 4.50 € 4.51 € 4.50 
  Min Price € 2.87 € 2.87 € 2.88 € 2.75 
  Max price € 6.37 € 6.38 € 6.40 € 6.53 
  Volume N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Note: All prices are in €/ton; each EUA contract is for 1,000 permits (1000 tons).  Due to 
futures listing, only the 1-3 month series were created.  2013 individual volume series 
were not gathered.  
Source own calculations from Bloomberg (2013, 2014) and Point Carbon (2014) 
 
 ICE EUA futures were listed for trading at the start of Phase II.  In 2011, EUA 
futures contract listings were changed.  There are now monthly maturing contracts which 
begin trading three months in advance.  Quarterly futures contracts are listed three years 
in advance for the months of March, June, September, and December.  Because of the 
contract listing changes, the data series used are EUA1 -3 month horizons (see the futures 
section in Chapter Three for a description of futures series formation).  Table 4.4 
provides a detailed description of the yearly EUA1-3 month futures and OTC mean, 
minimum, and maximum price along with total volume.  ICE EUA1 month ahead futures 
traded in the range €13.72-29.33 in 2008, €8.06-15.63 in 2009, €12.22 - 16.42 in 2010, 
€6.45 - 16.42 in 2011 and €5.72 - 9.28 in 2012, and €2.93 – 6.53 in 2013.  Slight 
variation between the prices exists but overall values largely maintain similar ranges.   
 Total EUA volume of permit traded in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 we 
1,991m, 3,775m and 4,266 m, 5,442m, 6,464m, and 7,257m respectively. Futures volume 
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has increased in every year of the market. After 2009, more permit futures traded than 
were used in yearly compliance.       
 Figure 4.1 graphs the EUA1 month futures and spot OTC prices from July 2008 – 
July 2012. This figure and Table 4.4 illustrate how prices began above €25 in 2008.  
Since then prices have declined to a trading range of €5 - 10 by 2014.  The table also 
illustrates how prices traded in a wider yearly range in the beginning years.  The figure 
and table imply that as prices declined, yearly volatility (yearly price range) also appears 
to decline.  Intuitively, the price and volatility decline could be a result of the supply and 
demand conditions as reflected in the stocks-to-use ratio.  In agreeing to extend the EU 
ETS through 2030, the question of how to deal with the excess supply is a hotly debated 
topic which has to still be agreed upon.  
 
Figure 4.1 CO2 OTC and EUA1 Futures prices 2008 – 2014 
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   CO2 Market Events 
 The global financial crisis that began in 2008 has and is still impacting the EU 
economies.  The crisis has resulted in some member states’ economies falling into 
recession.  From 2008 – 2012 EU the annual real GDP growth rates were 0.4%, -4.5%, 
2.10%, 1.6% and -0.4%(Eurostat 2013).   Because CO2 emissions are linked to economic 
output, part of the reduction in emissions can be attributed to weak economic 
conditions44.    
 In 2009 exploitation of value added taxes (VAT), termed carousal fraud, was 
revealed.  The exploration arose through different tax treatments of CO2 permits, CERs, 
and ERUs occurring between countries.  Because each EU country maintains its own tax 
system, some countries enacted tax credits for CO2 permits, CERs, and ERUs whereas 
other countries implemented taxes on CERs and ERUs; the rationale was that because 
CERs and ERUs arose through investments in other countries they should be taxed.  
These different tax systems’ rules between countries could be profitably manipulated 
through transferring credits between countries for compliance use.  This cross country 
multi-jurisdictional framework allowed trading exploitation of an estimated €5000m (EC 
2012a).  In 2010 changes to the EU ETS were adopted to counter VAT fraud (Europol 
2009).   
 The second event uncovered in 2010 involved registry hacking of over 28m 
permits.  This led to the closure of all EU ETS registries in January 2010 for several days 
                                                 
44 For instance in 2008 the financial crises was estimated to reduce energy related CO2 emissions by 3% 
(IEA 2009).  This factor has been recognized by EC reports which acknowledge that while CO2 prices are a 
contributing factor, the EU economic crises is also a major cause of the overall reduction (EC 2012c).    
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as new safeguards were put in place.  This hacking episode only affected government 
registries and OTCs; because ICE maintained its own accounts and security, EUA futures 
continued trading.  Both episodes had the potential to impact price efficiency reflected by 
the large number of permits involved. 
4.5 CO2 Policy: Conclusion 
 The EU ETS CO2 permit trading policy marked a new cross country approach to 
regulating CO2 emissions externalities.  The system implemented a long term (2005 – 
2030) market based approach for reaching desired goals.  Permit property rights designed 
one homogenous permit which could be stored for compliance use during any year over 
2008 – 2030 (Phase II, III, and IV).   
 At the beginning of Phase II in 2008, a transparent electronic registry system 
existed for the issuance, exchange, monitoring, and enforcement of policy performance. 
Phase II started a new market through the issuance of 1,994m permits across 30 
countries.   The permit total gradually increased, reaching 2,228m by 2012.  In the first 
year of trading, no permit inventory existed.  During Phase II, 96.9% of permits were 
given as free endowments and the rest were auctioned.  Phase III started in 2013 and 
maintained a permit property right structure identical to that of Phase II.  This allowed the 
permit inventory to be carried over for use in Phase III.  However, in Phase III 40% of 
permits were now auctioned.         
 In Phases II and III, additional permit supply was created through the use of up to 
1,700m international emission reduction credits, generated through the Kyoto Protocol’s 
flexible mechanisms, .  By 2013, 1,246m international emission reduction credits had 
been exercised, thus adding to market supply.  Between the international emission credits 
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and more permits being issued than used in compliance, an inventory of permits began to 
accumulate.  After only five years of trading, this resulted in over a full year’s supply of 
permits (2,100m) existing in 2013.   
 The EUA futures contract successfully began trading in 2008.  In addition several 
spot OTCs also formed for permit exchange.  Futures and OTC prices traded in a wide 
range of €13 – 30 during the first year.  Since then prices have steadily declined, reaching 
a range of €2 – 6 by 2013.  An active futures market has existed during all of these years 
with volume rising substantially over time.  Futures volume started at over 1,990m 
permits in 2008 and had reached over 7,200m by 2013.  Interestingly, this volume 
increase occurred while prices declined each year and additionally traded in narrower 
yearly range (i.e., a less volatile range).  Understanding futures performance in the CO2 
permit market is important because the EU ETS will be actively trading through 2030.     
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CHAPTER 5 
FUTURES CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND PRICES 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides context for understanding how futures markets work and 
how they can be used for permit pricing and emissions compliance.  To further 
understand what futures trading means for these markets, the remainder of the chapter 
first defines futures’ contracts and their primary roles.  Next it describes how futures 
markets function.  The theory of storage is then used to explain permit futures prices 
based on permit, futures, and other commodity characteristics.  An extensive literature on 
agricultural, energy, and metal commodity futures exists along with a rich literature on 
the empirical performance of EU CO2 EUA futures.       
5.2 Futures Contracts and Markets 
Futures Contracts and Contract Series 
 Due to commodity market volatility (uncertainty), producers and consumers seek 
ways to mitigate risk (Pindyck 2001, Tomek 1997, Tomek and Robinson 2003).  
Alternative pricing mechanisms to address price risks for commodities include forward 
contracts, OTCs, options, futures, and swaps.  Of these, futures contracts are the most 
widely used45.  Their trading characteristics have been shown to serve firms’ desire to 
manage price uncertainty associated with storable agricultural, energy, and metal 
commodities (Carlton 1984, Pindyck 2001, Tomek 1997, Tomek and Robinson 2003, 
Garcia and Leuthold 2004).   
                                                 
45 Exchange traded futures volume in 2010 was over 22 billon contracts worldwide with a notional value of 
$601 trillion for commodities and financial assets (Chance and Brooks 2013).  
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 Futures contract for storable commodities have been described as having three 
primary roles (Pindyck 2001, Tomek and Gray 1970, Tomek 1997).  The first is to 
provide a pricing mechanism that allows firms to manage the risk associated with 
uncertain commodity prices over time through the process of hedging (Pindyck 2001, 
Tomek 1997, Tomek and Robinson 2003)46.  The second is to facilitate assimilation of 
decentralized agents’ information in prices, termed “price discovery” (Tomek and 
Robinson 2003).  Third, futures play an important role in the temporal allocation of 
inventories (Tomek and Gray 1970, Working 1948, 1949).   
 A futures contract is a legal agreement to either take delivery (buy) or provide 
delivery of  (sell) a specified quantity of an underlying commodity with a particular grade 
(quality) at a defined future maturity date and agreed-upon price (CME 2014, Tomek and 
Robinson 2003).  The maturity date is the date at which the futures contract is settled by 
delivery of the physical commodity.  At delivery, ownership changes from a futures 
contract to a supply transfer of the commodity under specific terms and procedures 
governed by the rules of the exchange (CME 2014).  A futures contract is a standardized 
contract whose specifications are fixed; the only participant-determined variable is the 
price.   
An example will illustrate how a futures contract works.  In July a buyer of a 
December futures contract at a price x, agrees to take delivery of underlying commodity 
in December for x.  Similarly, the seller agrees to make delivery of the underlying 
commodity in December at this price.   
                                                 
46 A futures hedge uses a futures contract as a temporary substitute for a later spot transaction; it is taken to 
offset market risk.   
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 Futures contracts are created in a contract series, defined as a set of contracts 
representing the same underlying commodity but at a series of different maturity 
horizons.  Each contract in a series has the same grade specifications.  Within a series 
only two variables differ among contracts, the maturity date and the contract price.  The 
exchange sets the different contract maturity dates in a predetermined fashion, and 
participants interact to determine the prices.  Table 5.1 gives a sample European Union 
Allowance (EUA) CO2 futures contract series quote sheet.  The sheet shows the prices on 
February 11, 2015, for EUA futures contracts maturing in February 2015 (€7.16), March 
2015 (€7.18), December 2015 (€7.26), December 2016 (€7.39), December 2017 (€7.51), 
and December 2020 (€7.92).  For instance, on February 11, 2015, participants could have 
purchased an EUA CO2 December 2017 futures contract for €7.51, which upon maturity 
would become a supply transfer of EU CO2 permits at that price.  The table illustrates 
how a futures contract series can provide pricing information at differing time horizons 
and facilitate trading on this date for later delivery of the underlying commodity. 
Table 5.1 European Union Allowance CO2 Future (EUA) 
Maturity date Feb-15 Mar-15 Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-17 Dec-20 
Price €7.16 €7.18 €7.26 €7.39 €7.51 €7.92 
Prices were taken Feb 11, 2015, from the ICE exchange.  These contracts represent a 
sample of the total contract series trading on this date. 
 
 Contract series can have monthly, quarterly, or yearly contracts listed several 
years out.  Currently some commodity futures trade eight years out, such as the European 
Union Allowance (EUA) CO2 futures and the West Texas Intermediate crude futures.   
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Once a futures market is functioning, it is common for the same contracts to simply be 
continuously offered in different years on a rolling basis as one contract matures47.     
Exchanges and Futures Market Rules 
 An exchange is an independent for-profit entity that creates the futures contracts, 
houses the futures market, maintains all of the contract trading activity, insures 
counterparty risk, disseminates information, posts prices, and enforces performance48.  
The exchange generates profits by charging a small fee on the trades it facilitates49.  
Because the exchange’s profits come from transaction fees, its incentives are to promote 
a large competitive market.  Therefore, the exchange’s incentives are separated from that 
of futures contract buyers and sellers.    
 The futures market itself is a double auction where buyers and sellers 
simultaneously submit bids and offers for futures contracts.  Information flow is 
promoted through price transparency, defined by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(2014) as: 
 “Market prices that are universally available in real time, where all market 
participants have equal access to the same markets and prices at the same time. 
This facilitates a fair and anonymous trading environment where the best bid and 
best offer have priority. Creating a level playing field.” 
 
                                                 
47 For example in December 2014, the December 2014 EUA futures contract would mature and be delisted.  
Simultaneously, a new EUA futures contract with a maturity in December 2022 would be listed and begin 
trading. 
48 Counterparty risk refers to risk that the opposite party to a contract will not fulfill their terms of the 
agreement. 
49 For example ICE, the company that listed both the SFI and EUA futures contract, is a publicly traded 
company listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  In 2006, the EUA CO2 futures (SO2 SFI futures) 
contract transaction fee was 0.0145% (0.0114%) of a permit’s total value. 
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These prices are quoted electronically.  Trading can also be conducted electronically or 
through open outcry50.  Both trading mediums promote open access for firms’ and 
speculators’ trading participation alike.  All that is required for participation is a valid 
trading account (i.e., meeting minimum credit and balance standards).  Contract 
performance is insured by the exchange, a unique feature that eliminates any counterparty 
risk and reduces information costs.   
 Once the futures contract and market rules are determined, performance depends 
on the level of trading behavior.  Measurements of market activity are volume and open 
interest.  Volume is the number of contracts traded within a defined period such as a day, 
month, or year.  In a contract series, the volume of contracts traded typically declines as 
the time horizon until maturity lengthens (Tomek and Robinson 2003).  Over the life of a 
single futures contract, volume typically increases as the time to maturity approaches 
(Tomek and Robinson 2003).    
 Open interest refers to the total number of long (ownership rights) or short (sale 
rights) positions outstanding without an offsetting position taken by the contract holder 
(CME 2014).  For an established futures contract, volume and open interest commonly 
exhibit consistent patterns over a contract lifecycle (Tomek and Robinson 2003).   
  
 
                                                 
50 Open outcry is a method of public auction for making bids and offers in the trading pits of futures 
exchanges. 
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Aspects of a successful futures contract have been discussed by Gray (1978), Silber 
(1981), Carlton (1984), Black (1986), Hieronymus (1996), Leuthold, Junkus and Cordier 
(1989) and Tashjian (1995), and Tomek and Robinson (2003).  These attributes include: 
 Homogeneity of the underlying commodity.   
 Accurate representation of the underlying commodity at delivery. 
 Storable inventory.  
 Large volumes of supply and demand must be large and reflect many 
independent users.   
 Market volatility.  
 Demand for the underlying commodity.   
 Hedging demand from industry.   
 Attractive to speculators.   
 Neutral contract terms between buyers and sellers.  
 Low transaction fees and information costs.  
Finally, the overall futures marketplace must be competitive (Tomek and Robinson 
2003)51.   
Futures vs. Forward Contracts 
 This section will discuss forward contracts and compare them with futures 
contracts.  A forward contract is an alternative pricing mechanism for permits to be 
delivered at a later date.  Forward contracts are privately negotiated between parties and 
so contract quantity, delivery point, and grade specifications are unique to the contracting 
parties.  Forward contracts also contain counterparty risk because they are individual 
agreements; this is unlike futures contracts where the exchange ensures performance.    
                                                 
51 Despite the motivation for optimal contract design and widespread futures use, forty percent of new 
contracts listed in the United States are delisted and cease trading within five years (Carlton, 1984).  This 
pattern has not improved over the years and is especially true for industries new to futures contracts 
(Thompson, Garcia and Wildman, 1996; Bollman, Thompson and Garcia, 1996).  
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 Payment timing and delivery can follow identical terms for forward and futures 
contracts if the dates match.  For instance if both contracts are entered into in time t with 
payment and delivery to occur at a later time T, then both have identical terms.  However, 
there is a cash flow difference between forward and futures contracts.     
 Futures contracts require a small margin -- a percent of total futures value (similar 
to a performance bond) -- to be put into an account at time (t) when the contract is 
negotiated.  The margin is held by the exchange.  The futures are then marked to market 
daily, with additional margin balances required if prices move unfavorably to the initial 
position and margin balances returned after favorable price moves.  Upon contract 
completion, either through delivery or exiting of the position, the exchange returns the 
margin balance.  The literature has examined this aspect in detail, with a consensus that 
margin requirements can be ignored for practical purposes when modeling price 
performance (see Hull 2011, Pindyck 1994, French 1983, Tomek and Robinson 2003)52.   
 In summary, there is one main difference between futures and forward contracts.  
The difference is that futures are standardized contracts whose terms are set in a 
predetermined fashion.  Through this design, futures markets are more transparent and 
easily accessible to participants.  Due to unique specifications of each individual forward 
contract, they typically have higher search and information costs, exhibit counterparty 
risk, and have higher transaction fees.  The result is that futures markets typically have a 
much higher volume of trading activity than forward contracts (Pindyck 2004, Tomek 
                                                 
52 For a proof of the theoretical differences between forward and futures performance caused by interest 
rates and margins, see Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981). 
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and Robinson 2003).  Thus for homogenous goods, forward markets do not provide the 
same competitive low cost market as futures. 
5.3  Theory of Storage 
Literature 
 The theory of storage has been used to characterize the spot and futures prices for 
storable commodities such as energy, metal, and agricultural products whose primary use 
is as an intermediate output or input in an industry production process (Working 1949, 
Fama and French 1987, 1988, Pindyck 1993, 2001, Hull 2011, and Tomek 1997)53.  
Because of storability, firms benefit by carrying inventories in order to avoid production 
process disruptions (Working 1949, Fama and French 1987, 1988, Pindyck 1993, 2001, 
and Tomek 1997).  These storage benefits are sometimes referred to as a “convenience 
yield”.  For example if a supply disruption (stockout) threatens crude supply, an oil 
refinery derives a convenience yield benefit from maintaining crude oil inventories to 
ensure that it can avoid disruption in the production and delivery of refined gasoline.  In 
this case, firms may wish to hold some amount of crude inventory even if market 
conditions suggest that there is no economic incentive to actually store the commodity 
(Pindyck 2001).    
 In this setting, it is convenient to describe price expectation for a storable 
commodity as composed of the spot price adjusted for the risk free return minus the net 
benefits of storage.  Within the commodity market literature, research has described the 
                                                 
53 Commodities are generally classified into two categories.  The first is consumption commodities that are 
used in firm production of goods whose price follows the theory of storage (Hull 2011).  The second is 
investment commodities such as gold, which are held for an income return and thereby related to the broad 
market (Hull 2011).   
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net benefits of storage as the “net convenience yield” (e.g. Fama and French 1987, 1988, 
Pindyck 1993, 2001, and Tomek 1997).   Total storage cost consists of physical storage 
cost plus the cost of having capital tied up in inventory.  The total storage cost is often 
referred to as the “cost of carry” (Working 1949, Pindyck 2001)54.  
 The price of a futures contract represents the market’s expectation of what the 
spot price will be at the delivery date.  Using the theory of storage terminology, the price 
for a futures contract should equal the spot price adjusted for the risk-free rate of return 
over the time remaining until maturity of the contract minus the net storage benefits from 
having inventory on hand to meet potential disruptions55. 
Permit Futures Price Formation 
 Within the U.S. SO2 and EU CO2 permit trading systems, emissions can be 
considered as outputs produced (emitted) from an industrial process in the coproduction 
of one or more marketed goods.  To comply with regulatory policy, a permit must be 
submitted annually for each ton of the emitted pollutant.  Both types of permits are 
considered “storable” because of banking provisions.  Firms may hold an inventory of 
permits for later use.  Thus it would seem, the theory of storage provides a convenient 
means to describe permit and permit futures prices.   
 A permit price expectation described in the theory of storage can be stated as  
(5.1) TttTtT srqE ,, )1()(   
                                                 
54 For this research, the terms total storage costs and net storage benefits will primarily be used for clarity.  
It is recognized that within the commodity literature “cost of carry” and “net convenience yield” are the 
standard terms.    
55 Working’s view was that futures prices were determined by storage benefits based on expected market 
conditions. 
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where q is the permit price, rt ,T is the risk-free interest rate at t spanning the time from t 
to T, s the spot (OTC) permit price,  and   the net storage benefits (convenience yield) 
(Working 1949, Tomek 1997, Pindyck 2001) 56.  The net storage benefits for holding an 
inventory of permits from t to T are the banking benefits received (inventory value) 
minus the total inventory storage costs.  A permit’s total cost of storage is only the spot 
price times the risk free return, reflecting capital costs.  There are no physical costs of 
storage for permits because of the electronic registry use.  Thereby, the net convenience 
yield of storage can be considered as the net value of storage costs and benefits.  The 
value is subtracted because storage benefits from t to T are accrued.   
 Permit futures contracts are for later delivery of a predefined number of permits.  
As a result, their price represents the market’s expectation of what the permit price will 
be at the delivery date57.  It follows that a permit futures price is 
(5.2) )( T
T
t qEF   
where q is the permit price at T,  F is the futures price for a later contract maturity date T 
- denoted with a superscript. 
 Net convenience yield values at a point in time through equation (5.1) and (5.2) 
may be expressed as 
(5.3) 
T
ttTtTt Fsr  )1( ,, . 
                                                 
56 The risk free rate at a point in time t, is the annual risk free rate (Tbill for US SO2 and LIBOR for EU 
CO2) at t, multiplied by the ratio of days the period covers from t to T expressed as 
tTt rtTr *365/)(,  . 
57 This discussion is meant as a general setup and leaves basis considerations for Chapter Six.  
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This convention illustrates how at time t, the spread between futures and spot prices 
reflects the markets valuation of storage benefits58.   
A zero net convenience yield occurs if the value of the storage benefit is equal to 
the cost of storing permits; it means that firms receive no excess storage benefits from 
having a permit inventory on hand.  This implies that the risk of permit supply 
disruptions on overall firm profits/production is minimal.  A zero value can occur due to 
several factors such as a large permit supply in relation to expected demand or low permit 
price volatility.   
 A net convenience yield greater than zero indicates that the firm receives excess 
benefits (a premium) by holding permit stocks to avoid potential production disruptions, 
termed backwardation.  Commodity market conditions that might create such benefits are 
low levels of inventories, price volatility, or uncertain later events (e.g. supply disruption 
or policy change).  For instance, a permit stockout can cause a firm to shut down 
production of good y because it cannot meet permit compliance requirements in the 
coproduction of emissions. Backwardation results in the holding of stocks when 
intertemporal spreads are negative (i.e., spot price + storage cost  > futures price) (Tomek 
and Gray 1970, Pindyck 2001) 59.  Weak backwardation indicates spot price > futures 
price but less than the storage cost.    
                                                 
58 It is through equation (5.3) and its extensions that the literature has examined storage benefits, spot 
prices, and futures prices (e.g. Kaldor 1939, Working 1948, 1949, Brennan 1958, Telser 1958, Pindyck 
1993, 2003, Fama and French 1987, 1988, Tomek and Gray 1970, Tomek 1997, Bailey 1998, Yoon and 
Brorsen 2002, and Williams 2001). 
59 If a firm did not need permits until the later contract maturity date and the market was in backwardation, 
the holding of a permit inventory would result in the firm paying for excess storage benefits they did not 
need; to avoid paying for these benefits they could buy the futures whose later date maturity price does not 
include the prior storage benefits.  
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A market in contango, on the other hand, reflects a negative net convenience yield 
value.  It is represented by the spot price + cost of storage < futures price.  Overall in 
each scenario the storage relationship over time is reflected through spot and futures 
contract spread.  Thus, an important role of a futures market is to value storage benefits 
and costs.  Through this role, futures allocate inventory in relation to expected later 
conditions which serves to stabilize markets through time (Tomek and Gray 1970).    
5.4 Conclusion 
 Futures contracts are designed as standardized contracts for later delivery of an 
underlying commodity.  They are listed in a contract series which provides a temporal 
constellation of future prices on any given day.  The futures contract and its 
corresponding market are created and housed by an independent exchange.  Exchanges 
create profits through charging small transaction fees on the futures trading activity.  In 
so doing their incentive is to create a competitive market with transparent prices and open 
access for agent participation.  Through these traits, futures attract decentralized trading 
among heterogeneous agents.  In turn, the trading activity serves to assimilate all of the 
independent pricing information over the contract series.  Thus, futures facilitate permit 
price discovery by creating a wealth of intertemporal market based pricing information. 
 Permit futures represent the market’s forecast of later permit prices which can be 
described through the theory of storage.  This futures price should equal the spot price 
adjusted for the risk-free rate of return over the time remaining until maturity of the 
contract minus the net storage benefits from having inventory on hand to meet potential 
supply/production disruptions. When considering production decisions, these futures 
prices can then help guide inventory allocations and emission decisions over time.  If 
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policymakers hope to achieve a competitive and robust permit market system, futures 
contracts offer the potential to vastly expand the constellation of permit pricing, trading 
activity, price discovery, and smooth temporal allocation.   
 Of the three key roles futures can provide (risk management, inventory allocation, 
and price discovery), risk management through hedging was not directly addressed.  
Chapter Six will discuss how futures can be used to mitigate permit price uncertainty.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PERMIT SYTEMS SUBJECT TO PRICE UNCERTAINTY  
IN THE PRESENCE OF A FUTURES MARKET 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter outlines the role that markets in futures contracts for tradable permits 
can play in improving the performance of permit systems for environmental externalities.  
An extensive literature on tradable permits exists.  However to my knowledge, permit 
futures’ influence on marginal production decisions as an instrument for responding to 
permit price uncertainty has not been considered. This chapter provides a description of 
how futures can be used to manage the price uncertainty associated with permits in 
emission compliance decisions. The expected utility framework developed in Chapter 2 is 
extended to allow a firm that produces both a marketable good (e.g., electricity) and the 
associated emissions regulated through a tradable permit system access to a permit 
futures market.  Firms can use the current futures price to determine the efficient level of 
emissions.  The futures price reflects the marginal cost of compliance from using permits 
to meeting regulatory emissions standards.  Since there is no uncertainty about that price, 
production is not affected by a firm’s risk aversion or its expectations regarding the 
permit price.  By hedging with futures, firms can mitigate the permit price uncertainty.  
Under the assumption that all firms optimally hedge, the theoretical model shows that 
futures’ hedging allows firms to maintain production of the marketed good at the policy 
cost minimizing level, thereby separating the output decision from the emissions control 
decision.   
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 The next section of this chapter provides motivation for why futures should be 
considered in permit systems.  Next comes an outline of a model of the firm in the 
presence of a futures market.  The results with a futures market are then compared to 
those without a futures market under otherwise identical assumptions.  The final section 
summarizes the results and discusses their implications for policy design. 
6.2 Futures Literature and Permit Context 
 There is a rich literature on the ability of futures markets to reduce risk for the 
underlying “commodities” these contracts represent.  Beginning with Kaldor (1940) and 
Working (1948, 1949), this research has considered the theoretical and empirical 
relationship between spot and futures prices.  A futures hedge takes a temporary position 
in a futures contract as a substitute for a later spot market transaction; it is taken to help 
manage/reduce market risk associated with a commodity that may be needed later.   
Because futures can be bought or sold across time, these contracts can be used to insulate 
against unfavorable price movements.  Within this context, product price uncertainty has 
been examined by Anderson and Danthine (1981, 1983a, 1983b), Feder, Just, and 
Schmitz (1980), Holthausen (1979), Newberry and Stiglitz (1981), Rolfo (1980), Stein 
(1984), Paroush and Wolf (1986, 1989), Kawai and Zilcha (1986)60.  Their findings 
demonstrate that futures can help reduce the effects of risk, inform decision making, and 
be used to hedge later output price risk.  Further if a futures contract is a perfect substitute 
for the underlying commodity, current decisions can be based on the current futures 
price.  This allows output to be independent of the spot price risk, creating what is termed 
                                                 
60 Input uncertainty has also been considered in a similar fashion (e.g., Schmidt and Statman, 1980, Paroush 
and Wolf 1992, Anderson and Danthine 1983a). 
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the “separation property” (Feder, Just, and Schmitz 1980).  This eliminates any negative 
effects that the uncertain spot price would have on supply levels. 
 For futures to be a perfect substitute for the underlying commodity, there must be 
a zero basis value between spot and futures prices.  Basis is defined as the difference 
between spot and futures prices that is caused by timing, quality, and location differences 
in exchange (Tomek and Robinson 2003).  The basis is unique to each specific market.  
For instance, the location (the basis risk) of an oil refinery in need of crude for producing 
gasoline is unrelated to the factors affecting crude price levels (overall supply and 
demand).  If the refinery’s location is different than where crude futures delivery occurs, 
this would result in a basis effect.  Agricultural, energy, and metal commodity markets 
typically exhibit non-zero basis values. 
 If positive basis values are present, the separation property does not hold (Stein 
1979, 1984, Anderson and Danthine 1981, 1983a, Paroush and Wolf 1989).  Basis values 
limit the ability of futures to reduce the spot market’s price risk (Anderson and Danthine 
1981).  This is because futures are no longer able to offset all the risk of the uncertain 
underlying commodity’s price.  As a result, if a futures hedge is taken in the presence of 
basis risk, some degree of later spot market price risk persists.  Exceptions to this result 
can occur if there are multiple ways to hedge risk, either through the use of both futures 
and forward contracts or through multiple futures contracts (Anderson and Danthine 
1981, Paroush and Wolf 1989).    
 The literature has also considered two other factors that can affect futures’ ability 
to reduce risk.  The first is production uncertainty, characterized as uncertainty regarding 
the final quantity of a good to be produced.  For example when a farmer plants an annual 
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corn crop, uncertain weather over the growing season can cause the final quantity 
produced to be considered uncertain.  Production uncertainty has been shown to degrade 
futures performance in managing risk (Newberry and Stiglitz 1981, Anderson and 
Danthine 1983a and 1983b, and Chavas 2004).  Generally speaking, if the quantity 
produced is uncertain, then the corresponding futures position used as a hedge may not 
equal the realized quantity produced.   
 Permit Context 
 The SO2 and CO2 policy rules and markets have important features that influence 
how the implementation of futures markets and their modeling properties are expressed.  
The most important of these are that:   
 Permits can be banked across years and maintained in electronic registries. 
 The permit spot and futures prices have varied within a wide range and exhibited 
large percentage movements over time.   
 Both the SO2 and CO2 futures were actively traded as reflected by trading volume.   
 Both sources of emissions can be considered as outputs produced (emitted) from 
an industrial process in the coproduction of one or more marketed goods.   
 The marketed goods responsible for creating these emissions through their 
production process are subject to uncertainty61.    
 These properties can be considered within the context of storable commodities.  
This is because of permits represent emissions emitted as part of a production process, 
rules for banking, the presence of an active futures market, and a wide spot market price 
                                                 
61 For example Schennach (2000), considers both permit and electricity demand uncertainty as key aspects 
in evaluation of banking effects.  
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range paralleling other storable commodities traits.  Within this framework, an expected 
utility model is used to describe how permit futures can reduce product (permit) market 
price risk, drawing on Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980), Anderson and Danthine (1981), 
and Chavas (2004).  The exposition assumes the futures market to be ideal, in the sense 
that the current futures price represents the best information at that specific time as to 
what subsequent permit prices will be62.  First, the firm setup is discussed.  Then the 
question of how a permit futures hedge works is described.  Next I evaluate how permit 
futures perform in reducing permit price uncertainty effects.   
Theoretical Models 
 The firm, market conditions, and production decisions considered in this chapter 
are identical to that described in Chapter 2.  It follows that in production of a marketed 
good y, emissions z are generated which require an identical number of permits to be 
turned in for policy compliance. In addition, the firm receives a free endowment of 
permits, labeled . Table 6.2 provides a detailed description of the variables and their 
properties. 
 Production decisions are made in the first period t with output realized in a second 
period T (i.e., a static two period model).  The production technology is represented by 
two production functions, )(xfy  and )(ygz  .  At the time of the firm’s production 
decision, uncertainty exists regarding the marketable good’s final price p as well as the 
permit price q ( ep   and  q see table 6.2).   It follows that all output 
production decisions are made in the presence of two uncertain output prices.  This 
                                                 
62 Assuming an ideal futures market is consistent with the literature (Feder et. al. 1980, Anderson and 
Danthine 1981, and Chavas 2004) 
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translates into an uncertain revenue of py  and uncertain permit compliance cost of
))(( ygq . 
 To this point the firm and market setup is identical to that in Chapter Two, where 
the firm’s objective function was characterized as  
(2.1) )())()((   wEUvxCzqpywEU , 
where E is the expectations operator based on the subjective probability distributions of 
the random variables p and q.  For further detail see Chapter Two and Table 6.2.   
Introduction of a Futures Market 
Assume now that the firm has access to a futures market in tradable permits that 
can be used to hedge later permit needs, potentially mitigating some or all of the permit 
market price risk.  The futures market is assumed to be ideal in the sense that it generates 
futures prices that are the best representation of subsequent permit prices, based on 
current information.  Permit futures actively trade during the decision period t, with a unit 
price of F for a contract that matures in the output period T.  In the decision period, the 
futures price F is considered a known market price.  Therefore, the firm can use that price 
in the decision making period t to hedge later period T permit compliance needs.  The 
number of permit futures hedged is H.  Viewed from the decision period t, the price for 
the futures contract at maturity in the second period T is considered unknown, 
represented by ψ.   
 A general hedging example within this setup illustrates the trading mechanics.  A 
hedge uses a futures contract as a temporary substitute for a later spot transaction in the 
second period T.  In this example, the hedge is used to offset permit product market price 
risk, which is it the permit price uncertainty or the product market price uncertainty in 
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period T.  The firm plans to produce a quantity y of the marketed good which will require 
z permits for compliance at T.  Suppose the firm purchases z permit futures as a hedge (H 
= z) in the decision period t with a permit unit price of F.   To exit the hedge in the output 
period T, the firm simultaneously sells the futures position H at a permit unit price of   
and buys z permits at the spot permit unit price of q. See Table 6.1 for an outline of the 
hedging process.      
Table 6.1 A Regulated Firm Permit Compliance Needs Hedging Example 
Time Period Futures  Permit  Purpose Price  
 quantity (H) quantity (z)   
Decision  Buy H futures N/A Hedge risk Known 
   period (t) at F    
Output Sell H futures  Buy z permits  Own  physical permits Unknown  
   period (T) at   at q for compliance  
Total costs -FH +  H -qz   
Notes: F is the futures price in t (i.e., it is known at t),  is the futures price in T (it is 
unknown at t), q is the spot permit price at T (it is unknown at t). 
 
 The compliance cost of using the hedge is given by 
(6.1) zqHHF TTt   , 
Each term represents a separate trade; 1 futures trade valued at HFt  in period t, 1 futures 
trade valued at HT in period T, and 1 spot trade worth zqT in period T for a total of 3 
trades.  In this example, if the permit futures unit price at maturity is equal to the spot 
permit unit price )( TT q , then the final price paid using the hedge is Ft  per permit.  
This illustrates how the hedge would allow the firm to price all of its permit compliance 
needs using the known decision t period futures price, thereby removing the effect 
associated with the unknown later period-T spot price.  However to understand the final 
permit price paid and the overall role of futures, we must further define what comprises 
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permit spot and futures prices in the maturity time period T.  We must also consider the 
production process that gives rise to emissions and the need for permits.   
 The permit futures price at maturity (second period) is  , which is assumed to be 
a random variable characterized by   , with a mean  )E(  where   is 
a random variable with mean zero, and λ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the 
distribution of q (noting these values are the same as that of the spot permit).  
Additionally the basis, defined as the difference between spot and futures prices, is 
represented by , a random variable with a mean zero and  is a mean-preserving 
spread parameter for the distribution of .  Within an asset pricing context, represents 
intrinsic price risk.  The  basis risk is the difference between spot and futures prices 
that is caused by timing, quality, and location traits unique to a specific market.  Thus, the 
two risks can be treated as statistically independent, such that 0)( E .  It follows that 
the variance of the futures price is )var()var()var(
22   . See Table 6.2 for a list 
of the variables described.    
 By comparing the conditional futures maturity price    with the 
conditional permit price  q , we see that the first two terms are the same and the  
difference is   (the basis effect).   This value reflects any differences due to timing, 
quality, and location factors between permit spot and futures.  The output period date is 
set equal to the futures contract maturity/delivery date, so that no basis effects are caused 
by timing differences between spot and futures in the output period. Because an 
electronic registry is used to facilitate spot and futures exchange, no physical permit 
transportation costs for user location differences apply; therefore, there is zero basis 
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effect due to location.  Further, because regulatory policy defines only one homogenous 
use in compliance for a SO2 (CO2) permit which was identically matched to SFI (EUA) 
futures delivery terms, it follows that through transfer of permit registries at delivery, no 
permit quality (grade) specification differences exist between spot and futures; hence, 
there is zero basis effect due to quality differences.  Combined permit spot and futures 
traits in exchange result in a zero basis value in the output period (at the futures maturity 
date)63.   Even though the basis is zero, it is initially included because a zero basis is a 
unique and favorable trading property of storable electronic permits that is worth 
highlighting.  A zero basis improves a firm’s ability to hedge risk and in turn aids in 
creating a successful permit futures market.  Intuitively, this is because the spot and 
futures prices are for the same homogenous permit whose trading and compliance use is 
solely electronic.  As a result, the two prices are based on identical information.   
Maximizing Expected Utility with Futures 
In the presence of a futures market the firm’s uncertain revenue is  
HFygqpy )())((   . 
The firm’s initial wealth is represented by w.  Its terminal wealth at T is:  
xvHFzqpyw ')()(   , 
                                                 
63 Outside of the static model, if the basis between spot and futures was not zero at maturity, arbitrage 
potential would exist.  However with respect to the maturity point in time, no negative consequences would 
occur because if one owned futures as a hedge and spot>futures (unfavorable basis), one could simply take 
futures delivery electronically at no cost to avoid any basis differences.  Conversely if spot < futures, the 
futures buyer (long) has profitable arbitrage potential through selling the futures and buying spot permits 
for a realized gain equal to the basis. 
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which is uncertain64.  Table 6.2 provides a list of the variables described in this setup.  
The decision maker is assumed to maximize expected utility of wealth and to have risk 
preferences represented by the utility function )(U .  
 The firm’s objective function then is  
(6.2) )()),()())(((   wEUyvCHFygqpywEU , 
where E is the expectations operator based on the subjective probability distributions of 
the random variables p, q, and ψ. 
Table 6.2 List of Variables Defined 
Variable Description 
w wealth 
y good output, with a production function of y=f(x), where f’>0 and f’’<0 
p the good’s output price in period T, which (from the perspective of the 
production decision in period t) is assumed to be a random variable with a 
mean )( pE  in which ep   , where e is a variable random with 
mean zero and σ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the distribution 
of p 
q the expected period T permit (emissions output) output price, which is 
assumed to be a random variable with a mean )(qE , and is 
characterized by  q where   is a random variable with mean zero, 
and λ is a mean-preserving spread parameter for the distribution of q 
  the period T futures maturity output price, which is assumed to be a random 
variable with a mean  )E( , characterized by   , where λ
  carry the same measures as the spot permit. Additionally, the basis is 
represented by  , a random variable with a mean zero and mean-
preserving spread parameter   for the distribution of  .   
z emissions output (number of permits required), with a production function 
of z=g(y), where g’>0 and g’’<0.   
  free permit endowment 
F the period t futures price (decision making period) 
v a vector of input prices 
x input quantity, with a cost function of   
n
i ii
yvcxv
1
),(  
E expectation operator for the subjective probability distribution of the 
random variables 
)(U  
utility function, which satisfies 0/'  wUU and 0/''
22  wUU  
                                                 
64 Time discounting is not considered for clarity; otherwise terminal wealth would reflect )1( rw  . 
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 The firm’s production decision is described by  
(6.3) )}()(:)()(({
1,,,
ygzxfyxvHFzqpywEUMax
n
i iizyxH
   . 
See Table 6.1 for a description of the variables.  Upon simplification, the production 
decision may be written as  
(6.4) ))},()())((({, yvCHFygqpywEUMax yH   , 
 see (D.1). This allows the firm’s decisions to be characterized entirely in terms of the 
good y output and the permit futures quantity H taken as a hedge65. The firm’s profit is 
),()())(( yvCHFygqpyw   .   
 The first order necessary conditions for optimal output y and H are 
 (6.5) 0)]''('[: 


CqgpUE
y
EU  
and 
(6.6) 0)]('[: 


FUE
H
EU
 . 
For convenience the first order conditions can be rewritten by setting )''( CqgpAi   
and )( FA j   , such that 0)'()'(  jí AUEAUE .  Next drawing on Feder, Just, and 
Schmitz (1981) and by using Feder (1977, Lemma 4), it may be shown that 
(6.7) )(' jí AgA   
(See Appendix D.2).  The Hessian, denoted as 2 , formed from (6.5) and (6.6) and using 
(6.7) is 
                                                 
65 Noting eq. (6.4) implies uncertainty does not affect the cost function; future research could examine cost 
uncertainty implications.  
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(derived in Appendix D.4).  The second order condition is 
(6.8) 0])'/()''([)'(''])'/()''[()'('' 22222  gAUEUEcgAUEqUEgD ii   
from (D.4).  Because 2 H<0, (7) describes a saddle point reflecting a local maximum, it 
follows that the saddle point found would be in the positive production range.  
Additionally, because of permits’ negative revenue effect, y = 0 is an alternative 
production possibility. That would be the case if, because of permit regulations, a firm is 
no longer profitable and shuts down. 
   Using eq. (6.7) to modify eq. (6.6) gives (6.b) 0)]''('[  gFgUE .  Equating 
equations (6.6b) and (6.5), using the conditional expectations of p, q, and ψ output prices 
and conditional covariance for q and ψ (see D.5), the optimal choice of y satisfies the 
following condition   
(6.9) 
]'[
),'(
'':
UE
pUCov
FgC
y
EU



   
where   is the expected good’s price, the firm’s marginal cost of production is 
yCC  /'  and the marginal cost of emissions compliance with respect to y is 
ygFFg  /' . The good’s uncertain price effect is 
)'(
),'(
UE
pUCov which reflects the 
good’s expected price relationship with utility. 
 The futures price F reflects permit demand associated with production of good y 
which, in turn, reflects the incremental cost of compliance in that period.  Therefore in 
this static framework, Fg’ is the firm’s marginal compliance cost from producing one 
more unit of y.    
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 It follows that uncertain spot permit price expectation E(q) no longer negatively 
affects the firm because futures can be purchased in the decision period for a known price 
as a perfect substitute for permits66.  Thus, the separation property holds and the 
production decision for good y is independent of the permit price risk.  If the basis was 
not equal to zero, then futures would only be a partial hedge of risk and permit price 
uncertainty would again affect firm behavior.  
Certainty Equivalent 
The certainty equivalent can describe the intuition of how futures alter uncertainty 
effects through the risk premium.  Specifically, the risk premium describes terms 
associated with the futures position in relation to the variance of profits.  These terms can 
illustrate how permit price risk is mitigated.  The discussion in Chapter 2 defines the risk 
premium as a measure of the private costs of risk borne by a firm.   
In the presence of a futures market, R is the certain amount a firm is willing to pay 
to become indifferent between receiving the risky return 
)),()())((( yvCHFygqpyw     
versus the sure amount 
])),()())((([ RyvCHFygqpywE   .   
Using a Taylor approximation derived in appendix (D.6), the variance of profits in this 
setting is   
                                                 
66 A distinction is made in that permit prices no longer affect the firm negatively; in that it is possible to use 
the covariance of permit futures with the good’s price to further reduce risk, a beneficial role termed a cross 
hedge.  The cross hedging effects would be reflected in 
)'(
),'(
UE
pUCov
.  A cross hedging discussion is 
included below.   
 109 
 
(6.10) 
),cov(2),cov()(2)var()(2
),cov(2),cov(2),cov()(2
)var()var()var()()var()var( 2222
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

qHqHygqyg
pyHqpyqpyyg
Hqqygpy



 
which includes effects for the good’s product price variability, permit price variability, 
and futures maturity price variability.  The futures position taken in period t is FH. 
Because its value was known when the hedge was entered, the current futures price F 
does not influence profit variability.  The variance of profits in eq. (6.10) illustrates how 
the futures position H  at time T has a sign opposite to the permit price term.  The 
appendix (D.6) then goes on to derive the risk premium as )][var(
2

r
R , where the 
variance of profits is reflected by eq. (6.10).  
 It follows that the certainty equivalent with futures is  
(6.11)   },)())(({, RyvCHFygyMax Hy   . 
The first-order necessary condition with respect to good y is 
 (6.12) ''':/ RFgCyCE    
with the marginal risk premium equal to  
(6.13) )],cov(),cov()(),cov()var()[(' qpqpygqpHpyrR  . 
The marginal risk premium consists of five terms.  The first two terms represent (1) the 
firm’s risk preference and (2) the good’s price variance times the quantity produced.  The 
next terms representing (3) the futures position H, (4) the quantity of emissions produced, 
and (5) the endowment quantity, all with respect to the covariance of q and p.  The 
marginal risk premium found in eq. (6.13) highlights that the variance of permit prices, q 
no longer influences risk aversion.  
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 The third, fourth, and fifth terms are all concerned with the good’s price 
uncertainty, with the net of the terms representing any beneficial role futures can play in 
cross hedging the good’s price risk.  A permit futures cross hedge is defined as any risk 
reduction in the price of the good that can be achieved through use of a permit futures 
contract; this position would be in addition to the pure hedge position taken to offset 
permit price risk.  A cross hedge discussion is included because a firm’s production 
processes create both the good and the emissions.  This implies that through the same 
production processes the two outputs could potentially have positively or negatively 
correlated  market factors and costs which may give rise to use of a cross hedge67.  In this 
case the production relationship implies a positive relationship.  Following Anderson and 
Danthine (1981), the permit futures cross hedging potential for the total quantity of good 
y is represented by  
(6.14) ]
)var(
),cov(
[

p
yhedgecross  . 
The sign of (6.14) corresponds to the position taken; a positive (negative) sign 
corresponds to a long (short) futures position.    The cross hedge ratio reflects how many 
futures should be used per the marginal unit of good y to reduce the good’s price risk.  It 
can be expressed as 
 (6.15) 















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2
2
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


 
E
eE
E
eE
p  
                                                 
67 For instance, the concept of cross hedging with futures or options has been considered for crude and 
refined gasoline.  Alternatively, for permits a cross hedge could use natural gas, coal, or electricity futures 
to reduce permit price risk.  
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where 
 ,p is the correlation coefficient between the T period futures price   and 
good’s price p (this is solved in (D.7) following Anderson and Danthine 1981).  The 
correlation coefficient has a value 10 ,   p , where a  ,p =1 would means that 
permit futures’ prices and the good’s prices are perfectly correlated (i.e., futures are a 
perfect substitute for the good).  A correlation less than one in absolute value would mean 
that futures can eliminate some of the good’s price risk effects. Because of the cross 
hedging relationship just described, the third, fourth and fifth terms will only be present if 
futures provide cross hedging benefits.    
 By assuming that no cross hedging benefits exist, it can be shown that permit 
prices no longer enter the marginal risk premium in eq. (6.13).  For instance if the good’s 
price and permit futures price are uncorrelated 
 ,p = 0, then the third, fourth, and fifth 
terms of (6.14) become zero; this leaves only the good’s price variance, )var( py .  Thus, 
the risk premium in (6.14) is only based on the good’s price uncertainty and contains no 
additive risk from permit price uncertainty.  This outcome happens because the zero basis 
allows futures to be a perfect substitute for permits68.  In turn, the futures can be 
purchased in the decision period at a known price F.  Permit futures prevent the 
uncertainty in permit prices from further adding to the effects of risk aversion.  
Connecting Expected Utility and the Certainty Equivalent with Firm Supply 
By comparing the certainty equivalent with expected utility it may be shown that  
(6.16) 
)'(
),'(
'
UE
pUCov
R  ,  
                                                 
68 The absence of a permit price variance term in (6.14) is also a result of this effect. 
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where the firm’s marginal risk premium from producing one more unit of output y may 
alternatively be expressed as this covariance term.  This link illustrates that the risk 
premium can be used to characterize price uncertainty in both production contexts 
(Chavas 2004).    
 In the presence of a futures market, the first-order conditions in equation (6.9) 
0]'[/),'(''  UEpUCovCFg  can be expressed through the risk premium as 
(6.17) ''' RCFg   
where R’ is the marginal risk premium, C’ the marginal cost of production, and Fg’ the 
marginal compliance cost for emissions emitted in generating a unit of good y.  This 
equation shows that the marginal output of y is based on equating the good’s expected 
price μ to the marginal compliance cost, Fg’, of producing one more unit of good y, the 
marginal cost, C’, of good y production, and the marginal risk premium R’.  It 
demonstrates that the three cost components are additive in arriving at the firm’s total 
cost.  The firm’s risk preferences do not interact with the uncertain permit price to 
negatively affect production because the marginal compliance cost is based on the known 
futures price F.  Thus, the supply of good y with respect to permit policy costs is based on 
incremental compliance costs only. Further, ceteris paribus, permit price risk will not 
alter good y production and policy cost minimization is achieved.  
6.3 Conclusion  
 The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that with a permit futures market 
production decisions can be based on the current futures price.  In this role, futures 
provide a known price for equating the incremental compliance costs of emission control.  
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As a result, price uncertainty can be mitigated, thereby allowing supply of the marketed 
good at the cost minimizing level. 
 The current framework considers production quantities as certain once decisions 
are made in the first time period.  Production uncertainty at the time decisions are made 
compared to realized output in the later period is a relevant consideration. Future research 
should extend this model to consider production uncertainty in one or both of the 
marketed good and emissions.       
 A relevant policy consideration is that the specification of the theoretical model 
assumes a one to one linkage between output and emissions.  Abatement activity can 
change this relationship.  This linkage is not considered here.  Future research should 
examine this topic.  Abatement activities could involve building new plants or retrofitting 
existing plants with better emission control technologies.  The model could be altered to 
include abatement factors that lower the level of emissions as represented by )(ygz   
per unit y of output.  If such a model framework was solved for abatement activity, the 
futures price would serve as the price signal to harmonize abatement activities among 
firms.   
 Because policymakers must select regulatory action in the absence of complete 
cost information, these results demonstrate that a futures market can provide important 
social benefits in allocating resources, achieving pollution reductions, and mitigating 
permit price uncertainty.  Thus, from a policy cost perspective, futures contracts can 
enhance a permit systems’ performance.   
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CHAPTER 7 
EMPIRICAL METHODS AND RESULTS 
7.1 Introduction  
 The analysis in the previous chapters describing the role of futures contracts is 
based on the assumption that an ideal futures market exists.  This chapter empirically 
examines the SO2 and CO2 futures markets to determine if support, over the specific time 
frames examined, is shown for the presence of an ideal futures market.  These results will 
suggest whether those market prices can be relied upon to support emission decisions and 
hedging of permit price risk as the theory suggests.  
 This chapter has six main sections.  The first links the empirical tests with the 
futures assumptions maintained in the theoretical context.  The second section tests if the 
futures market leads the spot market in reflecting new permit pricing information.  The 
third section presents some initial insights into the efficiency of these futures markets by 
focusing on futures performance in forecasting permit prices and their ability to 
encompass all of the information contained in an alternative forecast.  The fourth section 
uses the theory of storage to describe the benefits reflected in the relationship between 
spot and futures prices.  In so doing, conditions in the SO2 and CO2 markets are 
considered.  In each section the test is first outlined, data described, SO2 results shown, 
and CO2 results shown.  The next section compares these results to findings previously 
presented in the literature related to the S02 and C02 markets respectively.  The final 
section summarizes the set of results and discusses the overall implications.     
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7.1 Empirical Context 
 A market for futures contracts is said to be ideal if the associated futures forecast 
provides the best available information at a point in time on the delivery time price of the 
underlying commodity.  Therefore, in the case of S02 and C02, the futures forecast should 
provide the best forecast of the respective permits’ spot price at the time of delivery.  As 
noted by Leuthold and Hartman (1979, pg. 482) “… rational price formation becomes a 
principal economic role for the market because futures prices can provide guidance for 
decision making and resource allocation.”  If the pricing information reflected in futures 
is poor, then it is reasonable to expect a misallocation of resources and ultimately a 
reduction of economic welfare (Stein 1981).   
  For purposes of empirical examination this definition implies two main 
proporeties, whose connections with the two-period expected utility model influence 
testing choices.  The first is that futures should reflect all known permit pricing 
information.  The second is that in modeling the price an economic model must be 
constructed to express the equilibrium permit prices intertemporally. Both aspects offer 
empirical applications for testing futures.  Tests of futures pricing information will be 
considered here69. 
 Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved that in a complete market there exists an 
equilibrium in which assets are allocated to their highest value use.  At a point in time, an 
asset’s price reflects the discounted sum of future payoffs for alternative state prices 
                                                 
69 This choice was made for research consistency to maintain themes throughout the chapters.  It is 
recognized that several alternative empirical procedures exist.  For example, another approach could have 
created an intertemporal permit pricing model; however, this approach has two drawbacks.  The first is the 
joint hypothesis problem discussed below.  The second is that abatement activities are not expressly 
considered here and they would have to be a factor in any intertemporal permit pricing model.   
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(Arrow 1953, Duffie 2008).  The different state payoffs are based on the possible 
resource allocation use values through time, given the economic conditions.   
 One approach to describe these asset prices is the intertemporal asset pricing 
model (Breeden 1979, Lucas 1978, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross 1985).  The Lucas (1978) 
model will be drawn on for discussion.  His study develops a model of equilibrium asset 
prices in a stochastic two period, one-good, pure exchange economy with homogenous 
consumers.  The model is consumption based.    
 Lucas (1978) found that when prices are in equilibrium, they reflect all available 
information.  His study discusses how this result is consistent with the defining 
characteristics of market “efficiency”.  It describes that an implicit assumption in the 
model -- that expectations of the later period price are rational and, in Fama’s term, “fully 
reflect all available information” (Lucas 1978, pg. 1429).   
 A general intertemporal asset pricing model can be expressed through the Euler 
condition as 
(7.1) 

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where p is the asset price, U’ (Ct) is the marginal utility of consumption Ct at t, and 
10   is a time preference discount factor coefficient.  Here the current price can be 
stated as the expected later price times the pricing kernel (Cochrane 2005).  Efficient 
asset prices are those that reflect this equilibrium at a point in time based on the 
information set available (Fama 1970, 1991, Cochrane 2005).   
 In empirical testing of the efficiency of asset prices, a joint hypothesis problem 
arises in any test of efficiency because the test must assume an equilibrium model that 
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correctly describes the market (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, Fama 1991, Duffie 
2008).  As noted by Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997 pg. 24) “if efficiency is rejected, 
this could be because the market is truly inefficient or because an incorrect equilibrium 
model has been assumed.”  To account for the joint hypotheses problem while still 
allowing for adequate empirical insight, pricing efficiency tests become “conditional “or 
“relative” efficiency tests defined as informationally efficient in the sense that the capital 
market fully and correctly reflects all known information in determining asset prices 
(Fama 1970, 1991, Malkiel 2003, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997)70.    
 The idea that asset prices are relatively efficient is formally stated as the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama 1970, 1991, 1998, Malkiel 1973, 2003).  The EMH 
loosely states that in a perfect market with information available at no cost, current prices 
reflect all available information (Fama 1970, 1991, and 1998, Malkiel1973, 2003).  New 
information that arises randomly is reflected instantaneously in new prices; this process is 
termed a random walk (Malkiel, 1973, 2003, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997).  Fama 
(1970, 1991, and 1998) defines how semi-strong form efficiency can be used to 
understand the EMH.  Semi-strong form efficiency holds that current asset prices are the 
best estimate at a point in time of later prices and incorporate all publicly available 
information. The theory holds that in the long run markets are efficient (Malkiel 2003).   
 The assumption that futures pricing performance is ideal parallels the conditions 
for semi-strong form efficiency.  That is, the futures price reflects all publicly available 
information.  Therefore, semi-strong form futures efficiency tests will be the empirical 
                                                 
70 Conditional efficiency and relative efficiency are synonyms; however, different research literature 
references one term vs. the other.   
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standard.  Futures prices are considered semi-strong form efficient if they provide the 
best available information, at a point in time, on the future spot price of a permit at the 
time of contract delivery.  In futures markets for other commodities, a number of studies 
have focused on semi-strong form efficiency (Garcia, Leuthold, Fortenbery and Sarassoro 
1988, Tomek 1997, Sanders and Manfredo 2005).  For further background, Garcia and 
Leuthold (2004) provide a review of agricultural futures studies and Fama (1991) reviews 
asset pricing studies.  A central theme among all of these tests is that known public 
information is used to determine if, in fact, the futures prices accurately reflect the 
information set considered in forecasting later spot prices (Fama 1991).   
 Much of the analysis in this chapter relies on an understanding of the theory of 
storage.  The theory of storage was previously used describe permit futures in Chapter 5.  
The theory of storage holds that at any point in time the permit futures price represents 
the current spot price adjusted for net storage benefits71.  The net storage benefits from 
holding an inventory of permits from t to T is the banking benefit received (inventory 
value) minus the total inventory storage costs.  A firm’s banking benefits arise because 
holding permits can smooth overall production.  For both polices examined (S02 and 
C02), a permit’s total cost of storage is only the spot price multiplied by the risk free rate 
of return, reflecting capital costs.  No physical costs of storage exist because of the 
electronic registry characteristics.  In this setting, the futures price expectation is 
(7.2) ]))1[((][ ,, tTittTittTi
Ti
t IsrEIAEF   
                                                 
71 See Chapter Five section 5.3 for further discussion. 
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where Ft is the futures price for contract maturity date Ti where i = 1,…N is consistent 
with the contract delivery date.  For example, at a given point in time t, T1 refers to the 
one month ahead futures maturity date and T3 to the three month ahead futures maturity 
date, etc.  Furthermore, ATi is the actual (realized) permit spot price at contract maturity 
Ti such that ATi = sTi, rt ,Ti is the risk-free interest rate at t spanning the period from t to Ti, 
Tit ,  the net storage benefits at t for holding permits to the later date Ti, and I is the 
information set available at time t (Working 1949, Tomek 1997, Pindyck 2001).  This 
formulation allows evaluation of different futures maturity horizons (Ti) at each point in 
time (t).  The risk free rate at a point in time t, is the annual risk free rate (Treasury bill 
rate for US SO2 and LIBOR for EU CO2) at t, multiplied by the ratio of days the period 
covers from t to Ti expressed as 365/)(*, tTirr tTit  .  The net convenience yield can be 
negative, zero, or positive.  The next sections describe the tests used and provide details 
on specific information tested.   
7.2 Granger Causality  
 In an ideal futures market, new pricing information is instantaneously reflected in 
prices.  For example, if a court issued a ruling on permits that influenced demand, it is 
expected that for an ideal futures market the futures price adjusts to this new information.  
To evaluate this condition, I consider whether futures prices reflect information related to 
permit price changes at the same time or faster than that of spot prices.  If futures do not 
incorporate pricing information at this speed, the presence of an ideal futures market may 
be in question.  In considering the court case example, if new information impacts 
permits, this should be reflected instantaneously in all the markets it effects (i.e., both 
spot and futures).  Granger causality will be used for this analysis.  The remainder of this 
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section describes the Granger causality procedure, the data used in estimation, SO2 SFI 
futures results, and CO2 EUA futures results.   
Granger Causality Procedure 
 Once a vector autoregression (VAR) model is fitted using spot market prices and 
futures market prices, it can be used to test if one variable “Granger causes” another 
(Granger 1969).  In VAR estimation of a market price y, a variable x Granger causes  y if 
past values of x contain information about changes in y. The method has been used to 
examine lead-lag relationships among spot and futures prices for CO2 permits from 2008 
– 2009 by Chevallier (2010) and during 2008 by Joyeux and Milunovich (2010).  
Because three separate tests are made, a discussion on the related permit futures literature 
with these results comes at the end of this chapter.  The method has been used to test the 
lead-lag relationships between spot and futures prices for live cattle (Koontz, Garcia, and 
Hudson 1990, Oellerman and Farris 1985).  It has also been used to examine convenience 
yield and spot price relationships for copper, heating oil, and lumber in which 
convenience yield values were found using futures and spot prices (Pindyck 1993).  
Granger causality has been used to understand basis relationships in pricing between 
different market locations for corn and soybeans (Manfredo and Sanders 2006, McKenzie 
2005, Lewis, Kuethe, Manfredo, Sanders 2012).   
 A VAR is a model in which K variables are specified as linear functions of  p lags 
of their own past values and p lags of other price series values (Chevallier 2010, Becketti 
2013).  The spot and futures VAR can be expressed as  
(7.3) tptpttt yJyJyJvy   2211  
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where yt  is a vector of spot yi,t and futures yj,t returns 
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independent random variables following a centered bi-variate normal 
distribution ),(oN  (Chevallier 2010, Becketti 2013).   The lag lengths for yt are 
represented by p. 
 The Granger causality test for the VAR yi,t that the futures price does not Granger 
cause the spot price is a test of the null hypothesis  
(7.4) 0: 210  pJJJH    
(Chevallier 2010, Becketti 2013).  If the futures do not Granger cause spot prices, then 
past futures prices do not contain any statistically significant permit pricing information.  
The null hypothesis is examined using a Wald test.  Rejection of the null hypothesis 
suggests that the futures market indeed plays a role in determining the spot market price 
yi,t . Rejection of the null hypothesis supports the role of futures as an information source 
of permit price changes. 
 The procedure is then reversed to determine if the spot prices Granger cause 
futures prices yj,t.   This null hypothesis is again 
(7.5) 0: 210  pJJJH , 
in which case spot prices do not Granger cause futures prices.  Rejection of this null 
hypothesis suggests that the spot market plays a role in the futures market price 
determination.  
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 Considering the above lead lag relationships, the results can have four possible 
outcomes as outlined in Table 7.1.  The first is that the price is each market Granger 
causes the other, through rejection of the null hypotheses in (7.4) and (7.5) (result 1 in 
table 7.1).  This would imply that past spot prices and futures prices provide predictive 
information about price changes and that the two markets have a simultaneous 
information flow.  For purposes of this research, a simultaneous relationship is a positive 
indication of futures market performance. 
 The second possibility is that the futures prices Granger cause spot prices but spot 
prices do not Granger cause futures prices.   This result is found through a rejection of the 
null hypothesis in (7.4) and a failure to reject the null hypothesis in (7.5) (result 2 in table 
7.1).   This would imply the futures market provides information about permit price 
changes; however, spot prices do not contain information about futures price changes.  
Here futures are considered the dominant source of pricing information, an indication of 
futures market importance, and a positive indication of futures market performance.  
 The third possible result is a failure to reject the null hypotheses in both (7.4) and 
(7.5).  This would mean that neither past futures prices nor spot prices contain useful 
predictive information.  It is an indication of an inefficient market. 
 The fourth result is that futures do not Granger cause the spot prices but spot 
prices do Granger cause futures prices.  This would be shown by a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis in (7.4) and through rejection of the null hypotheses in (7.5).  It would 
suggest that futures do not add permit price change information and that information flow 
is dominated by spot market information (result 4 in table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 Granger Causality Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis Tests    Null Hypothesis 
7.4    Futures prices do not Granger cause spot prices 
7.5    Spot prices do not Granger cause futures prices 
Result combinations 
1 Rejection of (7.4) and 
(7.5) 
  
Futures prices Granger causes spot prices   
Spot prices Granger cause futures prices 
Simultaneous relationship 
Supports futures pricing information  SpotFut   
2 Rejection of only (7.4)  Futures prices Granger cause spot prices  
Spot prices do not Granger cause futures 
Futures dominate price change information flow 
Supports futures pricing information  SpotFut   
3 A failure to reject (7.4) 
and (7.5) 
Futures prices do not Granger cause spot prices  
Spot prices do not Granger cause futures prices  
No useful information flow between markets 
Does not support futures pricing information 
4 Rejection of only  (7.5)   Futures prices do not Granger cause spot prices  
Spot prices Granger cause futures prices 
Spot prices dominate price change information flow   
Does not support futures pricing information
SpotFut   
  
SO2 and CO2 Granger Causality Data and Model Specification 
 VAR modeling requires a large sample.  Because there is less than six years of 
data on each policy, weekly price series were used for estimation purposes.  This is 
consistent with the related literature which also uses weekly observations (Manfredo and 
Sanders 2006, Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 1990).  To test futures pricing information, 
two lag lengths of p are evaluated.  The first is that of the optimal VAR model 
specification in predicting permit prices.  Due to the sample size considerations, the 
maximum lag length was set at six months.  The optimal lag length was found by 
estimating the VAR in equation (7.1) for all lag combinations p=1, … , 26  and using the 
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lag structure that minimizes Akaike’s Information Criterion (Akaike 1981, Becketti 
2013)72.   
 The second VAR model specification evaluates the information contained in only 
the prior week.  In estimation of eq. (7.1), p is set to 1.  This lag length was chosen to test 
for the influence of immediate price change information.   
 Estimation in each market requires a permit OTC spot price and futures price. The 
sources are:  
1) SO2 over the counter OTC market prices.  The Cantor SO2 OTC market, listed through 
BGC Environmental Brokerage Services (formerly CantorCO2e Brokerage), was the 
primary source of SO2 spot market data.  Daily spot prices from July 2003 - October 
2011 and daily transaction volume from 2003-2009 were gathered for the Cantor SO2 
OTC directly from BGC (2012a & b).   
2) SO2 futures prices.  The Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) served as the primary SO2 
futures contract. SFI daily prices, volume, contract maturity date, and open interest for all 
monthly contracts were gathered from December 2004 – December 2011 as sourced from 
Bloomberg (2013, 2014).     
3) CO2 spot market prices.  The Point Carbon CO2 OTC price is a composite price 
compiled by Point Carbon.  It is the reported permit price used by the European 
Commission.  Daily spot prices from June 18, 2008 – May 2014 were purchased from 
Point Carbon (2014).  Additionally, monthly OTC spot prices for the first trading day of 
                                                 
72 The AIC criterion is dfLAIC 2)ln(2  where L is the maximized value of the likelihood 
function and df is the degrees of freedom.  
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the month for June and July 2014 were gathered from Bloomberg (2014). Volume data 
was not available through Point Carbon in connection with the composite price.   
 Point Carbon’s OTC price represents a composite of CO2 OTC markets housed on 
Bluenext, Climex, the European Energy Exchange, Green Exchange, ICE and Nord Pool 
from June 2008 – October 2013.  The price was compiled as the average of the reported 
closing prices from each OTC market.  Then in October 2013, Point Carbon changed the 
OTC spot price series to reflect only prices on ICE’s OTC because of extremely thin 
volume on the other OTCs (Point Carbon 2014). 
4) CO2 futures prices.  The European Union Allowance futures contract served as the 
primary CO2 futures. EUA daily prices, volume, contract maturity date, and open interest 
for all monthly contracts were gathered from July 2008 – July 2014 as sourced from 
Bloomberg (2013, 2014).     
 Granger causality for the SO2 market is tested using weekly price series for the 
SFI1 futures and Cantor OTC; the series use Wednesday’s closing price73.   The SFI1 
futures and Cantor OTC series contain 252 observations each from January 2007 – 
October 2011.   
 The weekly data was found to be nonstationary based on the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test.  To account for the nonstationarity, a first difference was taken and found to 
be stationary (Table 7.2).  This is represented as (OTCt  - OTCt-1) and (Futt -Futt-1) for 
each series where t is a weekly period.  Additionally, the futures series was corrected for 
                                                 
73 In the event of missing observations for Wednesday, the prior nearby price was given priority: Tuesday, 
Monday, Friday, etc. 
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contract rollover so that each futures contract was differenced from a prior t-1 value of 
the same contract74.     
Table 7.2 SO2 Weekly Price Series Stationarity Tests   
Price Series t-stat p-value No. of Obs. 
OTC -1.17 0.69 252 
Futures -1.11 0.71 252 
OTCt-OTCt-1 -15.93 0 251 
Futt-Futt-1 -15.34 0 251 
Note: The weekly series are used for Granger causality testing 
 The EU CO2 market was tested using weekly data for EUA1 futures and the Point 
Carbon OTC price series.  The weekly value uses the Wednesday closing price from each 
series.  Each price series contained 311 observations from June 2008 – May 2014.  Both 
series were found to be stationary (Table 7.3).   
Table 7.3 CO2 Weekly Price Series Stationarity Tests  
Price Series t-stat p-value No. of Obs. 
OTC -2.99 0.04 311 
Futures -2.96 0.04 311 
Note: The weekly series are used for Granger causality testing 
SO2 Granger Causality Results 
 The SO2 Granger causality tests employ first differences of the weekly levels for 
the SFI1 and OTC series from 2007 through 2011.  The optimal VAR lag length 
specification was shown to be 25 weeks using the AIC criterion (Table 7.4).  At this lag 
length, the futures prices Granger cause spot prices; however, the null hypothesis was 
only rejected at the ten percent level with a Wald statistic p-value of 0.081.  Spot prices 
did not influence futures prices at this lag length, shown by a failure to reject the null 
                                                 
74 This means that if the SFI July contract was the weekly series being used, its difference was taken with 
respect to the prior SFI July contracts value.  Then when the SFI August contract was being used, its 
difference was taken with respect to the prior SFI August contracts value.   
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hypothesis (Wald statistic p-value 0.116).  These results indicate that the SFI futures 
prices provided information about later permit price changes but the spot prices did not 
provide information about later futures prices. In this setting, the SFI futures market is the 
dominant source of pricing information relative to the spot market. 
Table 7.4 SO2 Granger Causality Results 
Hypothesis Tests 
Nearby VAR (1 week)  
test statistic  
Optimal VAR (25 weeks) 
test statistic 
 7.41 0.00***  0.081*  
 7.52 0.506  0.116  
Information Flow SpotFut    SpotFut    
Notes: Price series are in first differences; * indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
10% significance level, ** indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance 
level, and *** indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level and 
reported values are the Wald test statistic p-value. 1 Futures prices do not Granger cause 
spot prices. 2Spot prices do not Granger cause futures prices.  The arrows indicate the 
information flow found.  For example, SpotFut  indicates that futures Granger cause 
spot prices (futures lead spot).   
 
 The second set of results evaluates a lag length of one week.  At this lag, the null 
hypothesis that futures prices do not Granger cause spot prices was rejected at the 1% 
significance level (Wald statistic p-value 0.00, see Table 7.4).  This indicates that SFI 
futures prices from the previous week provide valuable information in forming spot 
prices.  Alternatively at this horizon, the results indicate that spot prices do not Granger 
cause futures prices (Wald statistic p-value 0.506).  Thus at the one week horizon, SFI 
futures prices are the dominant source of pricing information between the spot market 
and futures market.   
 In summary, both sets of Granger causality results indicate that futures prices are 
the dominant source of pricing information.  Through this role, futures provide 
information about permit price changes.  Further, futures information about price changes 
was shown to be reflected before that of spot price changes.  Based on the two sources of 
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information tested (spot and futures), futures can be said to reflect new pricing 
information ahead of the spot market.  These results imply that participants should look 
to the SFI futures market for changes in SO2 permit pricing information.  Thus, emission 
decisions should be based on futures pricing information.  These findings are supportive 
of the S02 futures market as being “ideal”.  Relative to other markets (e.g., the spot 
market examined) the nearby futures contract assimilates price information faster – that 
is, futures lead the spot market.                 
CO2 Granger Causality Results 
 The Granger causality tests for CO2 s employ the EUA1 futures and spot OTC 
price series in price levels.  Weekly EUA1 futures and spot OTC prices from June 18, 
2008 – May 2014 were tested.  The results are presented in Table 7.5.   
Table 7.5 CO2 Granger Causality Results 
Hypothesis Tests 1Nearby and optimal VAR (1 week) 
7.42 0.00*** 
7.53 0.014** 
Information flow SpotFut   
Notes:* indicates the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% significance level, ** indicates 
the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, *** indicates the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level. 1 The procedures resulted in identical 
tests discussed further in the text. 2Futures prices do not Granger cause spot prices. 3Spot 
prices do not Granger cause futures prices. SpotFut  indicates a simultaneous 
relationship between futures and spot prices.  
Reported values are the Wald test statistic 
 
 Considering lags from one through 26 weeks, the optimal VAR lag length 
specification was found to be one week using the AIC criterion.  Therefore, only the one 
week horizon was tested for Granger causality.  The null hypothesis that futures do not 
Granger cause spot prices was rejected at the one percent level (Wald test p-value 0.0).  
Thus, futures prices Granger cause spot prices.  The null hypothesis that spot prices 
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Granger cause futures prices was also rejected but only at the 5 percent significance level 
(Wald test p-value 0.014).  This relationship can be characterized as one of simultaneous 
information flow between both markets.  Therefore, both markets simultaneously reflect 
information that may impact the C02 permit market.     
Granger Causality Summary 
 An ideal futures market, in the context of the environmental markets examined 
here, is based on its ability to form a forward-looking permit price that reflects the best 
available information on the market-wide incremental cost of controlling the pollutant.  
Granger causality was used to establish that SFI futures are the dominant source for 
reflecting price information in comparison to spot prices for U.S. SO2 permits.  In the EU 
ETS, it was shown that permit price information was simultaneously reflected in EUA 
futures and spot prices.  Both SO2 and CO2 results meet the criteria necessary for futures 
to reflect permit pricing information based on the spot markets and futures markets 
tested.  This indicates that futures markets play an important role in the price discovery 
process for permits.  As a result, an initial criterion for the presence of an ideal futures 
market is satisfied, in that they reflect information simultaneously (as in the case with the 
C02 market) or before the spot market (as in the case of the S02 market).  Thus, for 
utilities and other entities that use permits in order to comply with emissions standards, 
these participants may be astute to look to the futures markets for information regarding 
the future price of the spot permits. The information provided by the futures market may 
be useful for planning and budgeting purposes as utilities and other users plan their 
strategies for compliance.      
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7.3 Futures Performance in Forecasting Subsequent Spot Prices 
 This section evaluates futures performance in forecasting subsequent permit spot 
prices.  The empirical tests will consider monthly futures forecast horizons to determine 
(1) if the permit futures price (forecast) at t for a contract delivery of permits in Ti 
represents a rational estimate of what the spot permit price will be at the time of contract 
maturity and (2) if the futures price (forecast) encompasses the predictive information 
contained in an alternative forecast of delivery time spot prices.  First, a framework for 
testing the two hypotheses is outlined. Then the data are described.  The results for the 
SO2 futures are then presented, followed by the results for CO2 futures.     
Futures Performance Test Set Up 
 As discussed at the onset of this chapter, an ideal futures market, in the context of 
the environmental control markets examined, requires that futures provide the best 
available information at a point in time on the later spot permit prices for the contract 
maturity date (Garcia, Leuthold, Fortenbery and Sarassoro, 1988, Tomek 1997, Garcia 
and Leuthold 2004).  For this condition to hold, the futures price must reflect all known 
information as of the time of estimation.  An established necessary condition for 
considering whether this standard is met is that the futures price must outperform any 
alternative price forecast generated from the known information at a point in time 
(Leuthold, Junkus, and Cordier 1989).  If the futures are found to outperform an 
alternative forecast, they are said to be relatively efficient with respect to the information 
tested.  Alternative forecasts previously used in comparisons for other commodities 
include econometric specifications, time series models, agency forecasts, and expert 
opinion (Garcia and Leuthold 2004). This necessary condition has been examined for a 
 131 
 
number of agricultural markets (Rausser and Carter 1983, Garcia et al 1988, Martin and 
Garcia 1981, Leuthold and Hartmann 1979, Irwin, Gerlow, and Liu 1994, Sanders and 
Manfredo 2005), energy markets (Ma 1989, Kumar 1992) and financial instruments 
(Leitch and Tanner 1991, Hafer and Hein 1989).   For the most part, these studies find 
that short time horizon (1-3 month) futures are relatively efficient but there is a 
degradation of performance as the time to maturity of the associated futures contract 
increases (Tomek 1997).    
 One way of testing for this necessary condition is through the mean squared error 
family of tests.  This family includes the mean squared error, root mean squared error, 
and mean absolute percentage error.  In this setting, if the (say) mean squared forecast 
error resulting from a futures forecast is smaller than a competing forecast’s, then the 
futures-based forecast is said to outperform the competing forecast, meeting the 
necessary condition for futures market efficiency (specifically semi-strong form market 
efficiency) 
 Sanders and Manfredo (2005) demonstrate how focusing on mean squared error 
only, may leave valuable insights unexplained and can possibly lead to the wrong 
conclusion regarding market efficiency.  In particular they discuss how one forecast may 
produce a smaller mean squared error than a competitor but still not contain all of the 
predictive information found in the competing forecast.  Sanders and Manfredo (2005) 
then describe and demonstrate how the forecast encompassing tests of Harvey, 
Leybourne and Newbold (1997, 1998) and Harvey and Newbold (2000) can be used to 
evaluate whether futures encompass all of the predictive information contained in an 
alternative forecast.  In doing this, Sanders and Manfredo (2005) demonstrate how 
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forecast encompassing is a more exacting criterion for testing semi-strong form market 
efficiency in the context of futures markets. 
In a separate line of literature, Vuchelen and Gutierrez (2005) develop a test for 
examining the incremental information contained in forecasts at differing forecast 
horizons.  Their test provides insights into situations where multiple forecasts exist for 
different time horizons of the same variable.  For instance, Vuchelen and Gutierrez 
(2005) considered how insightful OECD country gross domestic product forecasts were 
for 6 months, 1 year, and 2 years out.  The results allowed insight into if the 2 year out 
forecast added any value beyond that found in (say) the 1 year forecast.  In testing the 
value between different forecast horizons, the test was also embeds the standard forecast 
rationality tests (e.g., bias and efficiency).  This has led to the testing of futures markets 
within this framework by Sanders, Garcia, and Manfredo (2008) and Schnake, Karali, 
and Dorfman (2012). 
 The modeling approach used here draws on both the encompassing principle and 
the procedure of Vuchelen and Gutierrez (2005) to understand the futures pricing 
performance at different time horizons, specifically in comparison to a benchmark 
forecast.  This approach allows for the examination of forecast rationality (bias and 
efficiency) as well as forecast encompassing.  The model can be stated as     
(7.6)
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where the futures price,
Ti
tF , will be considered to be the preferred forecast, TiA  is the 
realized spot price at Ti,  the benchmark forecast is represented by tTit sr )1( , , e is the 
error term, and i corresponds to the selected month horizon.   
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The benchmark forecast relies on the theory of storage (see section 5.2).  It comes 
from the spot price adjusted by the risk free interest rate as  
(7.7) tTit sr )1( ,   
where ts is the spot price at t, and Titr , is the risk-free rate over the period t to T.  Noting 
that the risk-free rate Titr , is determined at each observation point in time t, it is not 
assumed to be a constant.  The benchmark can be considered to assume a zero net 
convenience yield.  This alternative is used because spot prices adjusted for the risk-free 
return are known values at time t.    
 Equation (7.6) is made up of three key factors: the actual price (dependent 
variable), the futures price (preferred forecast), and the alternative (benchmark) forecast. 
In essence, this is a modification of the Vuchelen and Gutierrez (2005) which allows for 
evaluating the futures information in comparison to an alternative forecast at each of the 
distinct time horizons.  The appendix (E.1) further outlines the detail behind the original 
Vuchelen and Gutierrez (2005) test and also describes how this setup can be linked with 
the encompassing principle. 
 Two hypotheses are evaluated.  The first examines futures forecast rationality 
following the traditional pricing approach.  Rationality is tested through a joint null 
hypothesis of β2i=β3i=1, β1i=0 where β1i=0 reflects an unbiased estimate of later permit 
prices and β2i= β3i=1 an efficient forecast (H.1 in Table 7.6)75.  Rational futures are a 
positive indication of futures pricing performance.   
 
                                                 
75 An unbiased forecast is one which does not systematically over- or underestimate 
the actual value, while an efficient forecast is one which utilizes all information available at the time of the 
forecast (Sanders, Manfredo, and Boris 2009).  
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Table 7.6 Futures Performance Hypothesis Tests Following Equation 7.6 
Futures information Hypothesis 
tests 
Futures support shown by 
 
H.1:
Ti
tF Futures are rational forecasts 
of maturity date permit prices  
β2=β3=1, β1=0 A failure to reject the null 
hypothesis 
H.2: 
Ti
tF Futures encompass all 
useful  information in spot prices 
adjusted for capital costs 
β2=β3 A failure to reject the null 
hypothesis 
 
 The second null hypothesis β2i=β3i , is that the weight (β2i − β3i) on the benchmark 
forecast tTiti sr )1( ,2   is zero in an implied composite forecast with futures Ti
t
F (H.2 in 
Table 7.6).  A zero weight on the benchmark, tsTit
r )
,
1(   in equation (7.6) yields
Ti
eTi
t
F
iiTi
A 
31
 .  This result and hypothesis test parallels that of the 
encompassing principle; see the appendix (E.1).   Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
implies that the futures price “encompasses” the competing forecast’s predictive 
information and is relatively efficient.  This satisfies a necessary condition for semi-
strong form futures market efficiency.   
  Finally, to evaluate different futures time horizons (e.g., SFI1 month ahead, SFI2 
month ahead, and SFI3 month ahead) , eq. (7.6) is separately estimated with i values set 
to identical time periods (months) such that the one month horizon is with i=1, the two 
month with i=2, and the five month with i=5.  For example, the five month (i=5) test at t 
uses the futures price for a contract that matures five months after t, , considers the risk-
free capital costs over the intervening five month period, and uses the realized spot price 
five months from t as the actual value (dependent variable).   
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SO2 and CO2 Pricing Efficiency Data 
The sources for the spot prices and futures prices are those previously discussed 
(the Cantor SO2 OTC market, the Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) futures contract, the 
Point Carbon CO2 OTC market, and the European Union Allowance (EUA) futures).  The 
tests are conducted using monthly observations.   
 Because each permit system is located in a separate region, different interest rates 
are used. The interest rate sources are: 
1) Treasury-bill rate. For the U.S. based SO2 policy, the capital cost of holding a stock of 
permits is based on the monthly Treasury-bill rate.  Monthly T-bill rates from 2007 - 
2011 were accessed through the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(2013).  
2) LIBOR. For the EU ETS CO2 system, the LIBOR monthly rate was used.  This series 
spans 2008 – 2014 and was taken from Bloomberg (2014).  
The futures series setup for testing the SO2 market will now be discussed. (In all of the 
methods the SO2 market will be used to describe the setup. The identical procedure was 
used in the CO2 market.)  To examine as many monthly horizons as possible, rolling 
contract series were constructed to represent t period futures that mature one month ahead 
(SFI1), two months ahead (SFI2),…, five months (SFI5) ahead.  In this case, the SFI1 = 
T1 in the model, etc. The rolling series create observations over time that represent 
identical time period forecast horizons; this is common practice in futures literature and 
testing (e.g. Tomek and Gray 1970, Sanders, Garcia, and Manfredo 2009, Schnake, 
Karali, and Dorfman 2012).  Table 7.7 illustrates how futures performance is considered.   
On July 1, 2007, five separate futures prices series existed for testing.  On July 1, 2007, 
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the SFI futures had contracts listed with the following maturity and prices: July 2007-
SFI1 $542; August 2007 SFI2 $544; September 2007 SFI3 $546; October 2007 SFI4 
$548; November 2007 SFI5 $550.   On July 1, 2007, the SFI1 was forecasting a spot 
price of $544 at maturity on July 26, 2007.   Similarly on July 1, 2007, the SFI5 was 
forecasting a November 27, 2007 spot price of $550.   
 The table also lists what the maturity date spot price was for each respective 
horizon, (i.e., the actual price tested).  The differences between the July 1, 2007 futures 
prices and the actual corresponding maturity date prices were SFI1 $12, SFI2 $25, SFI3 
$16, SFI4 $6, and SFI5 (-$2).  These differences reflect how the forecasted prices can 
differ from realized prices.  As Table 7.7 indicates, each contract has a slightly different 
maturity date.  To account for different contract maturity dates, all time t observations are 
taken on the first trading day of the month.  Actual (realized) time period T prices are 
taken on the contract maturity date, which is also the contract’s last trading day76. The 
actual price series ATi used in estimation reflects futures maturity date prices in both the 
CO2 and SO2 markets for consistency.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
76 SFI futures maturity date and last trading day of a particular contract is three business days prior to the 
last business day of the expiration month.  EUA futures maturity date and last trading day is the last 
Monday of the contract month; however, if the last Monday is a non-business day or there is a non-business 
day in the four days following the last Monday, the last day of trading will be the penultimate Monday of 
the delivery month.  In futures pricing evaluation use of futures maturity prices is one approach used in the 
commodity literature (e.g.  Fama and French 1987, Pindyck 1993, 2001, 2004, Sanders, Garcia, and 
Manfredo 2008, Tomek and Gray 1970).    
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Table 7.7 Snapshot of SFI 1-5 Futures Prices and Realized Values 
Futures SFI1 Jul-07 SFI2 Aug-07 SFI3 Sep-07 SFI4 Oct-07 SFI5 Nov-07 
7/1/2007 $542 SFIN7 $544 SFIQ7 $546 SFIU7 548 SFIV7 $550 SFIX7 
7/26/2007 $530 M         
8/28/2007   $519 M       
9/25/2007     $530 M     
10/26/2007       542 M   
11/27/2007         $552 M 
 Difference $12   $25   $16   $6   -$2   
Note: M means maturity. SFI(letter)(#) represents future contract symbols. Contract 
maturity is the futures last trading day. 
 
  In the SO2 market, the data allowed estimation of SFI1, SFI2, SFI3, SFI4, and 
SFI5 month ahead futures series from January 2007 – October 2011 generating a total of 
290 observations.  The SO2 market was constrained because active futures trading did not 
start until 2007 and October 2011 marked the end of active spot and futures trading. 
In the CO2 market EUA1, EUA2, and EUA3 month ahead futures series were created 
from July 2008 – July 2014 data for a total of 216 observations.  Monthly EUA futures 
contracts are only listed three months out; beyond three months, only quarterly contracts 
are listed.  Because of the EUA contract listings, only EUA1-3 month ahead series were 
available for testing.  The series did not start until July 2008 because this was the 
beginning of available Phase II OTC prices.  July 2014 was the last month available at 
the time of writing.   
 The actual ATi, futures forecast 
Ti
tF , and spot st series were tested for stationarity 
using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.  All of the price series were found to be 
nonstationary.  This resulted in the need to difference each price series, to allow for 
comparison between the futures forecast and benchmark forecast.  
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 Because each time period represents a unique information set, it is important to 
compare rates of return over identical information set time intervals.  By using log 
relative rates for identical time intervals for the futures and benchmark forecasts, the 
scale-free returns between forecasts can be compared over identical time intervals.  An 
advantage to this approach is that the generated returns are scale-free (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay 1997).  These properties allow for the log normality assumption to avoid 
issues of limited liability (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997).  Therefore, incorporating 
the differencing, equation (7.6) becomes  
(7.8) 
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where the notation follows that previously defined.  This approach represents one 
differencing technique used in the economic literature (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
1997, Hansen and Singleton 1982, Cochrane 2005) and is consistent with that of  
Schnake, Karali, and Dorfman (2012) who use a similar procedure.  Equation (7.8) is 
estimated using OLS, with results presented in tables 7.10 and 7.11 for the SO2 and CO2 
markets respectively as described below.    
 Because both the SO2 and CO2 markets had a limited number of years available 
for testing, every separate horizon was made a log relative return from the actual value 
immediately prior to time t in order to maintain the maximum number of observations.  
The differenced price series were all found to be stationary using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test; results are reported in Table 7.8 for SO2 and in Table 7.6 for CO2.   
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Table 7.8. SO2 Monthly Price Series Stationarity Tests, January 2007 - October 
2011  
Price Series  1 Month  2 Month  3 Month  4 Month  5 Month  
OTC t-stat -9.342 -4.742 -3.767 -3.637 -2.905 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Futures t-stat -9.428 -4.599 -3.725 -3.528 -3.04 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
 Implied val. 1 1 2 6 9 
 No. of Obs. 57 56 55 54 53 
Note: An implied value was constructed for missing observations outlined in (E.2).  
 
Table 7.9 CO2 Monthly Price Series Stationarity Tests, July 2008 - July 2014  
Price Series  1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 
OTC t-stat -11.209 -4.747 -4.952 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Futures t-stat -11.104 -5.291 -5.06 
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Implied val. 25 24 25 
 No. of Obs. 72 71 70 
Note: An implied value was constructed for missing observations outlined in (E.2).  
SO2 Futures Performance Results 
 The performance of Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) futures pricing was 
evaluated from January 2007 – October 2011.  During this time, spot permit prices 
ranged from $1-694, and SFI1 futures prices traded from $1-720 per permit.  The analysis 
examined the SFI one through five month futures maturity horizons through equation 
(7.8).  The results are based upon monthly observations using the log relative rates of 
return described above. 
  The SFI1 – 5 month futures results are presented in Table 7.10.  The first column 
indicates the futures maturity horizon tested.  The next three columns present the 
parameter estimates, with the standard error listed below each coefficient.  The first 
parameter 1 is the intercept, the second 2  is the slope coefficient associated with the 
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benchmark forecast, and the third 3 the slope coefficient for the difference between the 
futures and benchmark forecasts.  The fifth column presents the test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that futures are rational estimates (e.g. unbiased and efficient).  The seventh 
column presents results for the null hypothesis that futures encompass all the useful 
pricing information contained within the benchmark forecast (see Table 7.6 for a list of 
the null hypothesis tested).  P-values are reported for the null hypotheses parameter 
restrictions.  The 5% significance level was used to determine statistical significance.  
The last column lists the number of observations tested for each futures maturity horizon. 
 The failure of to reject the joint null hypothesis β2i=β3i=1, β1i=0 for the one 
month ahead SFI futures (column 5 in Table 7.10) indicates that these futures prices serve 
as rational forecasts of delivery time spot prices .  The test restriction in column six 
indicates that the futures encompass all of the predictive information contained in spot 
prices after adjustment for the risk-free rate of return ( 1312 TT    , p-value = 0.986).  It 
follows that the SFI1 futures are relatively efficient with respect to the information tested, 
a necessary condition for semi-strong form futures efficiency.  Thus, in forming rational 
estimates of the subsequent one month ahead permit prices, the SFI1 futures offer 
evidence consistent with an ideal futures market. 
Table 7.10 SFI SO2 Futures Pricing Performance Results 
Futures 
horizon 
Parameter    Nulla Nulla Obs 
β1 β2 β3 
β2=β3=1, 
β1=0 
β2=β3   
SFI 1 
month 
-0.0717b 1.4974 1.4991 0.0543 0.9862 58 
 0.0415c 0.3302 0.312    
      
SFI 2 
month 
-0.1442b 1.358 1.4484 0.0024 0.483 57 
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Table 7.10 (Cont’d) SFI SO2 Futures Pricing Performance Results 
Futures 
horizon 
Parameter    Nulla Nulla Obs 
β1 β2 β3 
β2=β3=1, 
β1=0 
β2=β3   
SFI 5 
month 
-0.3698b 1.5477 1.8374 0 0.1855 54 
  0.0821c 0.4081 0.3479       
 0.0561c 0.432 0.4082    
      
SFI 3 
month 
-0.225b 1.4571 1.5841 0.0001 0.4196 56 
 0.0687c 0.4227 0.3948    
      
SFI 4 
month 
-0.3125b 1.4027 1.4317 0.0002 0.8709 55 
 0.0899c 0.4639 0.4438    
Notes: a Test statistics represent p-values, a five percent significance level is used. 
b the variable coefficient values are in this row. 
c the variable standard errors are in this row. 
See Table 7.10 for a list of hypothesis tests. 
 
  The SFI2 – 5 month horizons all had similar test results.  The null hypothesis of 
futures rationality was rejected for each of the SFI2 -5 month horizons (column 5).  It 
follows that futures accuracy starts to degrade after one month.  If one accepts that the 
events as discussed in Chapter 3 created a large amount of market uncertainty which 
affected prices, this result would be expected77.   
   At the SFI2- 5 month horizons, the null hypothesis TiTi 32    could not be 
rejected (column 6).  This demonstrates that futures encompass all the predictive pricing 
information contained in the alternative (benchmark) forecast – the spot price adjusted for 
the risk free return.  Because of this, the benchmark forecast cannot be used to generate a 
                                                 
77 In the sense that these events would led to inaccurate later forecasts.  The next section discusses the 
events in relation to price movements and storage benefits.  For example, if in July the futures estimated a 
price of x for a September maturity, but a court decision with major price affects was released in August, it 
is reasonable to assume that this July price would no longer be an accurate forecast of the September price. 
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more accurate forecast relative to that provided by the futures market. .  Therefore at the 
time of estimation, futures are shown to be relatively efficient with respect to the 
information contained in the benchmark forecast.  This indicates all the SFI2 – 5 month 
futures satisfy a necessary condition for semi-strong form futures efficiency.  
  The results suggest that the SFI1 month futures can be looked to as rational 
permit price expectations. However, the SFI2 – 5 month futures were found not to 
provide rational estimates.  However, all the SFI1 – 5 month futures were shown to 
encompass the information contained within the alternative forecast.  The alterative 
forecast is directly based on the theory of storage and relies on the spot price at the time 
the forecast is made.  This implies the SFI1 -5 month futures are a source of valuable 
information regarding the market-wide incremental costs of permit compliance.  For SO2 
permit compliance, this suggests that futures prices can be used to reduce permit 
compliance price uncertainty and improve resource allocation.      
CO2Futures Performance Results 
 The results of the European Union Allowance (EUA) futures are presented in 
Table (7.11).  The time span for the analysis is July 2008 - July 2014.  The evaluation 
examines the EUA1 – 3 month futures maturity horizons.  During this time, EUA1 month 
futures traded between € 2.87 - 29.33 and OTC spot prices between € 2.93 - 28.00.  The 
first column lists the maturity horizon tested.  The second through fourth columns list the 
parameter estimates for the intercept, benchmark forecast, and difference between the 
futures and benchmark forecast respectively.  The standard errors are listed below the 
respective parameter estimates.  The fifth and sixth columns list the p-values for the 
restrictions tested.  The null hypothesis results in the fifth column represent if the futures 
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were rationale estimates.  The sixth column presents statistics for the null hypothesis that 
the futures encompass all the predictive information contained in the benchmark forecast.  
The final column lists the number of observations at each horizon.   
 The EUA1 month and EUA 2 month ahead futures were shown to be rational 
estimates of subsequent permit prices based on a failure to reject the joint null hypothesis 
of β2i=β3i=1, β1i=0 (column 5 in Table 7.11).  A failure to reject the joint null hypothesis 
of 1312 TT   (column 6) indicates that the futures encompass all of the predictive 
information contained in the alternative forecast.  Therefore, the EUA1 and EUA2 month 
futures are rationale estimates of later permit prices which satisfy a necessary condition 
for futures efficiency.      
Table 7.11 EUA CO2 Futures Pricing Performance Results 
Futures 
Horizon 
Parameter   Nulla Nulla Obs 
β1 β2 β3 β2=β3=1, β1=0 β2=β3   
EUA 1 month -0.0225b 0.7217 3.9293 0.1151 0.0702 73 
 0.0158c 0.1954 1.6936    
      
EUA 2 month -0.0486b 0.6802 -0.5352 0.0552 0.2470 72 
 0.0214c 0.2487 1.0413    
      
EUA 3 month -0.0738b 0.7362 -0.3933 0.0444 0.2665 71 
 0.0280c 0.3271 1.0261    
Notes: a test statistics represent p-values, a five percent significance level is used. 
b the variable coefficient values are in this row. 
c the variable standard errors are in this row. 
See Table 7.10 for a list of hypothesis tests. 
 
 At the EUA3 month horizon, futures rationality was rejected at the 5% level (p-
value 0.0444).  This indicates that the accuracy of the futures expected rate of return 
deteriorates as the time horizon increases beyond two months.  The EUA3 month futures 
were still shown to encompass all of the information contained in the spot price adjusted 
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for the risk-free return, 3332 TT   (column 7).  This illustrates that the futures were 
relatively efficient and outperformed the benchmark forecast, a necessary condition for 
efficiency. 
 The EUA1 and EUA2 month futures were shown to be rational estimates which 
encompassed the information tested.  Thus, these prices measure the market-wide 
incremental cost of controlling the pollutant for the 1 and 2 monthly maturity horizons.  
The EUA3 month horizon futures provide valuable information but are not rational 
estimates.  This suggests that EUA1 – 3 month futures provide valuable information for 
emission decisions and may be employed as a means to reduce risk through hedging.  
Further, the rational EUA1 and EU2 month futures suggest that permit compliance risk 
can be eliminated, thereby allowing risk averse firms to minimize policy compliance 
costs and improve resource allocation.          
7.1 Futures, Spot, and Storage Benefits 
 The theory of storage will be used to characterize the relationship between futures 
prices, spot prices, and storage benefits for the SO2 and CO2 markets.   This section first 
illustrates how storage benefits are defined based on the theory of storage.  Then the data 
used in estimation is described.  This is followed by a section describing the results for 
the U.S. SO2 market.  Then the EU ETS CO2 results are presented.  Finally, a summary 
discusses the implications for futures performance.  
 The theory of storage holds that the net storage benefits from holding an 
inventory of permits from t to T is the banking benefit received (inventory value) minus 
the total inventory storage cost.  A firm’s banking benefits arise because holding permits 
allows a firm to smooth production.  For both policies examined, a permit’s total cost of 
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storage is only the spot price multiplied by the risk free rate of return, reflecting capital 
costs.  No physical costs of storage exist because of the electronic registry characteristics.  
In this setting and by incorporating the spot and futures relationship, the net convenience 
yield (net storage benefit) is expressed as  
(7.9) 
T
ttTtTt Fsr  )1( ,,  
where F is the futures price for a later maturity date Ti, rt ,Ti is the risk-free interest rate at 
t spanning the time from t to T, s the spot (OTC) permit price, and   the net storage 
benefits (Working 1949, Tomek 1997, Pindyck 2001)78.   
The net convenience yield values can be negative, zero, or positive.  A zero net 
convenience yield value occurs when the storage benefits are equal to the cost of storing 
permits.  Backwardation refers to a net convenience yield greater than zero, which 
indicates that the market places excess benefits (a premium) on holding permit stocks to 
avoid potential production disruptions.  Backwardation is represented by the spot price + 
storage costs > futures price, which reflects negative intertemporal spreads (Tomek and 
Gray 1970, Pindyck 2001).  Weak backwardation occurs when the spot price > futures 
price but less than the storage costs.   A market in contango is one with a negative net 
convenience yield value.   
 To allow comparison between the SO2 and CO2 systems, the convenience yields 
were expressed as a percentage of the spot price at that point in time as 
(7.10)  )/(% ,, tTitTit s  .   
                                                 
78 The risk free rate at a point in time t, is the annual risk free rate (Tbill for US SO2 and LIBOR for EU 
CO2) at t, multiplied by the ratio of days the period covers from t to T expressed as 
tTt rtTr *365/)(,  . 
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This allows the net storage benefit to be discussed as a percent of the spot price.  
Equation (7.10) will be evaluated for each  i=1,…,N horizon available at each point in 
time t.  By analyzing different monthly horizons, it is possible to determine if storage 
benefit as a percent of spot prices changes over time.   
SO2 and CO2 Convenience Yield Data 
 The sources for the spot prices and futures prices are those previously discussed 
(the Cantor SO2 OTC market, the Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) futures contract, the 
U.S. Treasury-bill rate, the Point Carbon CO2 OTC market, the European Union 
Allowance (EUA) futures, and the LIBOR rate).   
 Equation (7.10) was measured using monthly series with each observation taken 
on the first trading day of a month. The futures series setup for testing the SO2 market 
will now be discussed. To examine as many monthly horizons as possible, rolling 
contract series were constructed to represent t period futures that mature one month ahead 
(SFI1), two months ahead (SFI2),…, five months (SFI5) ahead.  An example of how the 
SFI1-5 month horizon works is presented in Table 7.12.  On July 1, 2007, the SFI futures 
had contracts listed with the following maturity and prices: July 2007-SFI1 $542; August 
2007 SFI2 $544; September 2007 SFI3 $546; October 2007 SFI4 $548; November 2007 
SFI5 $550.  This means that on July 1, 2007, the SFI1 was forecasting a spot price of 
$542 at maturity on July 26, 2007.   Similarly on July 1, 2007, the SFI5 was forecasting a 
November 27, 2007, spot price of $550.  
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Table 7.12 Snapshot of SFI 1-5 Months Ahead Futures Price Series 
Futures Series SFI1 SFI2 SFI3 SFI4 SFI5 
Prices on 7/1/2007 $542  $544  $546  $548 $550  
Months until maturity 1 2 3 4 5 
Maturity date 7/26/2007 8/28/2007 9/25/2007 10/26/2007 11/27/2007 
Futures contract symbol SFIN7 SFIQ7 SFIU7 SFIV7 SFIX7 
Note: SFI(letter)(#) represents the future contract symbol, the maturity month, and 
maturity year. Contract maturity is the futures last trading day. 
 
In the SO2 market, the data allowed estimation of the one thru five month 
convenience yields from January 2007 – October 2011, generating a total of 290 
observations.  The SO2 market was constrained because active futures trading did not 
start until 2007, and October 2011 marked the end of active spot and futures trading. 
In the CO2 market the one thru three month ahead convenience yields were 
created from July 2008 – July 2014 data for a total of 216 observations.  Monthly EUA 
futures contracts are only listed three months out; beyond three months, only quarterly 
contracts are listed.  Because of the EUA contract listings, only EUA1-3 month ahead 
series were available for testing.  The series do not start until July 2008 because this was 
the beginning of available Phase II OTC prices.  July 2014 was the last month available 
at the time of writing for analysis.   
SO2 Futures and Storage Benefit Values 
A summary of the net storage benefit results from 2007 to 2011 is presented in 
Table 7.13.   A value of zero means that net storage benefit equals the capital costs 
associated with holding permits over the time horizon.  Over the total sample, 69% of the 
absolute values were greater than 1%.  This result suggests that other benefits to storage 
were priced into the market.  The results also indicate that 64% of the one month, 67% of 
the two month, 69% of the three month, 71% of the four month, and 74% of the five 
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month values were greater than plus or minus 1% of the spot price.  This illustrates that 
across months as the time horizon expands, net storage benefits deviate from zero more 
frequently.  Loosely, this implies that permit risk increases as the time horizon expands; 
the risk factors are discussed below.   
Table 7.13 SO2 Convenience Yield (CY) Values 1 - 5 Month Horizons 2007 – 2011 
CY horizons 1 month 2 month 3 month 4 month 5 month Total 
Negative CY values 14 14 16 17 18 79 
Positive CY values 44 44 42 41 40 211 
CY between + and -1% 21 19 18 17 15 90 
CY less than < - 5% 3 2 3 3 3 14 
CY Value greater than >  5% 25 26 26 26 27 130 
Total CY outside + or - 5% 28 28 29 29 30 144 
Number of observations  58 58 58 58 58 290 
Notes: Monthly convenience yield values from January 2007 - October 2011.  The CY% 
is found in eq. (7.10).  
  
 A positive convenience yield means that the market was in backwardation such 
that intertemporal spreads were negative.  In the full sample, backwardation was present 
at 73% of the SFI1-5 month horizons, with 75% at the one month horizon and a slight 
decrease to 69% at the five month.  Over the period from 2009 – 2011, the average of the 
one through five month convenience yields in backwardation rose to over 85%.      
 Two primary sources of risk create these conditions - low levels of inventory and 
a high degree of market uncertainty (price volatility has been used as a proxy for 
uncertainty) (Pindyck 2001).  Both aspects will be considered. 
 The permit inventory rose significantly from a bank of 6.9m permits in 2007 to 
over 16.4m in 2011.  In 2007, 9.5m permits were issued against the number needed for 
compliance of 8.9m.  By 2010, issued permits were 8.95m and the annual compliance 
need was 5.1m.  A stocks-to-use ratio defined as (yearn issued permits + montht-1 
inventory - month emissions) / (yearn total emissions) measures how long the current 
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permit supply would last, based on current demand.  This ratio was previously defined in 
eq. (3.1) and the results over the period considered are reproduced below.  Based on the 
values in Table 7.14, the ratio indicates that permit inventory was never below a six 
month supply and by 2010 had increased to an over 4.6 year supply79.  The rapid decline 
in firm emissions and near constant annual issuance drove the excess supply.  In addition, 
yearly electricity production, which represents the marketed good associated with SO2 
permit compliance, remained relatively constant from 2007 through 201180. This implies 
that increasing levels of electricity production were not a factor influencing permit 
demand.  Storage benefits (convenience yield) should have been very low or zero based 
on the permit inventory, permit compliance levels, and yearly electricity production. 
Table 7.14 SO2 Permit Stocks-to-Use Ratios 2000 – 2011   
Date 
Stocks:use 
(month) 
Stocks:use 
(year) 
Total 
supply 
Issued 
permits 
Permits 
used 
12/1/2006 8.043 0.670 6.300 - 9.4 
1/2/2007 20.303 1.692 15.058 9.5 - 
12/3/2007 9.303 0.775 6.900 - 8.9 
1/2/2008 24.895 2.075 15.767 9.5 - 
12/1/2008 13.895 1.158 8.800 - 7.6 
1/2/2009 37.526 3.127 17.825 9.5 - 
12/1/2009 26.526 2.211 12.600 - 5.7 
1/4/2010 49.706 4.142 21.125 8.95 - 
12/1/2010 38.706 3.225 16.450 - 5.1 
1/3/2011 66.733 5.561 25.025 8.95 - 
12/1/2011 55.733 4.644 20.900 - 4.5 
Notes: Permits are in millions. Stocks:use ratio equals how long the current supply will                              
last based on the current emission rates.        
Source: Own calculations from EPA reports     
                                                 
79 By comparison, over the last twenty years, the year ending stocks-to-use ratio for corn just before new 
crop harvest, its lowest yearly point, has only been above 0.30 (just over a three month supply) once.  
Further, the ending corn stocks-to-use ratio fell below 0.10 (1.2 months supply) five times.   
80 Yearly electricity production was actually about 1% less in 2011 than in 2007, see Table 3.2. 
 150 
 
 Market uncertainty, described by price volatility, is the second factor associated 
with causing backwardation.  Figure 7.1 graphs the convenience yield values along with 
the OTC spot prices from 2007 – 2011.  The graph illustrates that spot prices were very 
volatile over the period.  They traded from a high of $694 in 2007 to a low of $1.50 by 
2011.  Similarity SFI1 prices traded from $1 – 720 from 2007 through 2011.  Several 
events may be considered as possible influences on the pricing factors. 
 
Figure 7.1 Monthly U.S. SO2 Convenience Yields from January 2007 – October 2011 
Notes: CY1% is the one month convenience yield, CY3% the three month, and CY5% 
the five month. The CY% is found in eq. (7.10) as )/(% ,, tTitTit s  . 
Numbers - the numbers on the graph refer to events discussed below.     
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Prior to the evaluation years several policy changes had been proposed which 
could have altered the initial CAAA law.  Foremost was CAIR proposed in 2003.  It 
sought to account for regional concerns by requiring different compliance ratios in 
various states.  From a firm’s perspective, CAIR would require tougher emission 
standards and also an understanding of a complex ratio system that was not uniform 
across states. 
North Carolina challenged the EPA SO2 regulations in court on June 2006.  It 
argued that the state’s ability to meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) was inhibited by cross-state SO2 emissions.  The challenge questioned the 
EPA’s authority to implement rule changes and the CAAA system itself.  One potential 
outcome of this court challenge was that CAAA SO2 permits would no longer be used for 
electricity regulation; this would make permits worthless.  Generally, at the start of the 
evaluation period in 2007, it can be said that policy uncertainty existed; this uncertainty 
represented forces that had the potential to make CAAA permits either more valuable or 
worthless.    
During this period, the first major event (number 1 on figure 7.1) was when oral 
arguments were held on the North Carolina vs EPA case in March 2008.  Between the 
first trading day of March and April, spot prices dropped from $457 to $377 and SFI1 
futures from $461 to $340.  The one through five month horizon convenience yields at 
the start of March were all near zero (approx. -1%).  By April, all five month horizons 
had shifted to reflect storage benefits valued at over 9% of permit spot price.  This event 
resulted in a market shift to backwardation reflecting negative intertemporal spreads 
between spot and futures.  
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Then on July 11, 2008, the court ruled for North Carolina and vacated CAIR in its 
entirety, finding that states should be prohibited from damaging other states through cross 
pollution (see 2 on Figure 7.1).  The effect was that net storage benefits returned to 
approximately zero and prices were relatively flat for a couple of months.   
Next on December 23, 2008 (number 3), a court ruling left CAIR and the 
associated federal implementation plans -- including the CAIR trading programs -- in 
place until EPA announced the new rule to replace CAIR.  This was followed on July 6, 
2010 (number 4), by the EPA proposing the Transport Rule to control SO2.  Finally in 
July 2011 (number 5), implementation of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) 
occurred.  While these last three events were occurring, net storage benefits represented 
backwardation in excess of 5% of the spot price in 71% of the observations (125 of 175).   
This was a dramatic change from the time period prior to December 2008.   
This suggests that market backwardation was not driven by low levels of 
inventory (fear of stock outs).  Rather, it was caused by policy uncertainty regarding 
potential rule changes and court cases.  For instance in anticipation of a new rule 
requiring firms to use 4 permits for every unit of emissions (essentially a more stringent 
standard), it is reasonable that firms may have wished to hold an excess permit inventory 
to hedge against the risk of stricter compliance rules.   
Regardless of the cause, backwardation implied that the market perceived some 
type of risk through its willingness to accept a negative return from holding permits over 
an extended period.  These relationships suggest that futures prices are likely to provide 
information about net storage benefits.   
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CO2 Futures and Storage Benefit Values 
 The EU ETS CO2 convenience yield values expressed through eq. (7.10) were 
estimated at the one, two, and three month horizons.  A summary of the values are 
presented in Table 7.15.  Figure 7.2 presents the one, two, and three month convenience 
yields along with the spot prices from July 2008 – July 2014.  The results indicate that the 
absolute value of the percentage convenience yield values were very close to zero.  For 
the one to three month horizons, 63% of the 219 observations were within 1% and over 
95% of the total were within 5% of zero. Thus, these values indicate that no excess 
storage benefits existed.   
Table 7.15 CO2 Convenience Yield (CY) Values, July 2008 - July 2014 
CY horizons 1 month 2 month 3 month Total 
Negative CY values 42 39 43 124 
Positive CY values 31 33 29 93 
CY between + and -1% 57 43 38 138 
CY less than < - 5% 0 1 1 2 
CY Value greater than >  5% 0 1 6 7 
Total CY outside + or - 5% 0 2 7 9 
Number of observations  73 73 73 219 
Notes: Monthly convenience yield values from January 2007 - October 2011.  The CY% 
is found in eq. (7.10).  
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Figure 7.2 EU CO2 Convenience Yields July 2008 - July 2014 
Notes: CY1% is the one month convenience yield, CY2% the two month, and CY3% the 
three month. 
 
 The convenience yield measures imply 1) that the market believed there was an 
adequate supply of permits to meet compliance requirements and 2) that policy 
uncertainty did not give rise to storage values in excess of the capital costs of holding 
inventory.   
 For the EU ETS, permit supply factors include issued permits, permits used in 
compliance, and created permits from international emission reduction credits.  The 
permit inventory was zero at the start of 2008 because that was the first year of permit 
0 €
5 €
10 €
15 €
20 €
25 €
30 €
35 €
-15.00%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
CY1% CY2% CY3% CO2 OTC Spot
Start of Phase 
III
Jan. 2013 
Start of Phase II 
Jan. 2008
 155 
 
availability.  From 2008 on, inventories grew steadily, reaching more than 2,100m 
permits by 2014 (EC 2014b).  In 2013, 1,895m permits were used in compliance.  This 
resulted in a stocks-to-use ratio of over 1.1 years.   
 EC reports suggest that increased inventory was created by two factors.  The first 
was that more permits were issued than used in compliance.   For example in the first 
year of Phase III (2013), 2,084m permits were issued and 1,896m used in compliance 
(EC 2014b).  Similarly in the last year of Phase II (2012), 2,229m permits were issued 
and 1,950m were used.  These years are representative of all years over 2008 – 2014.  As 
a result, the discrepancy between yearly issuance and compliance increased supply.     
 The second supply/inventory factor is that international emission reduction credits 
can be created by firms to act as an outside supply source.  The credits can be created in 
two forms in accordance with the EU ETS and Kyoto Protocol rules.  The first is certified 
emission reductions (CERs) arising from emission reduction projects in developing 
countries.  The second is as emission reduction units (ERUs) created from emission 
reduction projects in industrialized countries.  The CER’s and ERU’s create a source of 
permits and uncertainty that is independent of the issuing of CO2 permits.  Their supply 
flow can come on-line any time during a year and does not alter the previously defined 
number of regular CO2 permits to be issued. From 2008 - 2012, the market made use of 
these credits through creation of over 1,047m CERs and ERUs.  This represented 9.7% of 
all verified permits through 2012 and highlights the fact that both CERs and ERUs have 
been used to create a large number of permits.  Given the large number of CER and ERU 
projects, it is reasonable to expect their continued project use as an exogenous factor.  It 
follows that they would be expected to add to the permit supply as an independent source.  
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This secondary supply source could potentially serve to reduce market uncertainty.  For 
instance if CO2 permit prices rise sharply because of greater demand, new ERU and CER 
projects can be undertaken.  These additional ERU and CER credits could then be sold at 
the higher permit price levels which would result in an influx of new CO2 credits.  
Another relevant factor is that these credits can only add to the permit supply (i.e., under 
no rules can they decrease available permits).  This suggests that CER and ERU credits 
serve to potentially limit worries about low permit supply.  
 The broad policy and rules outlining CO2 permit issuance and compliance are 
known.  Phase III runs through 2020, and the recently passed extensions run until 2030.  
However, new rule changes are currently being discussed that may alter the level of 
permits issued.  These rules would still be based within the broad EU ETS framework, 
but the individual EU27 countries must agree to any rule changes.  One possibility to 
consider is that new rules that would drastically reduce permit supply may not have a 
high probability of approval.   
 With the EU ETS in place through 2030, I expect that more permits will be issued 
yearly (auctions and endowments) than will be used in compliance, as is currently the 
case.  This would further increase permit inventories.  If so, zero or near zero net storage 
benefits are appropriate.  It follows that CO2 futures may not incorporate unique storage 
benefit information because the values are approximately zero.    
Summary of Futures and Storage Benefits Values   
 Positive net storage values were found for the U.S. SO2 and EU ETS CO2 permit 
systems.  The SO2 results illustrated the presence of storage benefits in excess of capital 
costs.  Market conditions imply that this was caused by policy uncertainty which can be 
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linked to events that affected spot prices, futures prices, and storage values.  In contrast, 
the CO2 market was found to have storage benefits equal to the capital costs of holding 
permits.  In both markets, the relationship between spot, futures, and storage benefits 
illustrates that the presence of a futures market offers firms a means to form emission 
decisions and lock in compliance costs through time.    
7.5 Related SO2 and CO2 Futures Literature 
 The results provided in the previous section are now considered relative to 
existing literature on SO2 and CO2 futures.  To my knowledge, no literature exists on the 
SO2 market that shows empirical connections for futures use by regulated firms as a 
means to eliminate permit price uncertainty effects on production of the marketed good.  
Within the empirical studies surprisingly little is known regarding the pricing efficiency 
of the Sulfur Financial Instrument futures for SO2 permits in general.  There is a rich 
literature surrounding the empirical examination of CO2 futures pricing efficiency.   
  SO2 SFI futures literature 
 One of the few, if only, studies to specifically examine SFI permit futures markets 
was that of Boutaba (2009).  The study tests the relationship between nine December SFI 
future contracts (the December futures contracts for 2006 through 2014) against the 
Chicago Climate Futures Exchange (CCFE) over the counter (OTC) spot market.  The 
study used daily prices from December 10, 2004, through August 29, 2008.   Due to 
nonstationarity in the price series, Boutaba used an error correction model to test the long 
run relationship between the nine futures contracts and spot prices.  The findings for all 
nine of the December futures contracts reject the joint null hypothesis of efficiency; the 
tested restrictions are that the futures are 1) unbiased –zero intercept, 2) rational – futures 
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coefficient of 1, and 3) that the error correction term deviates from the long-term 
relationship of the spot and futures (Boutaba 2009, Table 5 pg. 8).  This approach is 
similar to that used by Carter and Mohapatra (2008) who examined the efficiency of lean 
hog futures.  Boutaba (2009, pg. 8) concludes that “these results strongly suggest that 
there are short-run deviations from the long-run efficiency conditions and therefore the 
existence of short-run inefficiency”.    
 In sum, the results here for the SFI futures suggest that futures served a valuable 
role in providing information from 2007 – 2011.  This research finds support for the idea 
that futures efficiently incorporate information contained in spot prices, adjusted for 
carrying costs, for SFI 1 – 5 month horizons from 2007 - 2011.  However, only the SFI1 
month horizon was rational.  It also finds, in a VAR setting using Granger causality, that 
nearby futures are the dominant source of price change information.   In comparison, the 
Boutaba (2009) study found that nine SFI December contracts for 2006 – 2014 were 
inefficient based on their cointegrating relationship with spot prices from December 2004 
– August 2008.  
 Three differences may explain the markedly different findings.  The first is that 
this research evaluated time horizons with a maximum length of 5 months.  Boutaba 
considered SFI contracts whose initial maturity was over two years.  Taken together, the 
two studies suggest that as the time horizon increases, futures performance deteriorates.  
The second difference is that my research covered 2007 – 2011 whereas Boutaba covered 
December 2004 – August 2008.  Therefore, the price series considered in the two studies 
covered different time ranges.  A possible consideration, as discussed in Chapter 3, is that 
the SFI futures volume was not sufficient to form an active futures market until 2007.  A 
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very thin market is commonly characterized by inefficiencies.  It would be interesting to 
reexamine the Boutaba study through 2011. 
 The third difference may arise from a potential drawback of the Boutaba study 
that may affect comparisons to this research.  While the error correction method is 
consistent with the related studies, its use in examining futures contracts that had not 
matured is slightly different.  The SFI contracts I tested were the December contracts for 
2006-2014.  The daily price series only span December 10, 2004, through August 29, 
2008.  By August 29, 2008, seven of the nine contracts tested had not matured (SFI 
December 2008 – 2014).  It follows that futures convergence to SO2 permits did not take 
place for these seven contracts.  If a contract has not matured, the long run temporal 
relationship between the spot and futures markets has not been fully identified.  Because 
error correction models specifically examine the lagged long run equilibrium between 
spot and futures as a test restriction, this data limitation could affect the results.  This, in 
turn, may restrict the testable contracts to those that have matured.  If only the results for 
matured contracts are considered, then the only two contract available for interpretation, 
the SFIZ 06 and SFIZ 07.    
  CO2 EUA Futures Literature 
 The empirical literature examining CO2 Phase I and Phase II spot market, futures 
market, and pricing factors is voluminous, covering many modeling techniques.  It 
includes Alberola and Chevallier (2009), Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze (2008), Bunn 
and Fezzi (2008), Christiansen et. al. (2005), Chevallier (2010), Frunza, Guegan, and 
Thiebaut (2010), Joyeux and Milunovich (2010), Kanen (2006), Nazifi (2010, 2013), 
Rickels, Görlich, and Oberst (2010), and Venmans (2012).  Overall, the findings suggest 
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that CO2 Phase I permit pricing was inefficient (Alberola, and Chevallier 2009, 
Chevallier, Ielpo, and Mercier 2009, Hintermann 2010).  The results also indicate that in 
March of 2006 when the first report of total emissions used in compliance was released, a 
large information gap existed which led to a structural break in the market (price fell 
dramatically at this time).  This led the unit permit price to go from over €25 to under €5 
within a year.  By the end of Phase I, permits were trading below €1 as the large supply 
expired worthless.  
 Phase I did establish many important market aspects and information useful for 
forming the market in Phase II.   The Phase I literature examined fundamental price 
drivers of marginal abatement costs and permit prices.  These studies found limited 
support for permit prices being related to expected abatement factors such as coal, natural 
gas, and weather (Alberola, Chevallier, and Chèze 2008, Bunn and Fezzi 2008, 
Hintermann 2010).  Studies also considered the stochastic behavior of permit prices and 
emissions during Phase I (Rickels, Duscha, Keller, and Peterson 2007, Chesney and 
Taschini 2012, Hintermann 2012).  Of these, Hintermann (2012) found that permit prices 
are largely explained without relying on abatement cost drivers.  His study concluded that 
firms were hedging against the possible noncompliance penalty.  It also determined that 
uncertainty about future emissions was itself a key price driver (Hintermann 2012).  This 
literature supports the notion that permit prices are uncertain.  What is required for 
futures to be able to mitigate risk is that they offer the best available information on later 
compliance costs.  If futures are efficient, futures provide a useful tool that firms can 
employ to eliminate permit price variability through hedging.  
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 CO2 Phase II futures pricing performance results are mixed and vary by years 
examined.  In the initial policy years (2008 and 2009) the mixed results slightly suggest 
market inefficiency.  Studies covering later policy years support the notion that the 
market has become relatively efficient (e.g., Daskalakis 2013).  This may reflect learning 
by doing, in that as firms become accustomed to compliance, their knowledge and 
understanding increase. 
 In comparison to the tests used in this dissertation, Granger causality between 
spot and futures has been examined by Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) for 2008 and by 
Chevallier (2010) for 2008 - 2009.  Their findings suggest that futures play an important 
role in permit trading and price discovery.  Chevallier tested the relationship between 
spot prices on Bluenext OTC and futures from the European Climate Exchange.  Her 
study used a vector error correction model to demonstrate the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship between spot and futures and that the lagged values of each respective 
market price explained the corresponding price movement.  Chevallier also tested for 
Granger causality using a VAR specification.  The results indicate that futures cause spot 
price movements but that spot prices do not cause futures price movements. The results 
in this dissertation indicated a simultaneous relationship between spot and futures which 
is supportive for futures as a source of price change information.  This dissertation and 
the studies of Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) and Chevallier (2010) using Granger 
causality all indicate that futures play an important role in the price discovery process. 
 A recent paper by Daskalakis (2013) using EUA futures examined futures pricing 
efficiency overs the years 2008 - 2011 (the paper represents the longest time span 
covered by Phase II at the time of this writing). He used three trading rules to determine 
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if technical analysis could be used to exploit the market; a finding of trading profits could 
be used to reject market efficiency.  The study concluded that futures were efficient from 
2010 onwards (i.e., no trading profits were found for 2010 and 2011 (Daskalakis 2013).  
A prior study by Montagnoli and de Vries (2010) used variance ratio tests of the 
BlueNext exchange to find that, after inefficiencies in Phase I and at the start of Phase II 
(2005 – 2008), permit price traits reflected those of an efficient market by the end of 
2009.    
 The permit spot and futures relationship via convenience yield measurements has 
been used to find that the Phase II market was efficient by 2012 as well (Trück, Hardle, 
and Weron 2014).  Their study covered the Phase II years from 2008 – 2012 (it is the 
most recent on convenience yields at the time of writing).  This study was the first to 
consider all of the Phase II policy years.  It used data from Point Carbon which reflects 
futures prices for the EUA and spot prices for European Energy Exchange.  For 
convenience yield measurements the study considered the difference between spot prices 
and single futures contract prices over the contract’s life (spot vs. EUA Dec 2010, spot 
vs. EUA Dec 2012, and spot vs. EUA Dec 2014).  They also tested the correlation 
between the spot and futures contracts.  The findings indicate that the correlation 
coefficients between spot prices and different futures prices were always above 0.95 and 
very close to 1 (Trück, Hardle, and Weron 2014).   
 Trück, Hardle, and Weron (2014) found that after a brief period of backwardation 
during 2008, the market moved into near zero or negative convenience yield values 
(contango) from 2009 onwards.  They also determined that as the futures contract 
maturity approached, storage benefits moved closer to zero.  Their study adjusted the risk 
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free rate based on the European Central Bank’s AAA government bonds.  By adjusting 
the risk free rate, their study differs from the past convenience yield work by Madaleno 
and Pinho (2011), Chang, Wang, Peng (2013), and Gorenflo (2013).  However, their 
results generally still match the prior studies.  The only difference in Trück, Hardle, and 
Weron 2014 compared to the others is that their convenience yield values are negative 
form 2009 onwards.  Trück, Hardle, and Weron (2014) note that this difference in results 
is probably caused by the constant risk free rate used in the prior studies being much 
higher than the rates from 2009 on (which were approximately 1%).   
  Currently there is a large body of diverse tests covering futures performance for 
the EU ETS.  The efficiency procedures used here add to the literature by extending the 
years examined and by taking a different vantage point.  By using set time horizons, the 
separate one through three month ahead decisions can be considered.  Using the theory of 
storage to construct an alternative forecast offers a direct way to measure specific sources 
of futures pricing information.  The results support futures prices as an information 
source to inform decision making over one to three month horizons.  Support was also 
provided for the role of nearby weekly futures in the price discovery process.  These 
findings are consistent with recent papers which find that the EUA futures are efficient. 
7.6  Summary  
 Futures prices in the U.S. SO2 and EU ETS CO2 permit systems were tested for 
evidence consistent with the presence of an ideal futures market.  Ideal futures prices are 
those that provide the best available information at a point in time on the market-wide 
incremental cost of controlling the pollutant at the contract maturity date.  First, the 
ability of futures prices to reflect changes in permit pricing information was examined.  
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Then the ability of futures prices to forecast later permit prices was tested.   Finally, the 
theory of storage was used to describe permit market and futures market conditions. 
Overall, the findings offer evidence consistent with an ideal futures market, given the 
information tested.   
 SFI futures were examined from 2007 through 2011.  They were shown to be the 
dominant source of price change information over the spot market for SO2 permits.  In 
forecasting permit prices, the SFI1 month futures were rational estimates which 
encompassed all the pricing information contained in an (alternative) benchmark forecast 
formed from spot prices adjusted for capital costs.  The SFI2 – 5 month futures were also 
found to encompass all the information in the alternative forecast.  By outperforming the 
alternative forecast, the SFI1 – 5 month futures satisfy a necessary condition for semi-
strong form efficiency.  However, futures accuracy deteriorates as the time horizon 
increases beyond one month.     
 The theory of storage described how the permit market placed excess storage 
benefits on permits through the spot and futures price relationship over the one to five 
month horizons.  It was suggested that the extreme amount of policy uncertainty present 
in the marketplace, which ultimately led to the end of SO2 regulations as created in the 
CAAA, was the cause of these storage conditions.  This policy uncertainty may also have 
been a factor leading to the deterioration of futures forecasting performance as the time 
horizon increased.  The tests used here indicate support consistent with an ideal futures 
market for SO2 permits.   
 The EUA futures were evaluated from 2008 – 2014.  The futures were shown to 
have a simultaneous information flow with the spot market.  Both of the EUA1 and 
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EUA2 month futures were found to be rational estimates of later permit prices and 
encompass the information contained in the alternative forecast.   However, the EUA3 
month futures were only shown to outperform the benchmark forecast.  Overall, support 
is shown for the idea that EUA1-3 month futures provide valuable information on the 
later market-wide incremental costs of controlling CO2.  The conditions found through 
the theory of storage implied that the market had an ample supply of permits and little 
policy uncertainty existed.   
 These tests were used as a framework to describe market conditions and test for 
the presence of an ideal futures market, which is a maintained assumption of the expected 
utility model.  While informative for this focus, the results only indicate consistency – a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition -- with an ideal futures market.  As discussed at 
the outset, pricing performance should be based on use of the best available information.  
Several alternative information tests exist which can provide further insight into the 
question of whether an ideal futures market exists.  For instance, arbitrage conditions 
could be examined, trading rules tested, or several alternative permit forecasts created in 
addition to the benchmark used which relies strictly on the theory of storage (e.g., 
forecasts generated from an econometric model of permit spot prices; a time series model 
of past permit prices; expert opinion forecasts; etc.). Therefore, these results can be 
viewed as providing insight into specific areas related to this determination.  They are not 
definitive conclusions.   
 To summarize, the SFI futures and EUA futures results resemble the pricing 
performance of other storable commodity markets (e.g. Fama and French 1987, Garcia 
and Leuthold 2004, Tomek 1997).  For example, Fama and French (1987) found that 
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oats, soybeans, and soymeal futures had good predictive performance in estimating later 
spot prices and followed the theory of storage in forming prices. In the cases of SFI and 
EUA futures, outperforming the alternative forecasts, being rational estimates in the very 
near term, and reflecting new pricing information all suggest that futures prices are 
consistent with what would be expected of an ideal futures market.  This implies the SFI1 
– 5 month and EUA1 – 3 month futures can be looked to for the best information on the 
market-wide incremental costs of pollutant control at a point in time.  The use of futures 
prices when making emission decisions can eliminate the negative effects of permit price 
risk.  In turn this implies firms can use SO2 and CO2 futures to minimize permit policy 
compliance costs and improve resource allocation.  The next chapter summarizes the 
discussion and results considered in this dissertation. 
 167 
 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESERCH 
 This dissertation has studied the ability of futures markets in permits to enhance 
permit systems performance in the presence of permit price uncertainty.  Because 
policymakers must select regulatory action without complete cost information, 
understanding how different dimensions of uncertainty may affect policy performance is 
an important research topic.   
 It was first shown how permit price uncertainty can be described in an expected 
utility framework.  The setting considered a firm that produces both a marketable good 
(e.g., electricity) and the associated emissions that are regulated through the use of 
permits.  At the time of the production decision, uncertainty was assumed regarding both 
the marketable good’s final price and the permit price.  In the absence of a futures 
market, permit price uncertainty would imply that risk averse firms make output 
adjustments as part of their response to this uncertainty.  In this setting, a firm’s policy 
compliance costs would then reflect both the permit price and the effects of risk aversion. 
For a set permit quantity, this suggests that firm policy costs are higher than under 
conditions of certainty. 
 Futures markets were then introduced as an alternative permit pricing mechanism.  
The results demonstrated that the futures price reflects the marginal cost of compliance 
from using permits to meet regulatory emissions standards.  If there is no uncertainty 
about the futures price, production is not affected by a firm’s risk aversion or changes in 
expectations regarding the unknown later period permit price.  By hedging with futures, 
firms can eliminate the price uncertainty associated with later permit purchases.  
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Furthermore, under the assumption that all firms optimally hedge, the theoretical model 
showed that futures’ hedging allows firms to maintain supply of the marketed good at the 
cost minimizing level, thereby separating the output production decision from the 
emissions compliance decision.  
 The theoretical results assume that futures prices provide firms the best available 
information on the market-wide incremental costs of permit compliance.  To understand 
if real-world futures prices contain aspects of the information necessary for the 
theoretical results to hold, the Sulfur Financial Instrument (SFI) futures market for SO2 
permits and European Union Allowance (EUA) futures market for CO2 permits were 
empirically evaluated.  Consistent with an ideal futures market, it was shown that futures 
in both markets reflect changes in permit pricing information.  Evidence from both 
markets supports the assumption that futures encompass the predictive information 
contained in spot prices adjusted for carrying costs.  Then, the theory of storage was used 
to characterize how futures were able to convey this information within very different 
policy markets. Overall these information tests suggest that futures prices offer a window 
into the marginal cost of compliance associated with using permits.   
 Future research needs to consider the connection between futures markets and 
abatement activities.   This topic needs to be explored because reducing emission levels is 
a core policy goal.  The theoretical model used here assumes a one-to-one linkage 
between output and emissions.  Abatement activity can change this relationship.  For 
example, abatement activities could involve new production technologies for the 
marketed good, building new plants, or retrofitting existing plants with better emission 
control technologies.  An implication of these results is that the futures price could serve 
 169 
 
as the price signal to harmonize abatement activities among firms.  A second 
consideration is that certain abatement activities can involve a long time horizon, such as 
investing in research and development of new technologies.  If futures contracts with 
distant maturity horizons became available, long-term abatement pricing information and 
hedging of risk may become possible.     
 A second topic for future research would be examining the impact of certain 
events or possible structural change to determine if futures performance was consistent 
through time and across a futures contract series.  While the empirical results in this 
paper suggest that the futures performed reasonably well for both markets over the same 
period, it may be the case that the futures perform differently over certain periods 
surrounding policy changes.  Considering that proposed rule changes, new laws, and 
court rulings likely contribute to price volatility, this topic should be examined further.  
Specifically a futures contract series offers the opportunity to evaluate whether different 
risk premiums exist.  If different risk premiums exist, they may be used to understand 
events, anticipated rule changes, and structural changes in permit markets.   
 This dissertation provides a framework for understanding the role of futures 
markets in permit systems.  By offering a competitive market with a constellation of 
prices through time, futures can facilitate price discovery, hedge compliance risk, smooth 
inventory allocation, and reflect the market-wide incremental costs of permit compliance.  
Policymakers, environmental advocates, and industry groups should be aware of futures 
contracts and consider how the rules governing permit structure, exchange and banking 
affect the ability to sustain markets in futures contracts as well as the likely performance 
of the markets in permits. 
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The appendix is numbered such that a section or equation corresponds to the text 
reference (A.#).  Any equation written as (#) corresponds to its place in the main body of 
text.  In the appendix, derivations (letters) are used to denote equations used in solving 
for the appendix value. 
 (A.1) The firm’s maximization expressed in terms of y in (2.4). 
)}(:)}(:'{))()(({,, ygzxfyxvMinHFzqpywEUMax xzyH    
)}(:),'()()(({,, ygzyvCHFzqpywEUMax zyH    
)}}(:{),'()(({, ygzqzMaxyvCHFqpywEUMax zyH    
(A.2) Forming equation (2.6) based on expectations of p and q for rewriting (2.6), output 
prices are 
 
]'[),'(]'[
][]'[),'(]'[
UEpUCovpUE
pEUEpUCovpUE


 
 ]'[),'(
][]'[)]('[
][]'[]'[),'(
eUEpUCov
eEUEeUE
pEUEpUEpUCov





 
and permit prices are  
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(2.4) then can be stated as 
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(A.3) Forming the risk premium of (2.8) 
The firm’s risk premium is found by combining two Taylor series expansions.  A second 
order Taylor series expansion of )),'())((( yvCygqpywU   in the neighborhood 
of ))],'())((([ yvCygqpyEw   can be expressed as 
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where wUU  /' is the first derivative of the utility function, and 22 /'' wUU   is the 
second derivative, each evaluated at ))(( Ew .  After taking the expectation, separated 
into parts, the middle term is 
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The last term is 
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Combining the terms gives 
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 Next, take a first order Taylor series expansion of 
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and from the definition of the risk premium R at ]),'())((([ RyvCygqpyEw   , 
R=0 and simplifying gives 
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By substituting the results from equations (b) and (d) into the definition of the risk 
premium, equation (2.8), I obtain 
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Given U’>0, equation (e) simplifies to 
 (f) )][var()'/''(5.0  UUR  
The result shows that in the neighborhood of the riskless case, the risk premium R is 
proportional to the variance of profit, )var(  (Chavas 2004).  The coefficient of 
proportionality is )]
'
''
(5.0[
U
U
  thereby equation (f) is a local measure of the risk premium 
R.  It follows that the risk premium R can be approximated in the “in the small” (Chavas 
2004).  Now following Chavas (2004), the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion is defined as )
'
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(
U
U
r  .  This allows the risk premium to be approximated as 
)var()2/(  rR .  Since 0)var(  for all nondegenerate random variables, it can be 
stated that the sign of the risk premium R is always the same sign as r (Chavas 2004).  
Further, from Jensen’s inequality, given U’>0, and the definition of the risk premium, the 
result holds globally (Chavas 2004).  Equation (f) then simplifies to 
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CHAPTER THREE SO2 SULFUR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT (SFI) FUTURES 
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SFI 2010 futures contract specification sheet (ICE 2014). 
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Table B.1 ICE's SFI futures contracts listed (2004 - 2012) 
Futures Month Year   Futures Month Year   Futures Month Year 
SFI March 2005  SFI March 2006  SFI January 2007 
SFI June 2005  SFI April 2006  SFI February 2007 
SFI September 2005  SFI May 2006  SFI March 2007 
SFI December 2005  SFI June 2006  SFI April 2007 
    SFI July 2006  SFI May 2007 
    SFI August 2006  SFI June 2007 
    SFI September 2006  SFI July 2007 
    SFI October 2006  SFI August 2007 
    SFI November 2006  SFI September 2007 
    SFI December 2006  SFI October 2007 
        SFI November 2007 
        SFI December 2007 
SFI January 2008  SFI January 2009  SFI January 2010 
SFI February 2008  SFI February 2009  SFI February 2010 
SFI March 2008  SFI March 2009  SFI March 2010 
SFI April 2008  SFI April 2009  SFI April 2010 
SFI May 2008  SFI May 2009  SFI May 2010 
SFI June 2008  SFI June 2009  SFI June 2010 
SFI July 2008  SFI July 2009  SFI July 2010 
SFI August 2008  SFI August 2009  SFI August 2010 
SFI September 2008  SFI September 2009  SFI September 2010 
SFI October 2008  SFI October 2009  SFI October 2010 
SFI November 2008  SFI November 2009  SFI November 2010 
SFI December 2008  SFI December 2009  SFI December 2010 
SFI January 2011  SFI January 2012     
SFI February 2011  SFI February 2012     
SFI March 2011  SFI March 2012     
SFI April 2011         
SFI May 2011         
SFI June 2011         
SFI July 2011         
SFI August 2011         
SFI September 2011         
SFI October 2011         
SFI November 2011         
SFI December 2011                 
Source: compilation from Bloomberg (2014). 
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Table C.1 Phase II and III EUA Futures Contracts Listed   
EUA Futures Phase II and III (1-3 months) EUA Jan 2013 
EUA Dec 2008  EUA Feb 2013 
EUA Mar 2009  EUA Mar 2013 
EUA June 2009  EUA April 2013 
EUA Sept 2009  EUA May 2013 
EUA Dec 2009  EUA June 2013 
EUA Mar 2010  EUA Jul 2013 
EUA June 2010  EUA Aug 2013 
EUA Sept 2010  EUA Sep 2013 
EUA Dec 2010  EUA Oct 2013 
EUA Mar 2011  EUA Nov 2013 
EUA May 2011  EUA Dec 2013 
EUA June 2011     
EUA Jul 2011  EUA Futures Phase II and III (1-12 months) 
EUA Aug 2011  EUA Dec 2008 
EUA Sep 2011  EUA Mar 2009 
EUA Oct 2011  EUA June 2009 
EUA Nov 2011  EUA Sep 2009 
EUA Dec 2011  EUA Dec 2009 
EUA Jan 2012  EUA Mar 2010 
EUA Feb 2012  EUA June 2010 
EUA Mar 2012  EUA Sep 2010 
EUA April 2012  EUA Dec 2010 
EUA May 2012  EUA Mar 2011 
EUA June 2012  EUA June 2011 
EUA Jul 2012  EUA Sep 2011 
EUA Aug 2012  EUA Dec 2011 
EUA Sep 2012  EUA Mar 2012 
EUA Oct 2012  EUA June 2012 
EUA Nov 2012  EUA Sep 2012 
EUA Dec 2012  EUA Dec 2012 
    EUA Mar 2013 
    EUA June 2013 
    EUA Sep 2013 
        EUA Dec 2013 
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 The appendix is numbered such that a section or equation corresponds to the text 
reference (D.#).  Any equation written as (#) corresponds to its place in the main body of 
text.  In the appendix, derivations (letters) are used to denote equations used in solving 
for the appendix value. 
(D.1) The firm’s maximization problem is expressed in terms of H and y in (6.3). 
)}(:)}(:'{))()(({,, ygzxfyxvMinHFzqpywEUMax xzyH    
)}(:),'()()(({,, ygzyvCHFzqpywEUMax zyH    
)}}(:{),'()(({, ygzqzMaxyvCHFqpywEUMax zyH    
(6.4) ))},'()())((({, yvCHFygqpywEUMax yH    
(D.2) Derivation of (6.7).  Using Feder 1977, Lemma 4.  For any xi, xj such that 
0,0,0,0  jiji  it holds that jjií AA  //  and jji AA  //  .   
 By setting )''( CqgpAi   and )( FAj   , and because once g’ is given it 
can be treated as a constant, we set i = -g’ and 1j .  Now by applying Feder Lemma 
4, jjií AA  //  such that 1/'/ jí AgA   yields 
(6.7) )(' jí AgA   
(D.3) The Hessian, denoted as 2 , from (6.5) and (6.6) using (6.7) is 
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and by simplification and the chain rule 
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(D.4) The second order condition for (6.8) using the Hessian is 
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(D.5) solving for emissions production in (6.9).  First from Feder Lemma 4, used in eq. 
(6.7), eq. (6.6) becomes (6.b), 0)]''('[  gFgUE .  Next set (6.6b) equal to (6.5) 
 0)]''('[)]''('[  qgFgUECqgpUE  
(a) ']'[']'[']'[']'[]'[ gUEFgUECUEgqUEpUE   
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Then by using expectations of p, q, and ψ, output prices are  
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]][]'[][]'[),'(]'[
][]'[),'(]'[
UEpUCovpUE
eEUEEUEpUCovpUE
pEUEpUCovpUE



 
(c) 


]'[),'(]'[
][]'[][]'[),'(]'[
][]'[),'(]'[
UEqUCovqUE
EUEEUEqUCovqUE
qEUEqUCovqUE



 
(d) 



]'[),'(]'[
][]'[][]'[][]'[),'(]'[
][]'[),'(]'[
UEUCovUE
EUEEUEEUEUCovUE
EUEUCovUE



, 
respectively, where the permit spot and futures covariance terms can be expressed as 
(e) 
]'[),'(
][]'[)]('[
][]'[]'[),'(


UEqUCov
EUEUE
qEUEqUEqUCov



 
(f) 
][]'[)]('[
][]'[]'[),'(




EUEUE
EUEUEUCov
 
Here, based on the spot and futures traits in exchange leading to a zero basis,  becomes 
zero; this is a rational assumption. If it did not hold, the firm could find profitable 
arbitrage trades. Part (f) then simplifies to    
]'[),'(  UEUCov   
Now by replacing the terms in (a) with (b)-(f), (4) can be stated as 
]]'['']'[']'[]'[]'['']'[]'[),'(  UEggUEFgUECUEUEggUEUEpUCov  , 
which simplifies to 
(6.9) 
]'[
),'(
'':
UE
pUCov
CFg
y
EU



  
(D.6)  Forming the profit variance of (6.10) and risk premium of (6.11) 
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The firm’s risk premium is found by combining two Taylor series expansions.  A second 
order Taylor series expansion of )),()())((( yvCHFygqpywU   in the 
neighborhood of ))],()())((([ yvCHFygqpyEw   can be expressed as 
(a)
2))],()())(((()),()())(([(
2
''
))],()())(((()),()())(([('
)),()())((([()(
yvCHFygqpyEwyvCHFygqpywE
U
yvCHFygqpyEwyvCHFygqpywEU
yvCHFygqpyEwEUwU






 
where wUU  /' is the first derivative of the utility function, and 22 /'' wUU   is the 
second derivative, each evaluated at ))(( Ew .  After taking the expectation   
]))()())(()()(([
2
''
))],(()()()())((
)()),(()()()())(()(['
))],()())((([(
2HEqEyqgEpyEHqyqgpy
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pyEyvCEFHEhEqEyqgEpyEU
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
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


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where the variance of profits is 
 202 
 
(6.10)
),cov(2),cov()(2)var()(2
),cov(2),cov(2),cov()(2
)var()var()var()()var()var( 2222



qHqHygqyg
pyHqpyqpyyg
Hqqygpy



 
(b) )][var(
2
''
)]([()(  
U
EwEUwU  
 Next, take a first order Taylor series expansion of 
)),'()())(((
_
RyvCHFzygqpywU    with respect to R in the neighborhood 
of ])),'()())((([
_
RyvCHFzygqpyEw   .   The expression is  
(c) )])(()[('))(()( REwRwUREwURwU    
and from the definition of the risk premium R at ])([ REw   , R=0. Simplifying gives 
 (d) RUEwUREwU  '))(())((    
By substituting the results from equations (c) and (d) into the definition of the risk 
premium, equation (11), we obtain 
 (e) RUEwU
U
EwU '))(()][var(
2
''
))((    
Given U’>0, equation (e) simplifies to 
 (f) )][var()'/''(5.0  UUR  
The result shows that in the neighborhood of the riskless case, the risk premium R is 
proportional to the variance of profit, )var(  (Chavas 2004).  The coefficient of 
proportionality is )]
'
''
(5.0[
U
U
  thereby equation (f) is a local measure of the risk premium 
R.  It follows that the risk premium R can be approximated in the “in the small” (Chavas 
2004).  Now following Chavas (2004), the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
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aversion is defined as )
'
''
(
U
U
r  .  This allows the risk premium to be approximated as 
)var()2/(  rR .  Since 0)var(  for all nondegenerate random variables, it can be 
stated that the sign of the risk premium R is always the same sign as r (Chavas 2004).  
Further, from Jensen’s inequality, given U’>0, and the definition of the risk premium, the 
result holds globally (Chavas 2004).  Equation (f) then simplifies to 
(e) )][var(
2

r
R  
 which is the risk premium used in eq. (6.11) 
(D.7) Expressing the hedge ratio correlation coefficient of permit futures and electricity 
prices as expectations in equation (6.15).  The ),cov( p is 
)(
)()()(
)()()])([(
)()()(),cov(
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The variance of electricity price, epE  )(  , is ])[()var(
2eEp  ; and the variance 
of permit futures price is ])[()var(
2 E .  After substitution and solving for ρ we 
have  
(6.15) 
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(E.1) Proof of β2=β3 being a necessary condition for semi-strong form futures 
market efficiency. 
 The null hypothesis β2=β3, is that the weight (β2 − β3) on spot prices and 
opportunity costs 
tt qr )1(2   is zero in an implied composite forecast with futures.  It is 
shown below that the null hypothesis β2=β3 is also a test that the futures encompass all 
useful pricing information contained within the spot price and opportunity costs, 
tt qr )1(2   which is a necessary condition for semi-strong form futures efficiency.  To 
establish this necessary condition within equation (7.6), a proof of the parallels between 
the null hypothesis  β2=β3 and the encompassing principle null hypothesis of 1 = 0, is 
shown. 
 The forecast encompassing principle was developed by Harvey, Leybourne and 
Newbold (1997, 1998) and Harvey and Newbold (2000) to test if one forecast contains 
more or less information relative to another.  Sanders and Manfredo (2005) extended the 
encompassing principle to futures market evaluation and provided a proof that it can be 
used as a necessary condition for semi-strong form efficiency81.   
 In construction for use in eq. (7.6), I use eq. (7.3) and (7.5) as two competing 
permit price forecasts.  For this description consider the error term notation as applying 
only to this appendix; this is for consistency in exposition with that of Harvey, 
Leybourne, and Newbold (1997, 1998).  Also the time subscript for different monthly 
horizons (i) is dropped.  The futures forecast is  
                                                 
81 See Sanders and Manfredo (2005 pg. 2-3) for the detailed example and discussion of the MSE vs. the 
encompassing principle. 
 206 
 
(a) t
T
tT eFA 121   , 
and the benchmark forecast is 
(b) ttTtT esrA 2,43 )1(   , 
where model (a) represents futures ability to accurately predict later prices with an error 
of te1 and model (b) represents the benchmark forecast’s ability to accurately predict later 
prices with an error of te2 .   
 Forecast encompassing can be tested with the following regression-based model: 
(c) t.2t1t11t  + )e - e (  e      
where, e1t is the forecast error series of the preferred forecast (futures), and e2t is the 
forecast error series of the benchmark forecast.  The null hypothesis is,  1 = 0, which is a 
test that the covariance between e1t and (e1t - e2t) is zero
82.  A failure to reject the null 
hypothesis implies a composite forecast cannot be constructed from the two series that 
would result in a smaller expected squared error than using the preferred forecast by 
itself.  That is, the preferred forecast “encompasses” the competing forecast’s predictive 
information (Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold 1998, Sanders and Manfredo 2005).  If 
the futures encompass the alternative forecast’s information, it is conditionally efficient 
with respect to the two forecasts - a necessary condition for semi strong form market 
efficiency (Sanders and Manfredo 2005).   
 By returning to our test equation  
(7.6) 
ttt
T
tttT eqrFqrA 3321 ])1([)1(    
                                                 
82 For an additional proof see Granger and Newbold (1986 pg. 267) who establish the encompassing 
principle in the context of the correlation between forecasts.   
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it will be shown that β2=β3 is parallel to testing the null  1 = 0 in equation (c).  First by 
multiplying through 3  and moving the futures price to the left hand side (7.6) becomes 
(d) 
ttttt
T
tT eqrqrFA 33213 )1()1()(   . 
Next by adding and subtracting 
TA  to the right-hand-side and rearranging yields  
(e) 
tttTtT
T
tT eqrArAFA 32313 ])1([)]1([)(    
From (e) the preferred forecast properties can be tested by   
(g)   tttTtTTtT eqrArAFA 323213 ])1([)]1([)(    
which allows for testing the null hypothesis, 2 = 0 whose properties also reflect the null 
hypothesis β2=β3.  A failure to reject the null hypothesis 2 = 0 implies a composite 
forecast cannot be constructed from the two series that would result in a smaller expected 
squared error than using the preferred (futures) forecast by itself.   In eq. (e) the null 
hypothesis, 2 = 0  matches that of the encompassing principle,  1 =0 described in eq. 
(c).  Thus, within our test equation (7.6) a failure to reject the null hypothesis β2=β3 
suggests the futures forecast “encompasses” or is “conditionally efficient” with respect to 
the benchmark forecast (Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold, 1998).   
 There is an important difference between Harvey Leybourne, and Newbold’s 
encompassing test in (c) and that implied by eq. (7.6) used here.  Namely, Harvey, 
Leybourne, and Newbold’s encompassing method imposes a unitary weight on the 
preferred forecast, 3=1 in (c).  They assume that the preferred forecast is rational and 
receives a weight (scaling) of 1 under the null hypothesis.  In applications, this may or 
may not be the case.  Here eq. (7.6) only requires that the coefficient of the preferred 
forecast equal that of the competing forecast β2=β3 a more flexible form of evaluation.  If 
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the restriction of unity is binding, it may lead to a more frequent rejection of the null 
hypothesis using the encompassing test than when using the procedure developed here 
(emphasizing the procedure used here is based on the forecasting test of Vuchelen and 
Gutierrez). 
(E.2) Missing observations in futures price series 
Missing observations were filled in by creating an implied value based on the other 
futures prices available at the point in time of the missing observation.  The procedure 
followed is described below.  For exposition it considers that a two month out futures 
contract price 
2t
tF is missing.   To create an implied value the one month out futures 
1t
tF
and three month out futures 
3t
tF are used.  First values for x and y are found as 
(a) )1/()(
1 ttsFx t
t
t   
and 
(b) )13/()(
13 ttFFy tt
t
t   
where st is the spot price and t# represents the days from t until the respective futures 
contract matures.  For example t3 would be the number of days from t until the three 
month out futures matured.  Because of various month lengthens, holidays, and the 
exchange trading dates - actual days for each point in time were calculated.   The values 
of x and y were then used to solve 
(c) )]12(*)]
)13(
)23(
1*()
)13(
)12(
1*[(12 tt
tt
tt
y
tt
tt
xFF tt
t
t 


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



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
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



 , 
creating an implied value for the missing observation.   
 
